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INTRODUCTION TO NEW MEDIA AND OLD METAPHORS 
2015 NOVA LAW REVIEW SYMPOSIUM 
JON M. GARON* 
 
The medium, or process, of our time—electric technology is 
reshaping and restructuring patterns of social interdependence and every 
aspect of our personal life. 
It is forcing us to reconsider and re-evaluate practically every 
thought, every action, and every institution formerly taken for granted. 
Everything is changing:  you, your family, your education, your 
neighborhood, your job, your government, your relation to the others. And 
they’re changing dramatically.1 
On February 12 and 13 of 2015, Nova Southeastern University 
Shepard Broad Law Center, in conjunction with the Nova Law Review and 
NSU Sports and Entertainment Law Society (SELS) presented the 2015 
annual Nova Law Symposium.  The program brought together seventeen 
voices in media and entertainment to provide an interdisciplinary review of 
issues involving business and industry responses to the transformative impact 
of new media on traditional entertainment and media, including journalism, 
sports, film, broadcast, gaming, music, and similar areas. 
In 1967, Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore published a cultural 
wake-up call regarding the intersection of media and culture.2  They 
discussed the influence of modern media on the restructuring of society.3  As 
they noted, “[t]oday’s child is growing up absurd, because he lives in two 
worlds, and neither of them inclines to grow up. . . . Mere instruction will not 
suffice.”4 
The book noted the cultural as well as economic shifts underway by 
the rise of media as the organizing principle for society.  In doing so, 
McLuhan and Fiore also noted common practice that defines legal 
jurisprudence, the tendency to use precedent and past as the framing 
principle for understanding new phenomenon.  “When faced with a totally 
                                                            
* Dean and Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard 
Broad Law Center. 
1. MARSHALL MCLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE:  
AN INVENTORY OF EFFECTS 8 (1967). 
2. See id. 
3. See id. at 18. 
4. Id. 
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new situation, we tend always to attach ourselves to the objects, to the flavor 
of the most recent past.”5 
The tendency to look back was aptly captured by noted scholar 
Arthur Miller.  In 1993, Miller used the parable of “old wine in new bottles” 
to frame what has become the central intellectual property debate of the past 
twenty years, namely the question whether the existing legal framework can 
adequately adjust to the information age.6 
Rarely, however, does media define law.  Instead “metaphors 
express analogies.”7  Metaphors to help us shape our understanding and 
relate abstract structures to our own, shared experiences. 
The Nova Law Review symposium and the articles captured in this 
edition address these changes.  The speakers and authors have gamely 
endeavored to look forward, peering back to the minimum extent necessary 
to identify the trajectory of their paths. 
The articles enable scholars to address the technological changes 
required of artists, industry, courts, and legislatures.  Nonetheless, the 
historical perspective remains essential to update the law itself.  The articles 
address how laws once designed for daily print newspapers and burlesque 
houses apply in the modern age.  Under pre-Internet laws, for example, a 
republisher of a libel was as liable for the statement as the original 
publisher.8  Special laws were enacted to immunize Internet Service 
Providers and others from responsibility for republishing such content.  That 
leads to questions beyond libel such as revenge porn,9 social media 
                                                            
5. Id. at 73–74. (“We look at the present through a rear-view mirror. We 
march backwards into the future.”). 
6. “To some, these issues were nothing more than the same old wine, and 
they fit nicely into the old doctrinal bottles. Others, although regarding computer technologies 
as a new wine, nonetheless found satisfactory answers in the old bottles. The controversy . . . 
was generated by those who believe that we really are dealing with a sufficiently new wine 
that it requires new conceptual bottles.” Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer 
Programs, Databases, and Computer Generated Works:  Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 979 (1993). 
The reference is to Matthew 9:17, “Neither do men put new wine into old bottles:  
else the bottles break, and the wine runneth out, and the bottles perish:  but they put new wine 
into new bottles, and both are preserved.” King James Ed. 
7. Brian L. Frye, Copyright as Charity, [reference in journal] citing Dedre 
Gentner et. al, METAPHOR IS LIKE ANALOGY, IN THE ANALOGICAL MIND:  PERSPECTIVES FROM 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE, at 199 (2001), available at http://groups.psych.northwestern.edu/
gentner/papers/GentnerA2K01.pdf. 
8. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578 (1977) (“Except as to those who 
only deliver or transmit defamation published by a third person, one who repeats or otherwise 
republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it.”). 
9. See GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 753 (Tex. App. 
2014), review denied (Nov. 21, 2014) (“[P]laintiffs allege[d] that these revenge [porn] 
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harassment,10 and other new issues in communications for which neither the 
common law rules of the republisher nor the blanket immunity serve well.  
The old bottles break when filled with these new issues, just as MeLuhan 
anticipated they would. 
New examples abound.  The FCC has introduced efforts to regulate 
the Internet under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 as a “common 
carrier,”11 an ancient common law concept once used to assure equitable 
prices from the rail and shipping industries.12  Common carrier laws were 
incorporated into telecommunications to manage broadcast and telephony.  
Now we must consider whether the regulation of data packets can be done in 
the same manner we once regulated crates and goods. 
In copyright and patent, even the concept of property has come 
under attack in academic and in Congress.13  The conversations held during 
the symposium and the papers that follow, however, focus on the creation 
and dissemination of new inventions and creative works.  These articles 
provide an effective path toward the future. 
In Professor Michael Epstein’s article, Reclaiming the Promise of 
Free Local Broadcasting:  Spectrum Reallocation and Public Interest in the 
Post-Aereo Age, Professor Epstein highlights the Twenty-First century trend 
away from over-the-air broadcast to Multi-channel Video Programming 
Distributors (MVPDs) such as cable or internet service providers.  Even 
cable and satellite are at risk of disintermediation from mobile and wireless 
devices.  Professor Epstein identifies the societal consequence of these shifts 
as a diminution on the “free, over-the-air model of broadcast distribution 
enshrined in the Communications Act of 1934 and enforced by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) through regulation.” 
The work highlights that this debate is far more than a discussion of 
which conglomerate should control the profits derived from content 
distribution, but rather the policy decision affects which content is created 
                                                                                                                                            
websites “engage[d] in the publication of obscenity and child pornography” in violation of 
Texas Penal Code.”). 
10. See Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation As Profit Center:  The Monetization 
of Online Harassment, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 383 (2009). 
11. In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket 
No. 14-28, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order Adopted:  Feb. 26, 
2015, available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0312/FCC-
15-24A1.pdf. 
12. See Phil Nichols, Redefining “Common Carrier”:  The FCC’s Attempt at 
Deregulation by Redefinition, 1987 DUKE L.J. 501 (1987). 
13. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject 
Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439 (2003); Daryl Lim, Copyright Under Siege:  An Economic 
Analysis of the Essential Facilities Doctrine and the Compulsory Licensing of Copyrighted 
Works, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 481, 481 (2007); Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on 
Information Propertization and Its Legal Milieu, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23 (2006). 
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and how the public is served with free and openly accessible content.  The 
benefit to the public is discussed through the consequence of broadcast 
spectrum allocation.  “If the right balance is struck, broadcasters, pay 
television MVPDs, broadband companies, phone carriers and the 
government could all benefit from a Spectrum Reduction Plan.” 
The importance, however, remains for the broader public.  “[M]ost 
importantly, the public would also benefit, since spectrum reduction to 
broadcasters means more spectrum is available for the public benefit 
elsewhere, and broadcasters would still need to operate in the “public 
interest, convenience and necessity.”“ 
Professor Jason Zenor focused on a different aspect of media 
regulation—that of journalist shield laws.  In his article, Shielding Acts of 
Journalism:  Open Leaks Sites, National Security, and the Free Flow of 
Information, Professor Zenor proposes “a model shield law that protects the 
publishing of national security information which serves the public interest 
and does not create an immediate, irreparable harm.”  Professor Zenor 
explains the modern challenge posed by WikiLeaks, bloggers, and the 
blurring of professional and non-professional journalists.  Unlike bloggers 
and non-traditional media websites, “the traditional media are exempt from 
prosecution under the Espionage Act and cannot be punished for publishing 
truthful information that is legally obtained.” 
Professor Zenor sets his debate for effective journalistic shield laws 
against the backdrop of websites and organizations dedicated to public 
dissemination of any and all leaked information.  These sites bear both 
similarities and differences to traditional media and the old laws simply 
cannot operate to make nuanced distinctions between those sites essential to 
a free press and those harmful of a civil society.  Professor Zenor provides a 
new model to rationalize these competing demands and provide a new set of 
metaphors to frame the next iteration of the Fourth Estate. 
In Christina Scelsi’s article, Care and Feeding of Privacy Policies 
and Keeping the Big Data Monster At Bay:  Legal Concerns in the Age of 
the Internet of Things, attorney Scelsi introduced the Internet of Things to 
the fields of entertainment and media privacy, noting that the Internet of 
Things “will affect nearly every industry, whether in terms of better planning 
as a result of the analysis of data collected by smart devices, or in the 
increased efficiencies created by the ability for people to use devices to 
communicate data to people located remotely.” 
Attorney Scelsi moves her analysis to the health law sector where the 
implications of data security are perhaps the most profound for most 
individuals.  In doing so, she illustrates the porous nature of the distinctions 
between media communications and the communications integral to personal 
autonomy as well as those of business and industry.  As the metaphors shift 
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and the analogies expand, the entire world becomes the stage upon which the 
new media takes shape. 
Professor Brian Frye utilizes metaphor directly.  In his article, 
Copyright as Charity, Professor Frye uses the lessons of copyright and the 
lessons of the nonprofit sector to suggest regulatory approaches to update 
copyright law itself. As he explains, “[c]opyright and charity law 
complement each other by solving market and government failures in works 
of authorship in different ways.” 
He points out that “new technologies like crowdfunding and the 
open-source movement enable authors and donors to solve certain market 
and government failures previously addressed by copyright and charity law, 
without the need for the indirect subsidies that copyright and charity law use 
to provide incentive to marginal authors and donors.”  Reflecting on 
Professor Frye’s article, it seems logical to extrapolate that when the market 
failure is solved through new technology and more efficient communications 
strategies, the market no longer fails and the subsidy may no longer be 
needed.  Lessons from copyright law policy and social welfare policy help 
illustrate their strengths and weaknesses to highlight policy suggestions. 
This issue also features a student comment by Dylan Fulop, titled 
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer:  A ‘Stairway’ to Countless Copyright 
Claims.  Mr. Fulop discusses the role that latches has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.14 In this interesting 
copyright dispute, the Court emphasized the statutory authority of Congress 
over the common law traditions of copyright, while retaining the equitable 
nature of the latches doctrine. 
Laches, we hold, cannot be invoked to preclude adjudication of a 
claim for damages brought within the three-year window.  As to equitable 
relief, in extraordinary circumstances, laches may bar at the very threshold 
the particular relief requested by the plaintiff.  And a plaintiff’s delay can 
always be brought to bear at the remedial stage, in determining appropriate 
injunctive relief, and in assessing the “profits of the infringer . . . attributable 
to the infringement.”15 
Mr. Fulop builds on the Petrella analysis involving the motion 
picture, Raging Bull, to address the potential claims in music litigation, 
specifically the Led Zeppelin classic, Stairway to Heaven.  The extension of 
Petrella will continue to be a contentious one, as the three-year window for 
copyright damages often does not coincide with the creation or primarily 
popularity of the infringement actions. 
                                                            
14. No. 12-1315, slip op. (U.S. May 19, 2014) 
15. Id. at 2. 
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These articles and the seventeen discussants at the symposium 
illustrate that society is only at the cusp of the true transformation.  
Interactive glasses from Google and Microsoft will marry a wearer’s 
perception of the world with real sight and virtual sight.  Digitally connected 
devices can communicate with each other and monitor the speed of our 
moving car, the steps we walk, the media we watch, and the company we 
keep.  Tomorrow’s laws regulating these devices may bear little relationship 
to the regulations currently on our books.  Yet the hindsight with which we 
view the world will continue to shape society’s perception of the law and 
human relations, even if it does not provide an adequate guide for particular 
jurisprudence. 
Although the symposium focused on the field of entertainment and 
media, conversations, presentations, and published articles highlight much 
more.  The technology affects constitutional issues of privacy, criminal 
search, publicity rights, consumer rights and many related areas of law.  It is 
my hope that the symposium and this edition of the Nova Law Review further 
this important dialogue on the future of media jurisprudence. 
As policy makers, we must be careful not to “put new wine into old 
bottles:  else the bottles break, the wine runs out, and the bottles perish:  but 
they put new wine into new bottles, and both are preserved.”16  Neither, 
however, can we do nothing.  “The wine in the bottle does not quench 
thirst.”17  By testing the metaphors, trying new regulations, and debating the 
future of new media, we will grow the best policy for the information age. 
                                                            
16. Matthew 9:17. 
17. GEORGE HERBERT, THE ENGLISH POEMS OF GEORGE HERBERT:  TOGETHER 
WITH HIS COLLECTION OF PROVERBS ENTITLED JACULA PRUDENTUM 241 (1902) (Google eBook 
Ed.) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the United States’ recent decision in ABC, 
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.1 reflects a growing imbalance between the market power 
of broadcasters and the government-owned distribution technology they 
control to distribute their content.2  Broadcast networks and affiliates, in 
legal filings and public comments, have drawn a line in the sand when it 
comes to technologies such as Aereo’s, which allow viewers to bypass local 
cable systems to receive antenna signals:  Had the Supreme Court sided with 
Aereo, incumbent broadcasters threatened publicly to migrate their signals to 
other Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (“MVPDs”), such as 
cable or internet service providers.3  Since nearly eighty-three percent of 
Americans receive their digital broadcast signals via cable and satellite 
MVPDs, broadcasters have grown to rely on retransmission consent fees 
                                                 
* Professor of Law and Director of the Amicus Project, Southwestern Law 
School.  Supervising Editor of the Journal of International Media and Entertainment Law, 
published by the American Bar Association and the Donald E. Biederman Entertainment and 
Media Law Institute at Southwestern.  The author thanks Natasha Mehlum, a Biederman 
Scholar at Southwestern, for her assistance in the preparation of this Article. 
1. No. 13-461, slip op. (U.S. June 25, 2014). 
2. See id. at 8, 12–13, 17–18. 
3. See 47 U.S.C. § 522(13) (2012); Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip. op. at 8, 
12–13, 17–18; Greg Sandoval, A Bet That Diller-Backed Aereo TV Startup Wins Its Day in 
Court, CNET (June 3, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/a-bet-that-diller-backed-
aereo-tv-startup-wins-its-day-in-court/. 
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from these MVPDs as a primary source of revenue, in addition to 
advertising.4 
Broadcasters’ reliance on retransmission fees, however, undermine 
the free, over-the-air model of broadcast distribution enshrined in the 
Communications Act of 1934, and enforced by the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) through regulation.5  Those fortunate enough to be 
granted a broadcast license benefit from what is known as a command-and-
control spectrum use policy that gives the licensee exclusive control of a 
large amount of frequency bandwidth—government bandwidth that is scarce, 
valuable, and in high demand by other telecommunications providers.6  This 
Article will examine the law and policy issues relating to a significant 
reduction—but not an abandonment—of the command-and-control system of 
spectrum use by current licensees.7  Simply put, broadcasters would use less 
spectrum to receive the same core benefits they have now.8  Indeed, 
Congress and the FCC should encourage a spectrum allocation system that 
allows for more efficient and localized use of frequency bandwidth by more 
users, while preserving public interest set-asides for current network and 
affiliate content on non-broadcast MVPDs. 
II. REVISITING THE FCC’S SPECTRUM REALLOCATION DEBATE 
In 2002, FCC Chairman Michael Powell convened a Spectrum Task 
Force that issued a report analyzing FCC policy regarding spectrum use.9  
The mandate of the task force was not only to review the current approaches 
to spectrum management, but also to explore alternative models of spectrum 
management that would “better promote the most efficient and productive 
use of [the] spectrum.”10 
In its report, the Spectrum Task Force describes three models of 
spectrum use in the United States:  command-and-control, exclusive use, and 
                                                 
4. See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, 
According to CEA Study, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS ASS’N (July 30, 2013), http://www.ce.org/
News/News-Releases/Press-Releases/2013-Press-Releases/Only-Seven-Percent-of-TV-
Households-Rely-on-Over-t.aspx; Sandoval, supra note 3. 
5. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–154 (2012); 
Sandoval, supra note 3. 
6. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE 
SPECTRUM RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WORKING GROUP 2–3, 10–11 (2002). 
7. See infra Part II, III. 
8. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 2–3, 17–18. 
9. See id. at 1. 
10. Id. 
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open access.11  Command-and-control is the most regulatory intensive of the 
models.12  “The traditional process of spectrum management in the United 
States,” command-and-control, requires the FCC to “allocate[] and assign[] 
frequencies to limited categories of spectrum users for specific government-
defined uses,”  including broadcasting.13  Nearly every aspect of spectrum 
use is defined by the FCC, including:  user eligibility requirements, “service 
restrictions, power limits, build-out requirements”, and infrastructure 
specifications, among others.14 
One of the great innovations of the Spectrum Task Force Report is 
its nod to exclusive use and open access use alternatives, both of which are 
more efficient than traditional command-and-control.15  The 2002 Spectrum 
Task Force Report describes exclusive use as 
 
[a] licensing model in which a licensee has exclusive and 
transferable rights to the use of [a] specified spectrum within a 
defined geographic area, with flexible use rights that are governed 
primarily by technical rules to protect spectrum users against 
interference.  Under this model, exclusive rights resemble property 
rights in spectrum, but this model does not imply or require 
creation of full private property rights in spectrum.16 
 
Many envision a system where broadcast signals could be relayed 
like mobile telephony across licensed signal conduits.17  In such a system, 
programmers can distribute content without monopolizing a dedicated 
frequency in an entire market.18  In effect, this is what many consumers do 
when they live stream a retransmitted feed from a broadcast television or 
radio station over a 4G or LTE connection to their smartphone or tablet.19  
From the consumer’s standpoint, there is no discernible difference in the 
                                                 
11. Id. at 2. 
12. See id. at 3–5. 
13. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 
2. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 17, 19. 
16. Id. at 2. 
17. See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, 
According to CEA Study, supra note 4. 
18. See WILLIAM LEHR, MASS. INST. OF TECH., TOWARD MORE EFFICIENT 
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT: NEW MODELS FOR PROTECTED SHARED ACCESS 4–5 (2014), 
available at http://cfp.mit.edu/publications/CFP_Papers/CFP%20Spectrum%20Sharing%
20Paper%202014.pdf. 
19. See Walter S. Mossberg, 4G or Not 4G:  A Guide to Cut Through All the 
‘Fast’ Talk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2012, at D1; Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on 
Over-the-Air Signals, According to CFA Study, supra note 4. 
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reception experience.20  But from a spectrum use standpoint, using a 
frequency for program streaming is much more efficient.21  For one, it is 
interactive, allowing consumers to choose what programs to stream over it.22  
But more importantly, the frequency itself is used more efficiently.23 
The least restrictive of the models is open access, also widely 
referred to as the commons.24  The commons is kind of like the wild west of 
spectrum use.25  As the report describes, the commons model 
 
[a]llows unlimited numbers of unlicensed users to share 
frequencies, with usage rights that are governed by technical 
standards or etiquettes but with no right to protection from 
interference.  Spectrum is available to all users that comply with 
established technical etiquettes or standards that set power limits 
and other criteria for operation of unlicensed devices to mitigate 
potential interference.”26 
 
By the turn of the current century, a number of academics, including 
Lawrence Lessig, pushed the commons model as a means to make spectrum 
use more efficient.27  In his book, The Future of Ideas, Lessig lauds the 
commons as a way to free spectrum from the yoke of government control:28 
My claim is that there is enough evidence of a different way to 
order spectrum that we should be exploring whether spectrum 
could be ordered as a commons. 
. . . There would be a role for regulation even if spectrum were 
free.  But this regulation would look very different from the 
regulation that now controls spectrum.  The government—or the 
market—would not be deciding who gets to use the spectrum.  The 
government would simply be assuring that the technologies that 
use the spectrum are properly certified technologies. 
                                                 
20. See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, 
According to CFA Study, supra note 4. 
21. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 6. 
22. See id. 
23. See id. 
24. Id. at 2. 
25. See id. 
26. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 
2. 
27. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE 
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 92 (2001). 
28. Id. at 83–84. 
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/1
2015] RECLAIMING THE PROMISE OF FREE LOCAL BROADCASTING 329 
. . . The role of the government . . . would be much less invasive 
than under the current regulatory regime.29 
 
Despite its embrace of the alternative spectrum management models 
for certain uses, the Spectrum Task Force ultimately concludes that certain 
uses of spectrum should continue to be managed under traditional command-
and-control.30  Command-and-control, in their view, is important to promote 
and enforce public interest objectives:31 
 
With respect to the command-and-control model, . . . the 
[Task Force] recognizes that continued use of this approach may 
be required in situations where prescribing spectrum use by 
regulation is necessary to accomplish compelling public interest 
objectives.  However, such objectives should be carefully defined, 
and the amount of spectrum subject to a command-and-control 
should be limited to . . . [that which] ensure[s] that those objectives 
are achieved.  Many spectrum users will claim that they warrant 
special consideration and thus deserve exemption from any reform 
of their service allocation rules.  It is therefore critical to 
distinguish between special interest and the public interest, 
establishing a high bar for any service to clear prior to receiving an 
exemption.32 
 
The Spectrum Task Force Report concluded in 2002 that command-
and-control was, as of then, the best model for broadcasting.33  But they left 
open the possibility that the time may come when efficiency considerations 
would outweigh public interest mandates.34  “For the time being, broadcast 
spectrum should continue to be subject to the command-and-control model 
due to the public interest obligations placed on broadcasters and the free 
over-the-air nature of broadcast service.”35  In the future, the balance 
between efficiency and public interest would need to be reevaluated.36 
 
We further recommend that the Commission fundamentally alter 
the existing balance among these models—which is dominated by 
                                                 
29. Id. at 83. 
30. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 
20. 
31. Id. at 20. 
32. Id. at 20–21. 
33. See id. at 44. 
34. See id. 
35. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 
44. 
36. Id. 
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legacy command-and-control regulation—by expanding the use of 
both the exclusive use and commons models throughout the radio 
spectrum, and limiting the use of the command-and-control model 
to those instances where there are compelling public policy reasons 
to continue using it.37 
 
In the nearly fifteen years since the Spectrum Task Force published 
its report, the need for greater spectrum use efficiency has increased 
significantly with the explosion of broadband and mobile telephony.38  At the 
same time, the utility of spectrum-based command-and-control broadcasting 
has diminished significantly.39  Broadcasters thrive in an age when the vast 
majority of American households rely on signal retransmission to receive 
broadcast programming through cable or satellite service, or by simply 
streaming on demand over a broadband Internet connection.40  Is the current 
6 MHz command-and-control allocation really in the public’s interest?  Or is 
it tantamount to an overly generous give-away of a government benefit to 
meet an industry’s special interest?  This Article proposes that the time has 
come to revisit the balance between efficiency and public interest in the use 
of broadcast spectrum.41 
III. REFRAMING THE PUBLIC INTEREST DEBATE 
Broadcasters benefit from two government-granted legal 
monopolies.42  They enjoy a license—without a government fee—that 
entitles them to command and control 6 MHz of radio spectrum in a 
specified local market for their private benefit.43  In addition, Congress 
created a market for these licenses, worth fifty billion dollars in the 
aggregate, by allowing broadcast entities to transfer licenses to third parties 
at market rates—and without recoupment of any of that value to the 
                                                 
37. Id. at 16–17. 
38. See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, 
According to CEA Study, supra note 4. 
39. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 42. 
40. See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, 
According to CEA Study, supra note 4. 
41. See infra Part IV. 
42. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) (2012); Jeffrey A. Eisenach, The Equities and 
Economics of Property Interests in TV Spectrum Licenses, NAVIGANT ECON. 6–7 (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/011614_Navigant_spectrum_study.pdf. 
43. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a), (c)(1); see also FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, THE 
BROADCAST TELEVISION SPECTRUM INCENTIVE AUCTION: INNOVATION IN POLICY TO IGNITE 
INNOVATION FOR CONSUMERS AND BUSINESS, FCC STAFF SUMMARY 3 (2013), available at 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-318455A1.pdf. 
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government.44  Broadcasters also keep their licenses in perpetuity, with 
largely pro forma renewals every eight years.45  In addition, broadcast 
licensees’ stations are universally available to the public, either through 
channels mandated for antenna reception on American television sets or, at 
the licensee’s election, through compulsory free carriage on pay television 
systems in their local area.46  In return for this command-and-control benefit, 
licensees are subject to regulations in the public interest, including public 
interest requirements for broadcasters, including candidate access, children’s 
television programming, indecency, and even no-longer-operable initiatives 
like ascertainment and the Fairness Doctrine.47 
Broadcasters also benefit from a second government monopoly, a 
bundle of exclusive rights set forth in the Copyright Act of 1976.48  The 
principal benefit available to licensees under copyright law is the ability to 
negotiate—and renegotiate—retransmission consent of its programming with 
other pay television MVPDs, like cable and satellite providers.49  These 
negotiated retransmission fees stand as a revenue-generating alternative to 
the must-carry rules available under the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (“Cable Television Act”), which 
mandates compulsory carriage of a broadcaster’s signal without a licensing 
fee if the broadcaster so elects.50  Until the 1970s, pay television 
retransmission consent and negotiated royalty payments were not issues for 
broadcast licensees who relied on cable television systems to relay their 
signals into communities where topography or interference prevented 
spectrum reception.51  These Community Antenna Television systems, as 
they were known during this era, were allowed to retransmit the licensees’ 
signals for free so that broadcasters could more fully realize the benefit of 
their command-and-control spectrum allocation.52  Broadcasters essentially 
                                                 
44. Eisenach, supra note 42, at 6, 11. 
45. 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1). 
46. See 47 U.S.C. § 534 (2012). 
47. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377–78 (1969). 
48. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
49. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. 
L. No. 102-385, § 6(2)(b)(1)(A)–(D), 106 Stat. 1460, 1482.  Broadcasters also enjoy limited 
rights as exclusive licensees of other copyright holders that create television programming.  17 
U.S.C. § 106(4)–(5). 
50. See § 4(a), 106 Stat. at 1471; § 6(2)(b)(1)(A)–(D), 106 Stat. at 1482. 
51. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 
385–90 (1st ed. 2001). 
52. Id. at 380. 
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did without one government benefit to avail themselves more effectively of 
the other.53 
By the time of the 1976 Copyright Act, however, the media 
landscape had already changed.54  In the 1960s, cable television providers 
discovered that customers were willing to pay for original content.55  
Dedicated basic cable channels and premium services proliferated, and pay 
television became a programming alternative to broadcasting.56  Cable was 
no longer Community Antenna Television; it had become a competing 
programming source, and a nascent threat to the established hegemony of 
broadcasting.57  This threat was addressed in the Copyright Act, in the very 
provisions that were before the United States Supreme Court in the Aereo 
case in 2014.58  Indeed, the public performance language that expressly 
applies copyright protection to the unaltered retransmission of a 
broadcaster’s signal legislatively overruled two Supreme Court cases from 
the CATV era, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.59 and 
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,60 which had 
viewed unaltered retransmissions as an exception to the retransmission 
consent requirement under the Copyright Act.61 
In the four decades since the Copyright Act, broadcast licensees’ 
reliance on the benefits of retransmission consent has increased significantly, 
as pay television became the dominant pipeline into American homes for 
television programming.62  Now television broadcasters, and the networks 
that own many of the stations, regularly engage in negotiations with cable 
television providers in hope of exacting a high market rate fee for 
retransmission consent.63  While they take a risk of having the negotiations 
fail, and getting blacked out on a local system, the upside has been great for 
broadcasters.64  A number of recent instances underscore the importance of 
                                                 
53. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 3–4. 
54. See Sharon Strover, Cable Television:  United States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
TELEVISION 2004, (Museum of Broad Commc’ns, Vol. 1, 2004). 
55. See id. 
56. See id. 
57. See id. 
58. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2012); see ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, 
slip op. at 7–8 (U.S. June 25, 2014). 
59. 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
60. 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
61. 17 U.S.C. § 101; Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 7; see also 
Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 414–15; Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 400–01. 
62. See Strover, supra note 54. 
63. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1. 
64. See id. 
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this new revenue source to broadcasters.65  In the 1990s, then Disney chair 
Michael Eisner may have threatened to pull Monday Night Football from its 
ABC network lineup because he was frustrated over affiliate compensation, 
which he considered uneconomic.66  The move of Monday Night Football to 
ESPN, became a reality under Bob Iger’s tenure, in 2006.67  A more dramatic 
dust-up was created by Chase Carey, COO of News Corporation, in 2013 
when he publicly mused about moving the entire Fox Broadcasting Network 
to cable.68  The threat was made in response to the perceived threat of Aereo 
to upend the retransmission consent fees that Fox had begun to rely upon.69  
One is left to wonder if Fox and other networks would have really abandoned 
their command-and-control spectrum if Aereo had prevailed in 2014.70 
The problem for broadcasters is that these two monopolies are 
fundamentally incompatible.71  The more licensees rely on the Copyright Act 
for revenue, the less valuable the benefit of command-and-control spectrum 
is for them.72  It is an inverse proportion that has been borne out by the failed 
promise of digital signal propagation.73 
In 2009, the FCC completed a gradual transition from the National 
Television System Committee (“NTSC”) standard definition television—the 
system that had been in place since 1940—to advanced television signals, a 
digital system that was supposed to usher in an era of crystal-clear reception 
and high-resolution.74  Unlike its analog counterpart, signals encoded 
                                                 
65. See, e.g., David S. Cohen, News Corp. Threatens to Make Fox Cable-Only 
Amid Aereo Dispute, VARIETY (Apr. 8, 2013, 10:42 AM), http://variety.com/2013/
digital/news/chase-carey-threatens-to-yank-fox-from-broadcast-tv-over-aereo-1200334235/. 
66. See Marc Gunther & Carol Vinzant, Eisner’s Mousetrap Disney’s CEO 
Says the Company Has a Lot of Varied Problems He Can Fix.  But What If the Real Issue Is 
Something He Can’t Face?, FORTUNE (Sept. 6, 1999), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/
fortune/fortune_archive/1999/09/06/265291/index.htm. 
67. See Bob Raissman & Matt Marrone, ESPN Grabs “Monday Night 
Football”, AM. SPORTSCASTERS ONLINE, http://www.americansportscastersonline.com/
mondaynightfootball.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2015); Robert A. Iger: Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer, WALT DISNEY COMPANY, https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/about-
disney/leadership/ceo/robert-iger (last visited Aug. 10, 2015). 
68. Cohen, supra note 65. 
69. See id. 
70. See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 17–18 (U.S. June 25, 
2014); Cohen, supra note 65. 
71. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012), with FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra 
note 43, at 1, 5. 
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 106; KIMBERLY M. RANDOLPH, STOUT RISIUS ROSS 
SPECTRUM LICENSES:  VALUATION INTRICACIES 2 (2011), 
http://www.srr.com/assets/pdf/spectrum-licenses-valuation-intricacies.pdf. 
73. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 5. 
74. James Miller & James E. Preiger, The Broadcasters’ Transition Date 
Roulette:  Strategic Aspects of the DTV Transition, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 437, 444 
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digitally cannot be partially decoded.75  Referred to as the digital cliff effect, 
all of a signal must be received or nothing can be decoded.76  The digital cliff 
proved to be an obstacle for antenna television households in major cities 
and rural areas.77  Reception in metropolitan areas with skyscrapers or 
mountains has been spotty since the transition, with large swaths of major 
cities like Los Angeles and New York from what the FCC calls the cliff 
effect, making antenna service impossible or too expensive.78  Households in 
rural areas similarly discovered that digital signals could not reach them.79  
Digital signals, as it turns out, have a higher drop-off rate as they travel 
longer distances than analog signals, making them unsuitable for homes far 
from city transmission towers.80 
For some, it may be possible to buy an expensive roof-mounted 
antenna that can scan interactively for signals, but the added expense and 
technical challenges have not proven worth it for most.81  For apartment 
dwellers without access to a rooftop antenna, no amount of money will make 
signal reception possible.82  Moreover, unless one subscribed to a pay 
television MVPD, homes were required to replace their old equipment with a 
new digital television, or a set-top converter box, and a new antenna.83  To 
alleviate the cost burden to consumers during the transition, the U.S. 
government initiated a coupon program for low-cost or no-cost converter 
boxes.84  Pay television subscribers did not have to buy new equipment; they 
                                                                                                       
(2011); Digital Television, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://www.fcc.gov/digital-television 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2015); see also Roy Furchgott, A Downside to Digital TV, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 24, 2008, at C6. 
75. See Miller & Preiger, supra note 74, at 448. 
76. Id. 
77. Id.; see also Furchgott, supra note 74. 
78. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC 05-199, STUDY OF DIGITAL TELEVISION 
FIELD STRENGTH STANDARDS AND TESTING PROCEDURES 25 (2005); see also Furchgott, supra 
note 74 (noting digital reception is more easily blocked than analog reception). 
79. See Furchgott, supra note 74. 
80. See Miller & Preiger, supra note 74, at 448; Furchgott, supra note 74; The 
Digital TV Transition:  Reception Maps, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 
http://transition.fcc.gov/mb/engineering/dtvmaps/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2015). 
81. See Furchgott, supra note 74; The Digital TV Transition:  Reception 
Maps, supra note 80. 
82. See JONATHAN RINTELS ET AL., LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 
& LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUC. FUND, TRANSITION IN TROUBLE:  ACTION 
NEEDED TO ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL DIGITAL TELEVISION TRANSITION 27–28 (2008) (“These 
digital gaps are not confined to sparsely populated rural areas; rather . . . millions of viewers 
in New York, Los Angeles, Boston, and other major metro areas will experience digital gaps 
in coverage.”). 
83. See id. at 7; Digital Television, supra note 74. 
84. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 3005(a)–(b), 120 
Stat. 4, 23 (2005). 
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could continue to use their existing NTSC televisions, did not need an 
antenna, and could continue to get a high-quality signal retransmission of 
broadcast and transmission of non-broadcast channels.85  In theory, pay 
television subscribers would be foregoing high-definition reception, but since 
many licensees had opted to multiplex their generous command-and-control 
bandwidth into standard definition programming streams, pay MVPD 
subscribers with standard definition receivers were not really giving up 
much.86 
Despite its promise of a new era for broadcasting, the government’s 
transition from analog to digital television was a boon for the pay television 
industry.87  Households that had once relied on free, over-the-air antenna 
television could no longer economically receive a decodable signal in the 
digital age.88  Instead of making broadcasters more competitive with pay 
television, the move to digital television made broadcasters more reliant 
upon it.89 
IV. TOWARD A MORE BALANCED SPECTRUM ALLOCATION POLICY 
A. Preserving Command-and-Control on a Smaller Scale 
Efficient spectrum reallocation does not need to abandon command-
and-control spectrum use, despite its inherent inefficiency.90  As the 2002 
Spectrum Task Force Report points out, command-and-control assures a 
variety of spectrum use in the public interest, including satellite access, 
emergency services, and, of course, terrestrial broadcasting.91  This Article, 
however, proposes a middle ground that is tilted much farther away from the 
current command-and-control structure.92  The idea here is to reduce the 
spectrum allocation to a bare minimum, enough so that licensees can 
transmit by relay to digital receivers to the cord-cutters and cord-nevers, 
perhaps using a technology not unlike that employed unsuccessfully by 
                                                 
85. See RINTELS ET AL., supra note 82, at 28; Only Seven Percent of TV 
Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to CEA Study, supra note 4. 
86. Albert N. Lung, Note, Must-Carry Rules in the Transition to Digital 
Television:  A Delicate Constitutional Balance, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 151, 206 (2000). 
87. See Digital Television, supra note 74; Only Seven Percent of TV 
Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to CEA Study, supra note 4. 
88. RINTELS ET AL., supra note 82, at 7. 
89. Id. 
90. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 4, 44. 
91. Id. at 20–21. 
92. See infra Part IV.A. 
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Aereo.93  How much spectrum is needed may be an open question, but this 
would be a significant reduction in the bandwidth currently provided by 
government.94  Signal power may also be an issue.95  If broadcasting is 
integrated into the existing infrastructure of cell towers and hot spots, it may 
be that the stations can operate at low power with little or no interference.96  
The quality of revamped antenna television reception may be a concern for 
licensees and broadcast networks, however.97  Broadcasters do not want it to 
be too good; otherwise, they would not be able to command high 
retransmission consent fees from pay television MVPDs.98  One way to 
address this may be to allow broadcasters to enhance the signal to the 
MVPD, allowing for a richer, or possibly even high-definition primary video 
and audio signal for the cable or satellite provider’s paying customers.99  
This would likely require action by Congress, but it would give broadcasters 
and pay television what they want most.100  A premium tier broadcast service 
would look and sound better than what would be available via antenna.101 
To be clear, this is a policy that the FCC has been tentatively testing 
with its voluntary spectrum buy-back plan for broadcasters, as set forth in the 
Agency’s 2010 Spectrum Task Force Report.102  So far, the buy-back has not 
freed up a lot spectrum, which the FCC acknowledges it needs to expand 
broadband and mobile telephony to underserved communities.103  
Broadcasters do not want to give up the scarce resource of spectrum, which 
                                                 
93. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 14–15, 17 (U.S. June 25, 
2014). 
94. See FED COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 26, 30. 
95. See id. at 46. 
96. See id. at 14. 
97. See Michael M. Epstein, “Primary Video” and Its Secondary Effects on 
Digital Broadcasting:  Cable Carriage of Multiplexed Signals Under the 1992 Cable Act and 
the First Amendment, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 525, 543 (2004). 
98. See id. at 542–43; Sandoval, supra note 3. 
99. See Epstein, supra note 97, at 529, 543.  More revolutionary transmission 
technologies like Visible Light Communications—also known as Li-Fi—could be utilized 
similarly in the service of broadcasters.  See Joao MM Santos et al., Hybrid GaN LED with 
Capillary-Bonded II–VI MQW Color-Converting Membrane for Visible Light 
Communications, SEMICONDUCTOR SCI. & TECH., March 2015, at 1, 
http://iopscience.iop.org/0268-1242/30/3/035012/pdf/0268-1242_30_3_035012.pdf. 
100. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
101. See Digital Television, supra note 74. 
102. Cecilia Kang, FCC to Offer Plan for TV Airwaves Auction, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 7, 2012, at A26; see also FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, MOBILE BROADBAND: THE BENEFITS 
OF ADDITIONAL SPECTRUM 4 (2010). 
103. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 102, at 4–5; see also Amy Gahran, 
FCC Warns of Looming Mobile Spectrum Crunch, CNN (Nov. 5, 2010, 5:14 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/mobile/11/05/gahran.mobile.spectrum.crunch/. 
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because of third-party resale has great value.104  But, in the Spectrum 
Reduction Plan proposed here, the return of spectrum—and bandwidth—
would be mandatory regulation.105  By making it mandatory, the FCC can 
help broadcasters understand what they apparently are unable to see:  A 
generous spectrum bandwidth allocation is not significant to the principal 
benefit they receive as terrestrial broadcasters.106  In that sense, this proposal 
takes existing FCC spectrum policy to the next level.107 
To make this work, the FCC would need to reallocate de minimus 
bandwidth to primary audio and video signal, as defined under the Cable 
Television Act.108  Weak broadcasters—the ones that Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. FCC109 recognized was in Congress’ purview to help 
economically with the must-carry rules—could still take advantage of cable 
distribution without payment—essentially the status quo benefit of 
broadcasting without the inefficient use of a government resource.110  Strong 
stations have demonstrated that they do not need this benefit of spectrum 
monopoly, but they would still be able to use the de minimus spectrum.111  
And they could still choose compulsory free carriage under current law.112 
Put differently, a broadcaster gets almost all the benefits of 
command and control—and the monopoly market power that comes with 
it—by reducing spectrum bandwidth subject to monopoly license to a much 
lower minimum.113  It is more responsive to a market reality in which 
broadcasters have effectively abandoned their government monopoly in 
exchange for free, over-the-air television.114  Ultimately, the real benefits of 
spectrum for broadcasters are the bundle of intellectual property rights that 
they have been able to monetize.115  Apart from licensing rights, the principal 
benefit of the federal regulatory system today is the capability of 
broadcasters to choose universal service, which most broadcasters do not 
choose to avail themselves of.116 
                                                 
104. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’M, supra note 102, at 26 n.36. 
105. See infra Part IV. 
106. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 47–48. 
107. See id. at 2. 
108. See 47 U.S.C. § 535(g)(1) (2012). 
109. 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
110. See id. at 213; 47 U.S.C. § 534(10) (2012). 
111. See TBS, 520 U.S. at 189. 
112. See 47 U.S.C. § 534(10). 
113. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1. 
114. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 42. 
115. See Eisenach, supra note 42, at 4, 17. 
116. See 47 U.S.C. § 534(10); Lung, supra note 86, at 159, 185. 
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B. Legislative and Broadcast Industry Opposition 
Incumbent licensees might try to argue that a reduction in spectrum 
allocation amounts to a taking of their property by the government.117  The 
Communications Act of 1934, however, expressly disclaims any property 
interest in their licenses.118  They may also argue that they have invested 
heavily in the infrastructure and technology of broadcasting.119  Moreover, 
this is not about revoking licenses, although Congress theoretically can do 
this without cause.120  Indeed, even if broadcasters can argue that they have 
some kind of property right to a government benefit, the critical aspects of 
that benefit would not be lost in a Spectrum Reduction Plan.121  First 
Amendment challenges would likely fail.122  Even if Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. Federal Communications Commission’s123 vision of the public’s 
paramount interest does not survive a challenge, it is easy to characterize 
spectrum reduction as content neutral, allowing for a good deal of deference 
to Congress.124  There is also no reason to think that the FCC would run afoul 
of Chevron deference to its agency discretion. 
One might fully expect broadcasters and their lobbyists to express 
opposition to spectrum reduction.125  For one, when there is a proposed 
reduction in a government benefit, the recipients of that benefit will oppose 
it.126  But the critical question should be whether the public interest is being 
disserved by spectrum bandwidth reduction.  Indeed, the spectrum-reduced 
regime permits licensees to enjoy retransmission consent rights under the 
Copyright Act or compulsory carriage under Cable Television Act.127 
Without generous bandwidth, broadcasters would lose the ability to 
broadcast to antenna televisions in high definition.128  While the public has 
an interest in high definition broadcasting, the reality is that broadcasters 
split their bandwidth into lower definition programming streams instead of 
using their full bandwidth for high-resolution programming.129  This signal 
                                                 
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). 
118. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
119. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 110, 121–22. 
120. See Red Lion Broad Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1969). 
121. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 121. 
122. See id. at 133–34; Red Lion Broad Co., 395 U.S. at 389. 
123. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
124. See id. at 390, 399–400; Lung, supra note 86, at 172. 
125. See Red Lion Broad Co., 395 U.S. at 388–89. 
126. See id. at 388–89, 400. 
127. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 4 106 Stat. 1460, 1471 (1992). 
128. See Lung, supra note 86, at 206. 
129. See id. 
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multiplexing has become a significant source of additional revenue for 
broadcasters, but it was not part of the public interest benefit that Congress 
legislated when it mandated a transition to HDTV.130  Indeed, it runs counter 
to this benefit.131  In addition, whether a broadcaster transmits in HDTV is 
immaterial to cable and satellite customers whose box or televisions are not 
HDTV capable.132  Pay television subscribers, as discussed previously, could 
benefit from an enhance signal from broadcasters, as long as their tuner and 
television are HD capable.133 
Pay television MVPDs might mount a challenge to new regulations 
requiring set-asides for broadcast stations on their systems.134  There would 
be little possibility of success in the courts, however, as the issue was settled 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Turner.135  Indeed, the 
implementation of a Spectrum Reduction Plan need not require a revamping 
of the must-carry rules currently in place.136  The change would be in the 
amount of spectrum that would be subject to the must-carry rules, the 
“primary audio and video signal.”137  From a cable or satellite provider’s 
standpoint, the burden is no different than it was before—it may even be less 
since unenhanced bandwidth would take up less of the subscriber’s 
broadband pipeline into the home.  Retransmission of an enhanced signal 
would be subject to negotiation and agreement with a broadcaster; a pay 
MVPD’s use of a licensee’s HDTV signal, for example, would be 
determined by the market, not by government regulation.138 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article does not propose a specific action plan; the idea here is 
to introduce a balance that preserves the principal rights and benefits of 
broadcasters in a way that makes much more efficient use of spectrum.  
Spectrum is much more valuable to the public interest if it is used for mobile 
                                                 
130. See Epstein, supra note 97, at 557, 568. 
131. See id. 
132. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 43.  
133. See supra notes 83, 85 and accompanying text. 
134. See supra Part III. 
135. TBS v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189–90 (1997). 
136. See id. at 185, 189–90; Epstein, supra note 97, at 536–37. 
137. See Epstein, supra note 97, at 536–37. 
138. 47 U.S.C. §§ 325(b)(1)(A), 535(g)(1) (2012); see also Eisenach, supra 
note 42, at 8, 10–11. 
35
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
340 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
telephony and new wireless broadband technologies.139  Even with a de 
minimus spectrum allocation, licensees still get a great deal from the 
government.140  They can continue to enjoy universal service and the must-
carry rules; they can also continue to benefit from a revenue stream under the 
Copyright Act.141  The government would also come out ahead here, since 
much of that freed up spectrum would be auctioned.  Mobile carriers and 
internet service providers are willing to pay the government top dollar for a 
slice of the radio frequency spectrum pie.142 
A Spectrum Reduction Plan may also be a net gain for MVPD 
carriers since they could benefit from freed-up spectrum.  Ultimately, there 
should be no additional burden for pay television providers.  The burden 
analysis under Turner’s application of the O’Brien test will be the same for 
pay television providers.143  Presumably, the same broadcasters who 
currently elect compulsory free carriage under the must-carry rules would 
continue to elect compulsory carriage.  It may even be less of a burden for 
pay television MVPDs since broadcasters’ reduced bandwidth would take up 
less space in the cable or satellite pipeline. 
Could broadcasters be happy with a mandatory Spectrum Reduction 
Plan?  Well, that remains to be seen.  At the end of the day, licensees would 
not lose much.  To the extent that de minimus spectrum allocation is 
incompatible with HDTV transmission, broadcasters can include that in 
enhanced signal negotiations—at market rates—with pay television 
providers.  The small percentage of homes that currently receive antenna 
signals would lose high-definition capability, but since licensees multiplex 
their signals into standard definition programming streams, they are not 
really losing high-resolution reception.144  Licensees may chafe with the 
continuation of the public interest regulations that attached to their use of 
spectrum—but industry challenges of scarcity and public trustee 
justifications for broadcast regulations are not new.145  Indeed, one of the 
benefits to the public of a Spectrum Reduction Plan is that it does not change 
the scarcity and fiduciary calculus.  The spectrum is still scarce, and it is still 
                                                 
139. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 20–21; Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to 
CEA Study, supra note 4. 
140. See Evolution of Cable Television, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/evolution-cable-television (last updated Mar. 14, 2012). 
141. 17 U.S.C. § 106; TBS, 520 U.S. at 185, 189–90. 
142. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1, 2. 
143. See TBS, 520 U.S. at 185, 189–90. 
144. Lung, supra note 86, at 205–06; Only Seven Percent of TV Households 
Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to CEA Study, supra note 4. 
145. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1–2; Lung, supra note 86, 
at 205–06. 
36
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/1
2015] RECLAIMING THE PROMISE OF FREE LOCAL BROADCASTING 341 
administered by the government as a public trust.146  Licensees are simply 
using less of it.147 
In the wake of their victory in Aereo, incumbent broadcasters have 
no need to make good on threats to migrate to subscription-based MVPDs 
such as Netflix or Comcast.148  They enjoy the best of two monopolies:  
Command-and-control over spectrum, and the exclusive rights of the 
Copyright Act.149  But they do not need a generous spectrum allocation today 
to run a profitable business.  If the right balance is struck, broadcasters, pay 
television MVPDs, broadband companies, phone carriers, and the 
government could all benefit from a Spectrum Reduction Plan.  And, perhaps 
most importantly, the public would also benefit, since spectrum reduction to 
broadcasters means more spectrum is available for the public benefit 
elsewhere, and broadcasters would still need to operate in the “‘public 
interest, convenience, and necessity.’”150 
 
                                                 
146. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1–2. 
147. See id. 
148. See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 17–18 (U.S. June 25, 
2014); Sandoval, supra note 3. 
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY 
TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 2–3. 
150. See Eisenach, supra note 42, at 7, 18. 
37
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
38
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/1
COPYRIGHT AS CHARITY 
BRIAN L. FRYE* 
 
I.  ABSTRACT ...................................................................................... 343 
II.  INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 344 
III.  WELFARE & COPYRIGHT ............................................................... 345 
IV.  COPYRIGHT & CHARITY LAW ........................................................ 347 
A.  The Economic Subsidy Theory of Copyright ..................... 348 
B.  The Economic Subsidy Theory of Charity ......................... 349 
C.  Comparing Copyright & Charity Law .............................. 350 
D.  The Justification for Copyright ......................................... 351 
E.  The Justification for Charity Law ..................................... 353 
V.  COPYRIGHT AS CHARITY................................................................ 354 
A.  Copyright & Efficiency ..................................................... 354 
B.  Charity Law & Efficiency ................................................. 356 
C.  Comparing the Efficiency of Copyright & Charity Law ... 356 
1.  Fiscal Sponsorship ............................................... 358 
2.  Crowdfunding ...................................................... 360 
3.  Open-Source ........................................................ 361 
VI.  CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 362 
 
I. ABSTRACT 
Copyright and charity law are generally considered distinct and 
unrelated bodies of law.  But they are actually quite similar and complement 
each other.1  Both copyright and charity law are intended to increase social 
welfare by solving market and government failures in public goods caused 
by free riding.2  Copyright solves market and government failures in works 
of authorship by providing an indirect subsidy to marginal authors, and 
charity law solves market and government failures in charitable goods by 
                                                
*  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky School of Law. J.D., 
New York University School of Law, 2005; M.F.A., San Francisco Art Institute, 1997; B.A, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1995.  The author thanks Dean Jon Garon and the 2015 
Nova Law Review Symposium, New Media and Old Metaphors.  The author also thanks 
Johnny Schmidt for helpful observations on the relationship between copyright and charity. 
1. See infra Part IV. 
2. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
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providing an indirect subsidy to marginal donors.3  Copyright and charity 
law complement each other by solving market and government failures in 
works of authorship in different ways.4  Copyright solves market and 
government failures in works of authorship by reducing ex ante transaction 
costs, but it increases ex post transaction costs.5  Charity solves market and 
government failures in works of authorship by reducing both ex ante and ex 
post transaction costs.6  Accordingly, the efficient scope and duration of 
copyright should reflect ex ante transaction costs, because charity can more 
efficiently reduce ex post transaction costs. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson observed, “[t]he essence of 
metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of 
another.”7  In other words, metaphors express analogies.8  For better or 
worse, legal reasoning depends on analogies.9  Lawyers argue cases by 
comparing them to other cases, and judges decide cases by comparing them 
to previously decided cases.10  Both assume that similar cases should 
generally produce similar results and dissimilar cases should generally 
produce dissimilar results.11  If it was negligent for a defendant to perform a 
particular act in a particular circumstance, we assume that it is negligent to 
perform similar acts in similar circumstances, but do not assume that it is 
negligent to perform different acts in different circumstances.12 
Analogical reasoning consists in determining when similarities and 
differences are relevant, and when they are not.13  Scholars disagree about 
                                                
3. See infra Part IV.C. 
4. See infra Part V.C. 
5. See infra Part V.A. 
6. See infra Part V.B. 
7. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 5 (1980) 
(emphasis omitted). 
8. Dedre Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, in THE ANALOGICAL 
MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE 199, 199 (Dedre Gentner et al., eds., 2001). 
9. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 741, 741 (1993) (“Reasoning by analogy is the most familiar form of legal reasoning.  It 
dominates the first year of law school; it is a characteristic part of brief-writing and opinion-
writing as well.”). 
10. Id. at 741, 745–48. 
11. Id. at 745–46. 
12. See id. 
13. Id. at 745. 
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the merits of analogical reasoning in law.14  Critics argue that it obscures the 
general theories that should determine the outcome of cases.15  But advocates 
argue that it can reveal the weaknesses of general theories by recognizing the 
contingent and circumstantial values that they ignore.16 
But what if analogical reasoning were used to compare general 
theories of law, rather than particular cases?17  Perhaps it could help identify 
relationships between theories that would otherwise be obscured, and thereby 
improve our understanding of those theories and how they apply in 
practice.18 
This Article argues that comparing the prevailing theories of 
copyright and charity law reveals that they are strikingly similar and 
complementary bodies of law.19  Copyright and charity law are both intended 
to increase social welfare by solving market failures in public goods caused 
by free riding.20  But they do so by reducing different kinds of transaction 
costs.21  It follows that each should be designed to focus on the transaction 
costs it is best suited to address.22 
III. WELFARE & COPYRIGHT 
In his provocative article Author’s Welfare:  Copyright as a 
Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing Rights, Tom Bell argues that welfare 
and copyright are similar because both are statutory entitlements intended to 
increase social welfare by redistributing personal property rights from 
members of the general public to particular beneficiaries:  “Welfare aims to 
improve social well-being by helping the poor, whereas copyright aims to 
improve social well-being by helping those who create expressive works.”23  
Welfare redistributes wealth from taxpayers to the poor, and provides the 
benefit of reducing poverty, at the cost of discouraging work.24  Copyright 
                                                
14. LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL 
ARGUMENT 67 (2005). 
15. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 
765 (2006) (book review). 
16. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 9, at 745. 
17. See id. at 776–77. 
18. See Posner, supra note 15, at 765. 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
21. See infra Part V.A–B. 
22. See infra Part V.C. 
23. Tom W. Bell, Author’s Welfare:  Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for 
Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 236 (2003). 
24. See id. at 231 n.1. 
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redistributes rights from the public to authors, and provides the benefit of 
increasing the supply of expressive works, at the cost of limiting their use.25 
More controversially, Bell argues that the success of welfare reform 
suggests the potential for successful copyright reform.26  Welfare reform 
reduced the subsidy provided to the poor by limiting the availability of 
welfare, and Bell claims that it was successful because it encouraged work 
without increasing poverty.27  Based on the success of welfare reform, Bell 
argues that copyright reform limiting the scope of copyright would increase 
the use of expressive works, without reducing their supply.28 
Of course, there are weaknesses in Bell’s argument.29  To begin with, 
many people disagree with his assertion that welfare reform was successful, 
or that it encouraged work without increasing poverty.30  If welfare reform 
was not successful, perhaps copyright reform would also not be successful. 
More fundamentally, Bell’s comparison of welfare and copyright is 
strained, because they are not as similar as he suggests.31  Bell himself 
admits that the analogy is not perfect, because copyright “looks a lot more 
like property than welfare does.”32  Specifically, copyright provides rights to 
exclude, but welfare only provides a right to due process.33  He argues that 
his analogy still holds, because welfare and copyright are both statutory 
entitlements, not property rights.34 
But Bell ignores other differences between welfare and copyright 
which are fatal to his analogy. First, welfare provides a direct subsidy to the 
poor, but copyright provides an indirect subsidy to authors. As a result, the 
burden of welfare falls on the government, but the burden of copyright falls 
on consumers of works of authorship. Second, welfare is vulnerable to 
                                                
25. Id. at 245. 
26. Id. at 277. 
27. Id. at 236; Peter Edelman, Professor of Law, Poverty & Welfare:  Does 
Compassionate Conservatism Have a Heart?, Edward C. Sobota Memorial Lecture Series 
(2001), in 64 ALB. L. REV. 1073, 1075 (2001).  Specifically, Bell refers to The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.  Bell, supra note 23, at 231 n.1. 
28. See Bell, supra note 23, at 236; Tom. W. Bell, Escape from Copyright:  
Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 741, 744, 746 (2001). 
29. See Edelman, supra note 27, at 1074–76, 1078–79. 
30. See, e.g., id. at 1074–76, 1078–79. 
31. See id. at 255. 
32. Id. 
33. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (providing exclusive rights in 
copyrighted works), with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–62 (1970) (holding that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires an evidentiary hearing before the 
termination of welfare benefits). 
34. Bell, supra note 23, at 273–74. 
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government failures caused by majoritarian politics, but copyright is 
vulnerable to government failures caused by rent-seeking. Third, welfare is 
intended to increase static efficiency by improving the allocation of wealth, 
but copyright is intended to increase dynamic efficiency by encouraging the 
creation of works of authorship. And fourth, welfare is a common-pool 
resource because it is rivalrous, but works of authorship are public goods 
because they are non-rivalrous. 
While the differences between welfare and copyright render Bell’s 
conclusions unconvincing, the analogy that he draws between welfare and 
copyright still improved our understanding of copyright by showing that it is 
best understood as a form of statutory entitlement, rather than a form of 
physical property.35  It follows that the scope and duration of copyright 
protection ought to be determined in relation to other statutory entitlements, 
rather than in relation to physical property.36  Moreover, even the limited 
success of Bell’s analogy suggests that alternative analogies may further 
improve our understanding of copyright.37  Specifically, this Article argues 
that comparing copyright and charity law can improve our understanding of 
both areas of law, and show how they complement each other. 
IV. COPYRIGHT & CHARITY LAW 
The prevailing theories of both copyright and charity law are 
economic subsidy theories, which hold that copyright and charity law are 
justified because they increase social welfare by solving market and 
government failures caused by free riding.38  This formal similarity of the 
respective theories of copyright and charity law is reinforced by a substantive 
similarity in their purpose.39  The purpose of copyright is to increase public 
welfare by solving market failures in works of authorship, which are a 
particular form of public good, and the purpose of charity law is to increase 
public welfare by solving market failures in charitable goods, which include 
                                                
35. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2005).  “If we must fall back on a physical-world analogy for 
intellectual property protection—and I see no reason why we should—treating intellectual 
property as a form of government subsidy is more likely to get people to understand the 
tradeoffs involved than treating it as real property.”  Id. at 1032 n.2 (stating “Tom Bell is the 
first to draw this analogy, likening copyright specifically to a particular form of government 
subsidy:  [W]elfare”). 
36. See id. at 1069–71. 
37. See id. at 1032. 
38. Brian L. Frye, Solving Charity Failures, 93 OR. L. REV. 155, 159–60 
(2014). 
39. See id. at 168. 
43
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
348 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
a broad range of public and quasi-public goods, including works of 
authorship.40  In other words, works of authorship are a category of 
charitable goods, and copyright is arguably a category of charity law, or 
rather, the continuation of charity by other means.41 
A. The Economic Subsidy Theory of Copyright 
The economic subsidy theory of copyright holds that it is justified 
because it solves market and government failures in works of authorship 
caused by free riding.42  Works of authorship are non-rivalrous—or public 
goods—because the consumption of a work of authorship does not affect the 
supply.43  Classical economics predicts that free riding will cause market 
failures in public goods, because rational economic actors will consume the 
good without paying the marginal cost of production.44 
Copyright solves market failures in works of authorship by making 
them excludable and thereby enabling authors to recover their fixed costs and 
opportunity costs.45  In other words, copyright indirectly subsidizes authors 
by giving them certain exclusive rights to use works of authorship for a 
certain period of time.46  As a result, authors can internalize some of the 
positive externalities or spillovers generated by the creation of a work of 
authorship by charging consumers more than the marginal cost of 
production.47  Essentially, copyright provides an incentive for marginal 
authors to invest in the production of works of authorship.48 
Of course, direct subsidies can also solve market failures in works of 
authorship caused by free riding.49  For example, governments directly 
subsidize the production of works of authorship by distributing grants to 
authors.50  But these direct subsidies are vulnerable to government failures 
caused by rent-seeking and transaction costs, especially information costs.51  
                                                
40. See id. at 166. 
41. Cf. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret 
eds., trans., 1976) (“War Is Merely the Continuation of [Politics] by Other Means”). 
42. Frye, supra note 38, at 159–160; see also RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. 
HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS 141 (2013). 
43. See Frye, supra note 38, at 163; Lemley, supra note 35, at 1054. 
44. Frye, supra note 38, at 164. 
45. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1054. 
46. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302 (2012). 
47. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
257, 268 (2007). 
48. Id. at 283–84. 
49. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164. 
50. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1063. 
51. See id. 
44
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/1
2015] COPYRIGHT AS CHARITY 349 
Public choice theory predicts that rent-seeking will cause governments to 
distribute grants inefficiently, and classical economics predicts that 
information costs and other transaction costs will prevent governments from 
distributing grants efficiently.52  In others words, governments cannot know 
which authors to subsidize, and politics creates incentives to subsidize the 
wrong authors.53 
Copyright solves government failures in works of authorship by 
reducing certain forms of rent-seeking and transaction costs.54  Copyright 
reduces ex ante rent-seeking by subsidizing all authors in relation to the 
economic value of their work of authorship.55  Copyright also reduces ex 
ante transaction costs by enabling marginal authors to decide whether the 
private cost of investing in authorship is smaller than the private benefit 
provided by copyright.56  Presumably, individual authors can gather and 
assess relevant information more efficiently than governments.57 
B. The Economic Subsidy Theory of Charity 
The economic subsidy theory of charity law holds that it “is justified 
because it solves market . . . and government failures in charitable goods” 
caused by free riding.58  Charitable goods resemble public goods because 
they are either actually or ideally non-rivalrous.59  For example, religion is 
actually non-rivalrous because the consumption of religion does not affect 
the supply; food banks are ideally non-rivalrous because they are intended to 
provide food to all who require it.60  Accordingly, “[c]lassical economics 
predicts that free riding will cause market failures in [charitable] goods.”61 
Charity law solves market failures in charitable goods by enabling 
certain donors to deduct certain charitable contributions from their income 
tax base, thereby compensating for free riding on charitable contributions by 
indirectly subsidizing altruism.62  In other words, charity law indirectly 
subsidizes the production of charitable goods by reducing the cost of 
                                                
52. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164–65; Lemley, supra note 35, at 1065. 
53. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164–65. 
54. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1063–64. 
55. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 47, at 268. 
56. See id.; Frye, supra note 38, at 164. 
57. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164. 
58. Id. at 158–59; see also JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE 
CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 109, 113 (1995). 
59. Frye, supra note 38, at 163, 165. 
60. See id. at 163–65. 
61. Id. at 163. 
62. Id. at 166–67. 
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altruism.63  Essentially, charity law provides an incentive for marginal donors 
to invest in the production of charitable goods, thereby generating positive 
externalities.64 
Of course, direct subsidies can also solve market failures in 
charitable goods caused by free riding.65  Governments can and do directly 
subsidize the production of charitable goods by distributing grants to 
charities.66  But these direct subsidies are vulnerable to market failures 
caused by rent-seeking and transaction costs.67  Public choice theory predicts 
that rent-seeking will cause governments to distribute grants inefficiently, 
and classical economics predicts that information costs and other transaction 
costs will prevent governments from distributing grants efficiently.68  In 
others words, governments cannot know which charities to subsidize, and 
politics creates incentives to subsidize the wrong charities.69 
Charity law solves government failures in charitable goods by 
reducing certain forms of rent-seeking and transaction costs.70  Charity law 
reduces rent-seeking and transaction costs by subsidizing altruism, 
depending on donors to identify worthy charities.71  Presumably, individual 
donors can gather and assess relevant information more efficiently than 
governments. 
C. Comparing Copyright & Charity Law 
The structural similarity of the economic subsidy theories of 
copyright and charity law is obvious.72  Both hold that indirect subsidies are 
justified because they solve market and government failures in a public good 
and thereby increase social welfare.73  Copyright is justified because it 
increases social welfare by providing an incentive to create works of 
authorship, and charity law is justified because it increases social welfare by 
providing an incentive to make charitable contributions.74 
                                                
63. See id. 
64. See Frye, supra note 38, at 168, 171. 
65. Id. at 167. 
66. Id. at 177. 
67. Id. at 177–78. 
68. See id. at 164–65, 177–78. 
69. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164–65, 177–78. 
70. Id. at 166–67. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 166. 
73. Id. 
74. Frye, supra note 38, at 162. 
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The economic subsidy theories of copyright and charity law are 
welfarist theories, which hold that copyright and charity law are justified 
because they are efficient.75  In other words, copyright and charity law are 
justified because their social benefit is larger than their social cost, so they 
actually increase social welfare.76  It follows that the justification of both 
copyright and charity law depends on a testable hypothesis.77  According to 
the economic subsidy theory, copyright is justified because the social benefit 
of increasing the production of works of authorship is actually larger than the 
social cost of increasing the scope or duration of copyright protection, and 
charity law is justified because the social benefit of increasing the production 
of charitable goods is larger than the social cost of reduced tax revenue.78  Or 
rather, copyright and charity law are justified because they increase social 
welfare on the margins.79  But that hypothesis is inconsistent with the 
doctrine and development of both copyright and charity law.80 
D. The Justification for Copyright 
Copyright doctrine is inconsistent with its welfarist justification 
because the scope and duration of copyright protection is uniform for all 
works of authorship, even though the efficient scope and duration of 
copyright protection necessarily depend on the circumstances.81  Each work 
of authorship necessarily has unique fixed costs of production, and each 
author necessarily has unique opportunity costs.82  Moreover, some authors 
may choose to invest in the production of works of authorship even if they 
cannot recover their fixed and opportunity costs.83  In theory, the scope and 
duration of copyright protection should vary from author to author and from 
work to work. 
Of course, it is practically impossible to tailor the scope and duration 
of copyright protection to particular authors and works.  But the scope and 
duration of copyright protection does not even vary among categories of 
works with manifestly different fixed and opportunity costs.84  As Brad 
Greenberg has memorably observed, Copyright protection under the 1976 
                                                
75. Id. at 168. 
76. Id. at 162. 
77. Id. at 158, 172. 
78. Id. at 162. 
79. Frye, supra note 38, at 166–67. 
80. Id. at 168. 
81. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302 (2012); Bell, supra note 23, at 277. 
82. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1032. 
83. See id. at 1050. 
84. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302. 
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Act is like an Oprah giveaway:  Everybody gets one.85  An email, a novel, a 
home video, and a feature film all receive copyright protection of the same 
scope and duration.86 
In addition, the actual scope and duration of copyright protection 
were not determined in relation to its ostensible welfarist justification.87  
Congress did not seriously consider marginal efficiency when it determined 
the scope and duration of copyright protection.88  And courts explicitly 
refrain from considering the marginal efficiency of copyright protection 
when reviewing its legitimacy.89 
Moreover, the economic subsidy theory assumes that copyright is 
justified because authors are rational economic actors, and marginal authors 
will decide whether to invest in creating works of authorship based on 
whether they can expect to recover their costs.90  But in practice, many 
authors are not exclusively rational economic actors, and choose to invest in 
the production of works of authorship even if they do not expect to recover 
their costs.91  In fact, because copyright automatically protects even the most 
trivial works of expression, copyright protection is not a salient incentive to 
the overwhelming majority of authors who receive copyright protection.92  
For example, copyright protects emails and snapshots, but does not provide a 
salient incentive to produce those works of authorship.93  The economic 
theory holds that copyright is justified because it increases social welfare; so 
to the extent that copyright protection is not a salient incentive, it is not 
justified.94 
                                                
85. Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright and Trademark Troll:  Fable or Fact?, held 
by Chapman University School of Law, Law Review Symposium (Jan. 30, 2015) (Audio 
Recording 19:34–19:53), available at 
http://ibc.chapman.edu/Mediasite/Play/5fee649a60414522a5a1c1627f222ff81d. 
86. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302. 
87. See id. §§ 106, 302; Bell, supra note 23, at 277. 
88. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302; Bell, supra note 23, at 277. 
89. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (“In sum, we find 
that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not at liberty to second-guess congressional 
determinations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they 
may be.”). 
90. See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY 24–25 (2008). 
91. See id. 
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 106; Bell, supra note 23, at 242. 
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
94. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 5–6. 
48
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/1
2015] COPYRIGHT AS CHARITY 353 
E. The Justification for Charity Law 
Charity law doctrine is also inconsistent with its welfarist 
justification because the indirect subsidy provided by the charitable 
contribution deduction is unrelated to the market and government failures 
that it ostensibly solves.95  The charitable contribution deduction indirectly 
subsidizes the production of charitable goods by allowing certain donors to 
deduct certain charitable contributions from their income tax base.96  As a 
consequence, the higher the marginal income tax rate on the donor, the larger 
the subsidy, and the lower the marginal income tax rate on the donor, the 
smaller the subsidy.97  But there is no relationship between a donor’s 
marginal income tax rate and the market and government failures associated 
with the recipient of that donor’s charitable contribution.98  If anything, they 
may be negatively correlated.99 
In addition, the charitable contribution deduction is a salient 
incentive to only a small minority of donors.  Taxpayers can claim charitable 
contribution deductions only if they itemize their deductions, but only about 
thirty percent of taxpayers itemize their deductions.100  As a result, the 
charitable contribution deduction is not a salient incentive for the seventy 
percent of taxpayers who do not itemize their deductions, and is a 
considerably less salient incentive for low-income taxpayers than it is for 
high-income taxpayers.101 
Moreover, the economic subsidy theory assumes that charity law is 
justified because donors are rational economic actors, and marginal donors 
will decide whether to make charitable contributions based on whether they 
will receive a deduction.102  But in practice, many donors are not exclusively 
rational economic actors, and choose to make charitable contributions even 
though they do not expect to receive a deduction.103  The economic subsidy 
                                                
95. Frye, supra note 38, at 159–60. 
96. Id. at 159. 
97. Id. at 169. 
 98. See id. at 168. 
 99. See id. 
100. BENJAMIN H. HARRIS & DANIEL BANEMAN, TAX POLICY CTR., WHO 
ITEMIZES DEDUCTIONS? 345 (2011), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
UploadedPDF/1001486-Who-Itemizes-Deductions.pdf. 
101. But see Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable 
Deduction:  An Introduction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1307, 1310, 1325–26, 1327 
n.93 (2012) (arguing that the charitable contribution deduction may be “hypersalient” to 
certain taxpayers who mistakenly believe they can claim a deduction). 
 102. DAVID CHEAL, THE GIFT ECONOMY 15 (1988); Frye, supra note 38, at 158. 
 103. See Frye, supra note 38, at 166, 182. 
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theory holds that charity law is justified because it increases social welfare, 
so to the extent that the charitable contribution deduction is not a salient 
incentive to a particular donor, it is not justified.104 
V. COPYRIGHT AS CHARITY 
While the premises of the economic subsidy theories of copyright 
and charity law are inconsistent with copyright and charity law doctrine, 
their structural similarities illuminate their complementary relationship.105  
The purpose of copyright is to increase public welfare by providing an 
incentive for marginal authors to invest in the production of works of 
authorship, and the purpose of charity law is to increase public welfare by 
providing an incentive for marginal donors to invest in the production of 
charitable goods.106 
Essentially, works of authorship are a category of charitable 
goods.107  Works of authorship and charitable goods both increase public 
welfare by providing a public good.108  In fact, charity law provides that 
subsidizing the production and distribution of works of authorship is a 
charitable purpose.109 
It follows that copyright and charity law ought to be evaluated in 
relation to one another. Under the economic subsidy theories of copyright 
and charity law, indirect subsidies are justified to the extent that they are 
efficient. If copyright is intended to increase public welfare by providing an 
incentive for marginal authors to invest in the production of works of 
authorship, copyright is justified only to the extent that it is more efficient 
than charity law at providing incentives for marginal authors to invest in 
charitable goods. 
A. Copyright & Efficiency 
Copyright efficiently reduces ex ante transaction costs that cause 
market failures in works of authorship by devolving the decision—whether 
to invest in the production of works of authorship—onto marginal authors, 
who are generally in the best position to determine whether investing in a 
                                                
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. at 159. 
 106. See Bell, supra note 23, at 236. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id.; Frye, supra note 38, at 168. 
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work of authorship is likely to increase social welfare.110  Moreover, 
copyright forces authors to assume the risk of their investment by providing 
a subsidy only if an author actually produces a work of authorship with 
social value. Accordingly, copyright is generally highly efficient to the 
extent that it enables authors to recover the fixed and opportunity costs of 
investing in the production of works of authorship.111  While many authors 
would choose to invest in the production of works of authorship whether or 
not they received a subsidy, copyright presumably provides at least a 
marginal incentive to authors who contemplate investing more than a 
nominal amount of resources in producing a work of authorship.112 
However, copyright is inefficient to the extent that it provides a 
subsidy in excess of the fixed and opportunity costs of investing in the 
production of works of authorship, not only because those subsidies do not 
provide a marginal incentive, but also because they increase transaction 
costs.113  To the extent that authors are rational economic actors, a subsidy 
that exceeds the fixed and opportunity costs of investing in works of 
authorship is inefficient; it provides an incentive to overinvest in the 
production of works of authorship. The purpose of copyright is to encourage 
authors to invest in the production of works of authorship that will increase 
social welfare.114  Increasing the subsidy to works of authorship provides an 
incentive to invest in the production of works of authorship even if they will 
not increase social welfare. 
In addition, copyright increases ex post transaction costs by 
increasing the cost of consuming a work of authorship and increasing 
information costs relating to the use of that work of authorship.115  
Transaction costs imposed by copyright protection are justified to the extent 
that they are offset by increases in public welfare. But copyright protection in 
excess of what is required to provide an efficient incentive to marginal 
authors is not justified because it creates transaction costs that are not offset 
by increases in public welfare.116  In other words, copyright protection that 
does not provide an efficient incentive to marginal authors provides a private 
                                                
 110. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 23–25; Bell, supra note 23, at 267, 
267 n.212 
 111. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 24–25; Bell, supra note 23, at 
267 n.212, 267–68. 
 112. See Bell, supra note 23, at 236, 267 n.212, 267–68. 
113. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1032. 
114. Bell, supra note 23, at 236, 238. 
115. See id. at 277–78, 278 n.261. 
116. See id. 
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benefit without generating a corresponding public benefit, and reduces public 
welfare.117 
To make matters worse, public choice theory predicts that copyright 
is vulnerable to rent-seeking because authors have a strong incentive to lobby 
the government to increase the scope and duration of copyright protection, 
irrespective of its efficiency.118  In particular, owners of valuable copyrights 
have an incentive to invest in lobbying the government to increase the value 
of those copyrights.119 
B. Charity Law & Efficiency 
Charity law efficiently reduces transaction costs that cause market 
failures in charitable goods by devolving the decision—whether to invest in 
the production of charitable goods—onto marginal donors, who are often in 
good position to determine whether investing in the production of a 
charitable good is likely to increase social welfare.120  Specifically, donors 
are reasonably well-positioned to determine whether investing in the 
production of a work of authorship is likely to increase public welfare.121  If 
altruism motivates a donor to make a charitable contribution to the 
production of a work of authorship, it is likely that the production of that 
work of authorship will increase social welfare, and is thereby likely that any 
indirect subsidy provided by the government will be efficient.122  In addition, 
if altruism motivates a donor to make a charitable contribution to the 
distribution of a work of authorship or the support of an author, it is likely 
that the contribution will increase social welfare by enabling that author to 
produce additional works of authorship, and is thereby likely that any 
indirect subsidy provided by the government will also be efficient.123 
C. Comparing the Efficiency of Copyright & Charity Law 
While copyright efficiently reduces ex ante transaction costs relating 
to investments in the production of charitable goods, it increases ex post 
                                                
117. See id. 
118. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 261, 264–65; Lemley, supra 
note 35, at 1063. 
119. Lemley, supra note 35, at 1063–64. 
120. See Frye, supra note 38, at 162, 167–68, 171. 
121. Id. at 174. 
122. See id. at 166, 171. 
123. See id. 
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transaction costs.124  By contrast, charity law reduces both ex ante and ex 
post costs.125  Copyright reduces ex ante transaction costs more efficiently 
than charity law, because authors are generally in a better position than 
donors to determine whether investing in a work of authorship will increase 
social welfare.126  But copyright increases ex post transaction costs by 
granting windfalls to authors and creating opportunities for rent-seeking, 
while charity law is associated with low ex post transaction costs, because it 
depends on altruism.127 
It follows that copyright should focus on providing ex ante 
incentives to marginal authors, and rely on charity law or its analogues to 
provide any additional subsidies to authors.  Charity law is especially well-
suited to this goal, because it relies on altruism, rather than self-interest.128  
Copyright assumes that authors invest in the production of works of 
authorship in order to benefit themselves.129  By contrast, charity law 
assumes that donors invest in the production of works of authorship in order 
to benefit the public.130  Charity law is likely to increase public welfare 
because it subsidizes donations intended to increase public welfare.131 
But there are additional reasons to consider reducing the scope and 
duration of copyright and to consider relying on charity rather than copyright 
to increase investment in works of authorship.  Historically, transaction costs 
made it difficult for donors to determine which marginal authors to 
subsidize.132  Donors did not know which authors to subsidize, and did not 
have a convenient way to make contributions.133  Moreover, charity law 
created incentives for them to donate to charities rather than individual 
authors.134 
Accordingly, donors contributed to charitable organizations, which 
solved transaction costs by developing expertise in identifying which artists 
                                                
124. See Bell, supra note 23, at 261, 264, 277–78; Frye, supra note 38, at 166–
68. 
125. See Frye, supra note 38, at 166–68. 
126. See Bell, supra note 23, at 261, 264, 277–78; Frye, supra note 38, at 166–
68, 182. 
127. See Bell, supra note 23, at 261, 264, 277–78; Frye, supra note 38, at 166–
68, 182. 
128. Frye, supra note 38, at 168. 
129. See Bell, supra note 23, at 238, 242. 
130. See Frye, supra note 38, at 161. 
131. See id. at 160–62. 
132. Id. at 157, 182. 
133. See id. at 157. 
134. Id. at 187–88. 
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to subsidize and provided charitable contribution deductions.135  But authors 
and donors also developed legal workarounds, which enabled them to steer 
charitable contributions to particular authors.136  And more recently, social 
entrepreneurs have developed methods of using technology to solve charity 
failures, and more efficiently encourage and enable marginal donors to make 
donations in support of the production of works of authorship.137 
1. Fiscal Sponsorship 
For example, in the arts sector, donors and authors use fiscal 
sponsorship in order to enable donors to both support particular authors or 
particular projects and claim a charitable contribution deduction.138  In 
theory, charity law only permits taxpayers to claim charitable contribution 
deductions for donations to charitable organizations that are exempt under 26 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).139  As a consequence, it does not allow taxpayers to claim 
charitable contribution deductions for donations to individuals, which are 
generally treated as gifts for income tax purposes.140 
Donors and authors use fiscal sponsors in order to circumvent that 
restriction.141  A fiscal sponsor is a charitable organization that receives 
charitable contributions from donors on behalf of particular authors.142  The 
donor claims a charitable contribution deduction, the charity claims a fee, 
and the author receives the balance of the donation.143  Essentially, fiscal 
sponsorship is a legal fiction that enables donors to claim a deduction for a 
contribution to an individual.144  In theory, the charity receiving the 
contribution is not obligated to pass the donation on to its intended private 
recipient, and makes an independent determination that providing funds to 
that author is consistent with its charitable purpose.145  But this obligation is 
observed almost entirely in the breach, and charities acting as fiscal sponsors 
                                                
135. See Frye, supra note 38, at 183. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 159, 190–92. 
138. Id. at 187–88. 
139. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); PUB. COUNS. L. CTR., FISCAL SPONSORSHIP:  
AN ALTERNATIVE TO FORMING A NONPROFIT 501(C)(3) CORPORATION 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.publiccounsel.org/tools/assets/files/0483.pdf. 
140. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
141. PUB. COUNS. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 2; see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
142. See PUB. COUNS. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 2.; Ioby’s Fiscal Sponsorship 
Service, IOBY, https://www.ioby.org/fiscal-sponsorship (last visited Aug. 27, 2015). 
143. Frye, supra note 38, at 187. 
144. See id. 
145. See PUB. COUNS. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 2; Ioby’s Fiscal Sponsorship 
Service, supra note 142. 
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effectively function as conduits for donations that would otherwise be 
ineligible for charitable contribution deductions.146 
Interestingly, the IRS has tolerated the practice of fiscal sponsorship, 
despite its apparent inconsistency with federal tax law.147  The best 
explanation for the IRS’s forbearance is probably that while fiscal 
sponsorship may strain the letter of the law, it is generally consistent with its 
purpose.148  Charities generally exercise at least some oversight over the 
authors and projects they agree to sponsor, and sponsoring works of 
authorship is generally a charitable activity. 
In addition, fiscal sponsorship may help solve market failures 
associated with works of authorship by reducing transaction costs associated 
with determining which works to sponsor.149  It is costly for charities to 
determine which authors and projects to sponsor, and it is difficult for 
charities to solicit funds to sponsor works of authorship in general, rather 
than specific projects.150  Fiscal sponsorship reduces these transaction costs 
by enabling donors and authors to make a direct connection, without a 
mediating charity.151 
In any case, the prevalence of fiscal sponsorship suggests that charity 
law provides a salient incentive to at least some marginal donors. In the 
absence of fiscal sponsorship, donors could still make gifts to individual 
authors.152  The primary purpose of fiscal sponsorship is to ensure that 
donors can claim a charitable contribution deduction for their donation.153  
Presumably, the ability to claim a charitable contribution deduction 
motivates at least some marginal donors to give. 
However, fiscal sponsorship has a critical weakness, which is a 
function of its reliance on leveraging the charitable contribution deduction in 
the service of reducing transaction costs.154  Because fiscal sponsorship 
depends on the salience of the charitable contribution deduction, it cannot 
provide a salient incentive to marginal donors who cannot claim the 
                                                
146. See Frye, supra note 38, at 187; Ioby’s Fiscal Sponsorship Service, supra 
note 142. 
147. See Ioby’s Fiscal Sponsorship Service, supra note 142. 
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153. Id. at 1318–19.  In addition, fiscal sponsorships enable certain private 
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grants to individual authors.  See Ioby's Fiscal Sponsorship Service, supra note 142. 
154. See PUB. COUNS. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 3. 
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deduction.155  As a result, the overwhelming majority of taxpayers should be 
indifferent to fiscal sponsorship. 
2. Crowdfunding 
As I have previously shown, charity law is vulnerable to charity 
failures, or inefficiencies in its ability to solve market and government 
failures, caused by the inability of the charitable contribution deduction to 
provide a salient incentive to the overwhelming majority of taxpayers who 
do not itemize their deductions.156  I argue that the remarkable success of 
crowdfunding—which already provides more arts funding than the federal 
government—is a function of its ability to solve some of those charity 
failures.  First, crowdfunding reduces transaction costs associated with 
soliciting donations, by providing authors with low-cost platforms that make 
it easy to leverage the network effects of social media.157  Second, 
crowdfunding reduces transactions associated with making donations, by 
reducing search and information costs on donors.158  And third, reward-based 
crowdfunding enables authors to provide salient incentives to marginal 
donors who cannot claim charitable contribution deductions.159 
Essentially, crowdfunding is a way of using technology to solve 
charity failures.160  Of course, crowdfunding works of authorship is generally 
not charitable in the strictest sense, as most donations are not charitable 
contributions under the Internal Revenue Code.161  However, it is often 
charitable in the broader sense that the contributions include a gratuitous 
element and are intended to support the creation of works of authorship that 
will increase public welfare.162 
                                                
155. Fiscal Sponsorship for Nonprofits, NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, 
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3. Open-Source 
The open-source movement is another way of using technology to 
solve charity failures.163  Open-source is a development model that provides 
universal access to works of authorship by providing a free license to use and 
distribute the work, and by requiring that authors of derivative works also 
provide a free license to use and distribute the derivative work.164  The open-
source movement initially focused on computer software, enabling authors to 
provide a free license for the public to use, distribute, and improve source 
code.165  But the open-source movement has subsequently expanded to other 
forms of authorship and innovation, and has inspired many related open 
licensing schemes, like Creative Commons.166  Open-source is especially 
prevalent in various scholarly fields, and there is an emerging norm among 
scholars in many fields to provide open access to all of their papers and 
research.167 
Essentially, open-source is a way of using the Internet and social 
media to reduce transaction costs associated with copyright and other forms 
of intellectual property.168  Historically, works of authorship were distributed 
by commercial intermediaries, which reduced transaction costs by enabling 
authors to effectively distribute works of authorship to the public.169  The 
Internet and social media have rendered many of those commercial 
distributors largely irrelevant by enabling authors to effectively distribute 
certain categories of works of authorship to the public at no cost.170  Many 
authors do not need to recover the fixed and opportunity costs of 
authorship.171  For example, most scholars produce works of authorship as a 
function of their employment.172  As a consequence, open-source is attractive 
                                                
163. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF 
CREATIVITY 46 (2004). 
164. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 17−18; LESSIG, supra note 163, 
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visited Aug. 27, 2015). 
165. See LESSIG, supra note 163, at 46; About the Licenses, supra note 164. 
166. See About the Licenses, supra note 164. 
167. See id.  But see ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: 
MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 128 (rev. ed. 
2001). 
168. See LESSIG, supra note 163, at 46−47; supra Part V.A. 
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to scholars, as it enables them to distribute their works of authorship at no 
cost to the consumer, thereby increasing its distribution in the academic gift 
economy.173 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Copyright and charity law are similar because they both use indirect 
subsidies to solve market and government failures in public goods caused by 
free riding. Copyright solves market and government failures in works of 
authorship, a particular category of public goods. Charity law solves market 
and government failures in charitable goods, which include a broad range of 
public and quasi-public goods, including works of authorship. Copyright 
solves market failures in works of authorship by making them partially 
excludable and thereby limiting free riding, and solves government failures 
by reducing information costs associated with determining which works to 
subsidize. Charity law solves market failures in charitable goods by making 
certain charitable contributions deductible, and thereby compensating for 
free riding, and solves government failures by reducing transaction costs 
associated with majoritarian politics. In other words, copyright and charity 
law are complements that use different means to pursue similar goals. 
Notably, copyright and charity law are associated with different 
transaction costs. Copyright efficiently reduces ex ante transaction costs by 
delegating the decision whether to invest in works of authorship onto 
marginal authors and by forcing them to internalize the risk associated with 
investing in works of authorship. But copyright increases ex post transaction 
costs by making it more difficult and expensive for consumers to use works 
of authorship. Moreover, copyright encourages rent-seeking by the copyright 
owners of works with substantial social value. 
By contrast, charity law moderately reduces both ex ante and ex post 
transaction costs by delegating the decision whether to invest in charitable 
goods onto marginal donors, and by providing a relatively modest and 
contingent subsidy. While copyright reduces ex ante transaction costs 
associated with investment charity law more efficiently than charity law, 
copyright increases ex post transaction costs, and charity law does not. In 
addition, new technologies like crowdfunding and the open-source 
movement enable authors and donors to solve certain market and 
government failures previously addressed by copyright and charity law 
without the need for the indirect subsidies that copyright and charity law use 
to provide incentive to marginal authors and donors. 
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As a consequence, we should consider reducing the scope of 
copyright protection to focus on its ability to efficiently reduce ex ante 
transaction costs by enabling authors to recover their fixed and opportunities 
costs, and use charity law and related technologies to reduce ex post 
transaction costs associated with investment in the creation of works of 
authorship. 
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Newspersons’ shield laws are not meant to protect a privileged class 
of journalists.1  Nor are they meant to protect whistleblowers whose acts fall 
under a different set of laws.2  Instead, shield laws are meant to protect the 
free flow of information to the public.3  Unfortunately, the conversation 
pertaining to shield laws is consumed by arguments over how to define who 
                                                            
*  Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Media and the Arts, 
SUNY-Oswego. 
1. See infra Part III.D.1.a. 
2. See Sarah Wood Borak, Comment, The Legacy of "Deep Throat":  The 
Disclosure Process of the Whistleblower Protection Act Amendments of 1994 and the No 
FEAR Act of 2002, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 617, 618 (2005). 
3. See Jill Laptosky, Note, Protecting the Cloak and Dagger with an Illusory 
Shield:  How the Proposed Free Flow of Information Act Falls Short, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 
403, 421–22 (2010). 
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is a journalist.4  But in the digital age, this debate is futile, as no one can give 
an adequate answer.5  In response to this debate, this Article argues that a 
federal shield law needs to be adopted that protects information, not people.6  
In particular, this Article focuses on open leak organizations—such as 
WikiLeaks—that challenge traditional notions of journalism.7  First, this 
Article outlines the history and controversy surrounding WikiLeaks and the 
publishing of national security information.8  Then, it outlines the 
development of shield laws and the current state of the privilege at the 
federal level.9  Finally, the Article presents a model shield law that protects 
the publishing of national security information, which serves the public 
interest and does not create an immediate, irreparable harm.10 
I. INTRODUCTION 
WikiLeaks innocently describes itself as a non-profit media 
organization dedicated “to bring[ing] important news and information to the 
public”;11 but for many of the world’s governments, it is a saboteur 
organization centered on anarchy.12  In 2010, WikiLeaks exposed hundreds 
of thousands of U.S. government documents.13  Some consider the document 
dumps to be vital to political change, including being the catalyst for the 
                                                            
4. See id. at 425; HENRY COHEN & KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL34193, JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE:  OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND LEGISLATION IN THE 
109TH AND 110TH CONGRESSES 7 (2008). 
5. See infra Part III.C. 
6. See infra Part III.D. 
7. See infra Parts I–II. 
8. See infra Part II. 
9. See infra Part III.C–D. 
10. See infra Part III.D. 
11. About: What is Wikileaks?, WIKILEAKS, http://www.wikileaks.org/
About.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
12. See Stephanie Condon, Congress Lashes Out at Wikileaks, Senators Say 
Leakers May Have “Blood on Their Hands”, CBS NEWS (Nov. 29, 2010, 5:03 PM) http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/congress-lashes-out-at-wikileaks-senators-say-leakers-may-have-
blood-on-their-hands/.  Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT) said: 
[the leak] is an outrageous, reckless, and despicable action that will undermine the ability 
of our government and our partners to keep our people safe and to work together to 
defend our vital interests.  Let there be no doubt:  the individuals responsible are going to 
have blood on their hands. 
Id.  Rep. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) said, “[l]eaking the material is deplorable . . . .  The world is 
getting dangerous by the day and the people who do this are really low on the food chain as 
far as [I am] concerned.  If you can prosecute them, [let us] try.”  Id.  Rep. Peter King (R-NY) 
called WikiLeaks a terrorist group.  Id. 
13. See Baghdad War Diary, WIKILEAKS (Oct. 22, 2010, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.wikileaks.org/irq/. 
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Arab Spring.14  However, some, like the U.S. government, fear WikiLeaks’ 
power to reveal secrets—which led to the derailing of a proposed federal 
shield law for journalists.15 
The information that WikiLeaks published was often republished by 
traditional news outlets.16  However, no criminal charges were brought 
against these traditional news outlets for the revelations because the 
traditional media outlets exist in a framework of traditional laws.17  For 
example, the traditional media is exempt from prosecution under the 
Espionage Act of 1917 (“Espionage Act”) and cannot be punished for 
publishing truthful information that is legally obtained.18 
A traditional media outlet can offer confidentiality to a source.19  
However, it cannot offer absolute anonymity since most state shield laws 
have several exemptions.20  Furthermore, national security whistleblowers 
have almost no promise of anonymity, because of the lack of a federal shield 
law.21  Thus, the risks are high for whistleblowers when working with 
traditional news outlets.22  Consequently, there are less revelations of 
government information.23  It is arguable that in the traditional model, the 
public interest is harmed.24 
                                                            
14. Peter Walker, WikiLeaks and Guardian Hailed as Catalysts of Arab 
Spring, GUARDIAN, May 13, 2011, at 17. 
15. See Laptosky, supra note 3, at 426; infra Part III.C. 
16. See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press:  Wikileaks and the Battle 
over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 333–36 
(2011). 
17. See id. at 353–56.  To have done so would certainly have been politically 
unpopular, but it is possible that criminal charges would have held up in court.  See, e.g., 
Walter Pincus, Prosecution of Journalists Is Possible in NSA Leaks, WASH. POST, May 22, 
2006, at A4.  “Undoubtedly, Congress has the power to enact specific and appropriate 
criminal laws to protect government property and preserve government secrets.”  N.Y. Times 
Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (per curiam) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
18. See The Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–94 (2012); Pentagon 
Papers, 403 U.S. at 744–45 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
19. See, e.g., Latara Appleby, Judge Rules Reporter Can Claim Fifth 
Amendment and Keep Source Secret, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
(Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news/judge-rules-reporter-
can-claim-fifth-amendment-and-keep-source-secre. 
20. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (1972); Laptosky, supra note 
3, at 410–11. 
21. See Laptosky, supra note 3, at 421–22. 
22. See id. at 421. 
23. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy:  National 
Security Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 456 (2014). 
24. See infra Part III.D. 
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But for these open leak sites dedicated to transparency—such as 
WikiLeaks—the rules are seemingly different.25  Though open leak sites 
consider themselves journalism outlets,26 they seem to be more concerned 
with transparency for transparency’s sake.27  They are online platforms for 
uploading documents that allow for easy and instantaneous information 
leaks, which exceed any Freedom of Information Act.28  Their encryption 
software offers confidentiality, which surpasses any shield law.29  But their 
acts, such as WikiLeaks’ voluminous data dumps, suggest little regard for 
vetting information.30  Furthermore, without some secrecy, governments 
become less effective31 and total transparency creates very real threats to 
                                                            
25. See Benkler, supra note 16, at 347.  Most open leak sites are outside the 
United States and offer many complex jurisdictional issues since they are international 
organizations, usually with no physical headquarters.  Id.; see also infra note 43 and 
accompanying text.  But for the purpose of this Article, we will not treat open leak sites as 
extra-territorial entities.  We will treat them as any media outlet that publishes in the United 
States and assume that similar sites could one day be based in the United States, or at the very 
least, within its jurisdiction. 
26. E.g., WIKILEAKS, http://www.wikileaks.org (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
27. See infra Part II.A. 
28. See Doug Meier, Note, Changing with the Times:  How the Government 
Must Adapt to Prevent the Publication of Its Secrets, 28 REV. LITIG. 203, 211 (2008).  Some 
critics argue that open leak sites incite leakers to break the law with the ease of dropboxes and 
the promise of confidentiality.  Id.  Cf. Tim Wu, Drop the Case Against Assange, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/04/drop-the-case-against-
assange/ (arguing that there is no case against Assange for conspiracy to commit a crime). 
29. See About: What is WikiLeaks?, supra note 11. 
30. See Julian E. Barnes & Jeanne Whalen, Pentagon Slams WikiLeaks’ Plan 
to Post More War Logs, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052748704407804575425900461793766#articleTabs%3Article.  
WikiLeaks claims to have sought the assistance of the Pentagon in redacting names of people 
in potential danger from the documents’ release.  See id.  But, in August of 2011, it was 
reported that due to internal strife and lack of security, WikiLeaks accidently released 
thousands of documents without redaction.  See Hayley Tsukayama, WikiLeaks Cables 
Possibly Released by Accident, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2011), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/wikileaks-cables-possibly-released-by-
accident/2011/08/29/gIQAfQHsnJ_story.html. 
31. See Chris Good, WikiLeaks and the U.S. Image, ATLANTIC (Dec. 3, 2010, 
6:42 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/12/wikileaks-and-the-us-image/
67487/#. 
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people’s lives.32  Thus, it is arguable that in the new model the public interest 
is also harmed.33 
This Article puts forward a model shield law that promotes the free 
flow of information that serves the public interest.34  Part II of the Article 
outlines the history of the most infamous open leak site, WikiLeaks.35  Part 
III examines the history of shield law protection at the federal level, 
including the recent proposals in Congress.36  Part IV proposes a model 
shield law to be adopted at the federal level that would protect publishers of 
national security information that serves the public interest.37 
II. WIKILEAKS 
A. Brief History 
WikiLeaks can be best described as a whistleblower intermediary.38  
It receives and releases leaked documents produced by governments and 
corporations.39  WikiLeaks’ goal is “to allow [for] ‘the entire global 
community to relentlessly examine any document for its credibility, 
                                                            
32. See Raffi Khatchadourian, No Secrets: Julian Assange’s Mission for Total 
Transparency, NEW YORKER (June 7, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/06/
07/no-secrets.  Julian Assange has agreed that the release of documents could lead to the 
organization having “blood on our hands.”  Id. 
33. See Good, supra note 31; Khatchadourian, supra note 32.  The U.S. 
government has volumes of classified documents that would not be a direct harm to national 
safety if released, but the release would hurt American interests worldwide.  See Good, supra 
note 31.  For example, WikiLeaks’ document dump in November 2010, was maligned by the 
media as being mostly a revelation into the foreign policy playbook versus a revelation of 
incriminating material.  Id.; Rainey Reitman, The Best of Cablegate:  Instances Where Public 
Disclosure Benefited from the Leaks, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 7, 2011), http://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/01/cablegate-disclosures-have-furthered-investigative.  “By the 
end of the year, the story of this wholesale security breach had outgrown the story of the 
actual contents of the secret documents and generated much breathless speculation that 
something—journalism, diplomacy, life as we know it—had profoundly changed forever.”  
Bill Keller, The Boy Who Kicked the Hornet’s Nest, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 30, 2011, at 33, 
34.  These documents fall into a legal void and are not statutorily protected.  See Stewart 
Harris, The First Amendment and the End of the World, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 785, 816–28 
(2007) (providing a detailed discussion of this statutory void). 
34. See infra Part III.D. 
35. See infra Part II. 
36. See infra Part III. 
37. See infra Part IV. 
38. See Ann Woolner, WikiLeaks Secret Records Dump Stays in Legal Clear, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 27, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-
07-28/wikileaks-secret-records-dump-stays-in-legal-clear-ann-woolner. 
39. Meier, supra note 28, at 204. 
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plausibility, veracity, and validity.’”40  Some of these documents are 
classified for reasons such as national security and trade secrets, while others 
are classified for ostensibly public relations reasons.41 
WikiLeaks describes itself as a multijurisdictional public service.42  
Its headquarters are located in Sweden, because that nation provides the 
world’s most expansive journalist’s shield law protecting confidential 
sources.43  The public face of WikiLeaks is Julian Assange,44 but the site 
claims to have several founders, which include dissidents, journalists, and 
technologists from around the world.45  Since it was created in 2006,46 
WikiLeaks has released thousands of documents.47  These documents range 
from government-approved assassinations in Somalia to the dumping of 
                                                            
40. Id. 
41. See id. at 211–12. 
42. WikiLeaks:  About, WIKILEAKS, https://wikileaks.org/wiki/
WikiLeaks:About (last visited Aug. 11, 2015); see also Nicola Laver, Revealing the Truth, 
INT’L B. ASS’N (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Article/
Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=CEA217A9-682C-4F6A-9465-5445603259D7. 
43. Woolner, supra note 38.  WikiLeaks has no actual physical headquarters.  
See Khatchadourian, supra note 32.  For a discussion on the differences between press 
protections in the United States and Sweden, see David Corneil’s Harboring WikiLeaks:  
Comparing Swedish and American Press Freedom in the Internet Age, 41 CAL. W. INT’L. L. J., 
477 passim (2011). 
44. See Khatchadourian, supra note 32.  Julian Assange was born in 1971—
the same year as the Pentagon Papers decision—in Australia.  Id.; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. 
United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 713–14 (1971) (per curiam).  He has worked 
as a journalist and publisher.  Khatchadourian, supra note 32.  As a teenager, he was charged 
with hacking computers.  Id.  Later in life, he attended college in Australia, but dropped out.  
Id.  In 2006, he was a founding member of WikiLeaks.  Id.  He has also had run-ins with the 
law for sexual assault.  Justin Elliott, Julian Assange and the Sex Crime Trojan Horse, SALON 
(Dec. 1, 2010, 2:46 PM), https://www.salon.com/2010/12/01/wikileaks_assange_legal_
dangers/. 
45. MICHAEL D. HORVATH, WIKILEAKS, WIKILEAKS.ORG—AN ONLINE 
REFERENCE TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, INSURGENTS OR TERRORIST GROUPS? 5 
(2008), http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/03/wikithreat.pdf; see also 
WikiLeaks:  About, supra note 42.  WikiLeaks started as a pure wiki with posts, comments, 
and user-edited content.  Chris Grams, Does WikiLeaks Damage the Brand Image of Wikis?, 
OPENSOURCE.COM (Dec. 8, 2010), http://opensource.com/business/10/12/does-wikileaks-
damage-brand-image-wikis; HORVATH, supra note 45, at 5, 10; WikiLeaks:  About, supra note 
42. 
46. Khatchadourian, supra note 32.  The website is published under the 
auspices of the Sunshine Press Organization.  About:  What Is WikiLeaks?, supra note 11. 
47. Larry Shaughnessy, WikiLeaks Redacted More Information In Latest 
Documents Release, CNN (Oct. 22, 2010, 10:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/
10/22/wikileaks.editing/; WIKILEAKS, supra note 26.  WikiLeaks claims to have millions of 
documents, but has only released approximately twenty thousand since its inception.  Kim 
Zetter, Claim:  WikiLeaks Published Documents Siphoned over File Sharing Software, WIRED 
(Jan. 20, 2011, 11:54 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/01/wikileaks-and-p2p. 
66
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/1
2015] SHIELDING ACTS OF JOURNALISM 371 
toxic chemicals in the Ivory Coast.48  The document leaks have also included 
information that has had less significance on world affairs, such as the 
secrets of scientology and some of Sarah Palin’s personal e-mails.49 
WikiLeaks received the most media attention for its leaks of U.S. 
government documents.50  The organization has alleged that it still holds 
seventy-five thousand U.S. intelligence reports on Afghanistan, four hundred 
thousand classified U.S. reports on the Iraq War, and two hundred fifty 
thousand confidential U.S. State Department diplomatic cables.51  In April 
2010, WikiLeaks gained international recognition with the release of a video 
from the U.S. military operations in Iraq.52  This video, Collateral Murder,53 
was gun-sight footage of an airstrike that occurred in Baghdad in July of 
2007.54  Early on that day, the U.S. troops had been engaged in combat with 
insurgents.55  The video is from later in the day and shows Iraqis and two 
Reuters reporters walking the streets with no clear threat of violence.56  The 
U.S. soldiers, in Apache helicopters, mistakenly identify the Iraqis as 
insurgents and mistake the journalists’ camera as a gun.57  The Apache 
helicopter fired upon the crowd.58  The video captured the troops celebrating 
their actions.59  In the incident, ten Iraqi civilians and the two Reuters 
employees were killed.60 
                                                            
48. See Khatchadourian, supra note 32; WIKILEAKS, supra note 26. 
49. Khatchadourian, supra note 32. 
50. See HORVATH, supra note 45, at 5.  In 2010, WikiLeaks revealed a secret 
2008 U.S. Department of Defense study strategizing on how to counter WikiLeaks.  See id. 
51. Laver, supra note 42. 
52. See Sunshinepress, Collateral Murder-Wikileaks-Iraq, YOUTUBE (Apr. 3, 
2010), http://www.youtube.com/verify_age?next_url=http%3A//www.youtube.com/
watch%3Fv%3D5rXPrfnU3G0.  The WikiLeaks version of the military video has been 
criticized as being edited and distorting the truth.  Larkin Reynolds, NSJ Analysis:  WikiLeaks 
and Jus in Bello:  Room for a Congressional Response?, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. (Apr. 9, 
2010, 2:40 PM) http://harvardnsj.org/2010/04/nsj-analysis-applying-the-law-of-armed-
conflict-to-wikileaks/ (citing arguments that the video is consistent with the military’s report). 
53. Sunshinepress, supra note 52.  Full footage of Collateral Murder is 
available on YouTube.  Id.  Assange commented on the naming of the video:  “We want to 
knock out this collateral damage euphemism, and so when anyone uses it they will think, 
collateral murder.”  Greg Mitchell, One Year Ago:  How The ‘Era of WikiLeaks’ Began-With 
‘Murder’, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2011, 10:31 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
greg-mitchell/one-year-ago-now-the-era-the-era-b_841376.html. 
54. Elisabeth Bumiller, Video Shows 2007 Air Attack in Baghdad That Killed 
Photographer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, at A13. 
55. See id. 
 56. Id. 
57. See id. 
58. Id. 
59. See Bumiller, supra note 54.  The soldiers’ reactions are documented on 
the film:  “‘Look at those dead bastards,’ one pilot says. ‘Nice,’ the other responds.”  Id.  “A 
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The traditional press had originally covered the airstrike story in 
2007, but without much scrutiny.61  Reuters later made a Freedom of 
Information Act request for the video, but was denied a copy.62  The U.S. 
military conducted an investigation into the incident and relieved all of the 
soldiers of any wrongdoing, stating that the soldiers did not know there was a 
journalist in the group.63  The video was eventually leaked to WikiLeaks and 
Assange premiered the release at the National Press Club in Washington, 
District of Columbia on April 5, 2010.64  Just weeks after the video was 
posted, the military arrested Private First Class (“PFC”) Bradley Manning for 
being the source of the leak.65 
In July of 2010, WikiLeaks began releasing documents from the 
Afghan War Diary—a compilation of more than seventy-five thousand 
                                                                                                                                            
wounded man can be seen crawling and the pilots impatiently hope that he will try to fire at 
them so that under the rules of engagement they can shoot him again.”  Id. 
“All you gotta do is pick up a weapon,” one pilot says.  A short time later a van 
arrives to pick up the wounded and the pilots open fire on it, wounding two children 
inside. “Well, it [is] their fault for bringing their kids into a battle,” one pilot says.  
At another point, an American armored vehicle arrives and appears to roll over one 
of the dead. “I think they just drove over a body,” one of the pilots says, chuckling 
a little. 
Id. 
60. Id.  This is how Mr. Assange described the video: 
“In the first phase, you will see an attack that is based upon a mistake, but certainly 
a very careless mistake.  In the second part, the attack is clearly murder, according 
to the definition of the average man.  And in the third part, you will see the killing 
of innocent civilians in the course of soldiers going after a legitimate target.” 
Mitchell, supra note 53. 
61. See, e.g., Alissa J. Rubin, 2 Iraqi Journalist Killed as U.S. Forces Clash 
with Militias, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at A8.  A Google News Search for the month of July, 
2007 lists 45 articles on “Reuters journalist killed in Iraq” published on July 12th and 13th.  
See, e.g., id.  For comparison, a Google news search of July 17th, 2007 lists 122 articles on 
“Victoria Beckham snubs Paris Hilton.”  See, e.g., Victoria Beckham Snubs Paris Hilton, OH 
NO THEY DIDN’T! (July 17, 2007, 10:27 PM), http://ohnotheydidnt.livejournal.com/
13986354.html?thread=1618067762. 
62. See Khatchadourian, supra note 32.  Reuters viewed the video three years 
after the incident.  Id. 
63. Bumiller, supra note 54.  The redacted military report of the investigation 
stated the Reuters employees “‘made no effort to visibly display their status as press or media 
representatives and their familiar behavior with, and close proximity to, the armed insurgents 
and their furtive attempts to photograph the coalition ground forces made them appear as 
hostile combatants to the Apaches that engaged them.’”  Id. 
64. Khatchadourian, supra note 32; Mitchell, supra note 53. 
65. See Julie Tate, Manning Is Sentenced to 35 Years for Leaks, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 22, 2013, at A1.  Manning is now incarcerated at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  Id.  He is 
serving a thirty-five year sentence—with a chance for parole after ten years served—for 
leaking classified information to WikiLeaks.  Id.  He was acquitted of the most serious charge 
of aiding the enemy, but was found guilty of violating the Espionage Act.  Id. 
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previously unreleased documents relating to the war in Afghanistan.66  
Similarly, in October of 2010, WikiLeaks began to release hundreds of 
documents from the alleged holding of four hundred thousand documents 
relating to the Iraq War.67  In November of 2010, WikiLeaks began the 
release of U. S. diplomatic cables68 that it claimed numbered in the hundreds 
of thousands.69  WikiLeaks has also released information—through 
Facebook and Twitter—suggesting that it has other documents including 
classified video of the notorious Gharani massacre in Afghanistan,70 
incriminating material on British Petroleum, and an insurance file set to 
release all the documents held should WikiLeaks ever be shutdown.71  In 
2012, WikiLeaks published more material referring to the U.S. Intelligence 
community, including information on private companies, such as Stratford, 
and The Detainee Policies, which outlines the rules and procedures on U.S. 
military custody of detainees.72  In 2013, it was reported that WikiLeaks 
                                                            
66. Kabul War Diary, WIKILEAKS (July 25, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://
www.wikileaks.org/afg; see also Alastair Dant & David Leigh, Afghanistan War Logs:  Our 
Selection of Significant Incidents, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/interactive/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-events. 
67. Baghdad War Diary, supra note 13; see also Iraq:  The War Logs, 
GUARDIAN, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/iraq-war-logs (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
68. Reitman, supra note 33; see also Seumas Milne & Ian Black, Secret 
Papers Reveal Slow Death of Middle East Peace Process, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2011, 3:08 
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/23/palestine-papers-expose-peace-
concession.  The first release was one thousand six hundred documents.  Milne & Black, 
supra note 68. 
69. Reitman, supra note 33.  In the media, this leak was affectionately known 
as Cablegate.  Id. 
70. See Philip Shenon, WikiLeaks Founder to Release Massacre Video, DAILY 
BEAST (June 15, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-06-15/
wikileaks-founder-has-garani-massacre-video-according-to-new-email.html; Luke Villapaz, 
WikiLeaks Releases Massive 400 Gigabyte Encrypted ‘Insurance’ Files on Facebook, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES (Aug. 18 2013, 7:21 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/wikileaks-releases-massive-
400-gigabyte-encrypted-insurance-files-facebook-1389531. 
71. David Leppard & John Ungoed-Thomas, Assange Ready to Unleash Tide 
of New Secrets, SUNDAY TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at 17. 
72. Andy Greenberg, Wikileaks Announces ‘The Detainee Policies’:  A 
History of U.S. Post-9/11 Military Prisoners in Leaked Documents, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2012, 
7:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/10/25/wikileaks-announces-the-
detainee-policies-a-history-of-american-military-detainees-in-leaked-documents/. 
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released 1.7 million U.S. Intelligence documents from the 1970s.73  That 
year, it also played a role in evacuating Edward Snowden to Hong Kong.74 
B. Reaction to WikiLeaks 
WikiLeaks has received mixed reactions.75  Some people have 
praised WikiLeaks for advancing the free flow of information, transparency, 
and accountability.76  Proponents believe that WikiLeaks has democratized 
information so we are “no longer reliant on a middle man to offer up an 
interpretation of [what is] going on.”77  The Executive Director of the First 
Amendment Coalition called WikiLeaks a journalistic necessity.78  Time 
magazine called WikiLeaks the most important thing that could happen to 
journalism since the Freedom of Information Act.79  Both the Index on 
Censorship80 and the Amnesty International81 gave an award to WikiLeaks 
for its work.82  Some have even argued that WikiLeaks has spurred recent 
pro-democracy movements in the Middle East.83 
                                                            
73. Kissinger Cables:  WikiLeaks Publishes 1.7m U.S. Diplomatic Documents 
from 1970s, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 08, 2013, 4:42 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/wikileaks-files/9977979/Kissinger-Cables-Wikileaks-publishes-1.7m-US-diplomatic-
documents-from-1970s.html. 
74. Shane Scott, Offering Aid, WikiLeaks Gets Back in the Game, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 24, 2013, at A1. 
75. Compare Matthew Barakat, Daniel Ellsberg Defends Julian Assange, 
Bradley Manning, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 16, 2010, 1:56 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/16/daniel-ellsberg-wikileaks_n_797801.html, with Bank 
Julius Baer & Co. v. WikiLeaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
76. Barakat, supra note 75.  Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the classified 
Pentagon Papers praised WikiLeaks:  ‘“I think they provided a very valuable service.’”  Id. 
77. Sean Lahman, The Importance of WikiLeaks, DEMOCRAT & CHRONICLE 
(Dec. 10, 2010, 7:26 PM), http://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/local/
blogs/watchdog/2010/12/10/the-importance-of-wikileaks/2269423/. 
78. Laver, supra note 42. 
79. Tracy Samantha Schmidt, A Wiki for Whistle-Blowers, TIME, (Jan. 22, 
2007), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1581189,00.html. 
80. Index on Censorship, Winners of Index on Censorship Freedom of 
Expression Awards Announced, INDEX (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.indexoncensorship.org/
2008/04/winners-of-index-on-censorship-freedom-of-expression-award-announced/.  
WikiLeaks won the Economist New Media Award in 2008.  Id. 
81. Amnesty International Media Awards 2009:  Full List of Winners, 
GUARDIAN (June 3, 2009, 6:15 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/
jun/03/amnesty-international-media-awards. 
82. Id.; Index on Censorship, supra note 80. 
83. See Daily Mail Reporter, ‘First Wikileaks Revolution’:  Tunisia Descends 
into Anarchy as President Flees After Cables Reveal Country’s Corruption, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 
15, 2011, 12:27 EST), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1347336/First-Wikileaks-
Revolution-Tunisia-descends-anarchy-president-flees.html (arguing that movement to oust 
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WikiLeaks has also received criticism.84  In 2008, the Swiss banks—
Bank Julius Baer and Company and Julius Baer Bank and Trust Company—
filed a preliminary injunction against WikiLeaks after the site published 
information about the banks’ accounts.85  A California district court judge 
ordered a U.S. based ISP to stop hosting the WikiLeaks site.86  After much 
scrutiny in the press, the judge reversed his order stating that it may have 
amounted to unconstitutional prior restraint.87  In 2010, the U.S. government 
opened a criminal probe into the organization to determine if it could bring 
charges under the Espionage Act.88  The U.S. government has also blocked 
its employees from accessing WikiLeaks on both their work and personal 
computers.89  It has also been reported that the U.S. government has 
pressured international corporations90 and foreign governments to stop 
                                                                                                                                            
Tunisian president began after corruption in its government was released by WikiLeaks in a 
cable documenting widespread government corruption). 
84. See, e.g., Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. WikiLeaks, No. C08-00824JSW, 
2008 WL 413737, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008). 
85. Id. at *1.  There had been allegations that the bank was laundering money.  
See id. 
86. See Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. WikiLeaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985–86 
(N.D. Cal. 2008); Bank Julius Baer & Co., 2008 WL 413737, at *1–2. 
87. Bank Julius Baer & Co., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 985; see also Jonathan D. 
Glater, Judge Reverses His Order Disabling Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2008, at A11 
(describing Judge White’s concern over his previous order).  Despite the original order, mirror 
sites of Wikileaks.org were pervasive online.  See Glater, supra note 87. 
88. Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Prosecution of WikiLeaks Founder, but 
Legal Scholars Warn of Steep Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at A18 (explaining the legal 
hurdles of prosecuting the press under the Espionage Act because of subsequent rulings of the 
Supreme Court of the United States expanding free press rights); see also The Espionage Act 
of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–94 (2012). 
The one effort to prosecute recipients of a leak under the Espionage 
Act ended in embarrassment for the Justice Department.  In 2005, it indicted two 
lobbyists for a pro-Israel group who had been accused of receiving leaked 
information from a Pentagon official and conveying it to others.  The case 
collapsed after a judge ruled that prosecutors had to prove that the lobbyists 
specifically intended to harm the United States or benefit a foreign country. 
Savage, supra note 88. 
89. Ewen MacAskill, Ban on Federal Staff Reading WikiLeaks Hampering 
Work, Says US Official, GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2010, 13:54 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2010/dec/10/us-ban-staff-wikileaks-official. 
90. See, e.g., Ashlee Vance, WikiLeaks Struggles to Stay Online After Attacks, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/world/europe/
04domain.html?_r=1&hp.  PayPal suspended WikiLeaks account in early 2010.  Kevin 
Poulsen, PayPal Freezes WikiLeaks Account, WIRED (Dec. 4, 2010, 3:31 AM), http://
www.wired.com/2010/12/paypal-wikileaks/.  Amazon.com cut ties with WikiLeaks in 
December of 2010.  Vance, supra note 90.  Throughout its short history, WikiLeaks has had 
trouble securing funding.  Jeanne Whalen & David Crawford, How WikiLeaks Keeps Its 
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associating with WikiLeaks.91  Congress also proposed the Securing Human 
Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination Act (“SHIELD Act”), 
which would have expanded the Espionage Act to include criminalizing the 
dissemination of information “concerning the human intelligence activities 
of the United States” that harms the United States’ national interests.92  This 
was after the Federal Government convened a federal grand jury to examine 
if WikiLeaks could be charged with violating the Espionage Act.93  In 2013, 
documents leaked by Edward Snowden showed that the NSA had put Julian 
Assange on the manhunt target list, joining top members of Al-Qaeda.94 
These people and organizations may very well be journalistic 
entities.95  Like traditional news media, they serve the public interest in the 
free flow of information.96  It is even arguable that open leak sites are 
fulfilling the press’ role of watchdog by revealing information that the 
traditional media97 either does not have access to, or will not cover because 
of corporate flak.98  Nonetheless, if the traditional media companies came 
across sensitive information, such as leaked government documents, it is 
likely that they would publish the information.99  But under the current 
                                                                                                                                            
Funding Secret, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704554104575436231926853198. 
91. See Vance, supra note 90.  This has allegedly included pressuring foreign 
government to enforce sexual assault charges against Julian Assange.  See Elliott, supra note 
44 (arguing that the criminal prosecution for sexual assault was pretextual). 
92. Geoffrey R. Stone, WikiLeaks, the Proposed SHIELD Act and the First 
Amendment, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 105, 105 (2011); see also SHIELD Act, S. 4004, 
111th Cong. (2010).  The SHIELD Act may be unconstitutional on its face because it does not 
require that the publisher know that the information would cause grave and imminent harm.  
Stone, supra note 92, at 105. 
93. Assange Attorney:  Secret Grand Jury Meeting in Virginia on WikiLeaks, 
CNN (Dec. 13, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/12/13/
wikileaks.investigation/; see also The Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–94 (2012); 
John Letzing et al., WikiLeaks Wants Google Answers on Giving Staff Data to U.S., WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/wikileaks-wants-google-answers-on-giving-
staff-data-to-u-s-1422302056. 
94. Julian Assange on Being Placed on NSA “Manhunting” List & Secret 
Targeting of WikiLeaks Supporters, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Feb. 18, 2014), http://
www.democracynow.org/2014/2/18/julian_assange_on_being_placed_on. 
95. See About: What Is Wikileaks?, supra note 11. 
96. Id. 
97. See, e.g., supra notes 61, 77 and accompanying text. 
98. See Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Toward a Better Competition 
Policy for Media:  The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies that Support the Media 
Sector’s Unique Role in Our Democracy, 42 CONN. L. REV. 101, 106–07, 118 (2009).  A third 
of news journalists and editors surveyed have reported that news stories will not be reported if 
it might negatively affect an advertiser or the parent company.  Id. at 118. 
99. See id. at 119. 
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precedent, those traditional media entities would not be punished, whereas 
open leaks sites, such as WikiLeaks, are under fierce legal scrutiny.100 
Some in the traditional media have argued that open leak sites are 
not journalistic organizations deserving protection.101  Under traditional 
models, it is hard to argue otherwise.102  Open leak sites challenge our 
traditional notions of journalism.103  For example, WikiLeaks claims to vet 
information, but the release of hundreds of thousands of documents seems to 
suggest otherwise.104  Critics argue that WikiLeaks does nothing more than 
provide a platform for others to publish illegally obtained documents.105  
Finally, WikiLeaks’ own lack of transparency106 and absolute protection of 
secrecy are antithetical to the very principles that it espouses.107 
Many critics argue that the objective of open leak sites is not to 
simply promote the free flow of information for a democratic society, but to 
instead create a new world order based in anarchy—or the end of the 
established hegemony.108  Finally, some have argued that these sites incite 
criminal activity.109  The argument is that otherwise law-abiding citizens, 
                                                            
100. See Savage, supra note 88; Assange Attorney:  Secret Grand Jury Meeting 
in Virginia on WikiLeaks, supra note 93. 
101. See Benkler, supra note 16, at 319–20; Lauren J. Russell, Comment, 
Shielding the Media:  In an Age of Bloggers, Tweeters, and Leakers, Will Congress Succeed 
in Defining the Term “Journalist” and in Passing a Long-Sought Federal Shield Act?, 93 OR. 
L. REV. 193, 217–18 (2014). 
102. See Meier, supra note 28, at 211. 
103. See id. at 211–12. 
104. See About: What Is WikiLeaks, supra note 11; Condon, supra note 12; 
Kissinger Cables:  Wikileaks Publishes 1.7m U.S. Diplomatic Documents from 1970s, supra 
note 73. 
105. See Barnes & Whalen, supra note 30. 
106. About: What Is WikiLeaks?, supra note 11; see also Khatchadourian, 
supra note 32.  In September of 2010, Daniel Domscheit-Berg left WikiLeaks and began 
Openleaks, a site that is meant to be more transparent than its predecessor, which Domsheit-
Berg claimed was no longer a true wiki site.  Andy Greenberg, WikiLeaks’ Stepchildren, 
FORBES ASIA, Jan. 2011, at 28; Ben Piven, Copycat WikiLeaks Sites Make Waves, AL JAZEERA 
(Dec. 17, 2010, 3:25 GMT), http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2010/12/
20101216194828514847.html# (highlighting five new international open source 
whistleblower sites). 
107. See Benkler, supra note 16, at 312–13, 320; About: What Is WikiLeaks?, 
supra note 11. 
108. See Condon, supra note 12. 
109. Meier, supra note 28, at 211–12.  WikiLeaks argues that it does not incite 
criminal activity or solicit information, but Julian Assange has called for a list of the most 
wanted leaks.  See Woolner, supra note 38. 
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who would have never broken the law and revealed national security secrets, 
are enticed by the protections of anonymity offered by these sites.110 
Since 2010, WikiLeaks has struggled.111  Much of their funding has 
dried up, as companies such as PayPal announced that they would no longer 
work with the organization.112  Julian Assange took asylum in the Ecuadorian 
embassy in London after he was accused of sexual assault.113  Many 
members of the organization have left.114  Nevertheless, WikiLeaks has 
inspired many similar sites such as OpenLeaks, created by former WikiLeaks 
spokesperson, Daniel Domscheit-Berg; BrusselsLeaks; TradeLeaks; 
BalkanLeaks; RuLeaks, Russia; and Honest Appalachia.115  There are 
numerous other sites, and many more will come.116  Despite governments’ 
best efforts, the open leaks sites are here to stay and have changed our 
contemporary notions of state secrets and transparency.117 
                                                            
110. See Meier, supra note 28, at 211–12.  “WikiLeaks [has] describe[d] itself 
as ‘an uncensorable version of Wikipedia for untraceable mass document leaking and analysis.  
It combines the protection and anonymity of cutting-edge cryptographic technologies with the 
transparency and simplicity of a wiki interface.’”  Id. at 211.  Meier argues that this promise is 
more akin to espionage than it is journalism, which can offer complete anonymity, as most 
shield laws have exemptions for such cases.  Id. at 211–12; SHIELD Act, S. 4004, 111th 
Cong. (2010). 
111. See Poulsen, supra note 90. 
112. Id. 
113. Elliott, supra note 44; Ricardo Patino, Two Years on, Julian Assange is 
Still a Prisoner of Process, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2014, 14:30 EDT), http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/17/julian-assange-ecuador-political-asylum-
stalemate. 
114. See Benkler, supra note 16, at 325–26; see also Gina Pace, WikiLeaks in 
Disarray, Says Former No. 2 Staffer, CBS NEWS (Sept. 27, 2010, 12:37 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/wikileaks-in-disarray-says-former-no-2-staffer/. 
115. Leak Site Directory, LEAK DIRECTORY, http://leakdirectory.org/
index.php/Leak_Site_Directory (last updated June 6, 2015); Piven, supra note 106.  For a 
comprehensive list of open leaks sites, go to Leak Site Directory.  Leak Site Directory, supra 
note 115. 
116. See Leak Site Directory, supra note 115. 
117. See Benkler, supra note 16, at 347, 350 (outlining how the traditional 
press assisted the government in painting WikiLeaks as a threat). 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Lack of a Federal Shield Law118 
On the federal level, there is no statutory protection against 
compelled disclosure of sources.119  In the last thirty-four years, at least 
twenty U.S. journalists have spent time in jail for contempt of court after 
refusing to disclose their sources.120  In recent years, reporters like Vanessa 
Leggett,121 Judith Miller,122 Matt Cooper,123 Mark Fainaru-Wada,124 Lance 
Williams,125 and James Risen126 have received media attention because they 
                                                            
118. For purposes of this Article, we will only consider protections at the 
federal level.  See infra Part III.B–D.  Fortunately for journalists, there are now thirty-six 
states and the District of Columbia that have statutory protection for journalists.  See 
Laptosky, supra note 3, at 410.  Two other states have adopted evidentiary rules that protect 
journalists.  See id.  Of the eleven other states, only one state, Wyoming, does not recognize a 
qualified constitutional or common law privilege.  Id. (detailing the current state of shield 
laws in the country). 
119. See infra Part III.C. 
120. See Paying the Price:  A Recent Census of Reporters Jailed or Fined for 
Refusing to Testify, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 
http://www.rcfp.org/jail.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
121. Id.  Leggett wrote a non-fiction book about a high profile murder in 
Houston, Texas.  See Laptosky, supra note 3, at 412.  Leggett had interviewed the suspect 
while he was in custody.  Id. at 413.  The suspect subsequently committed suicide.  Id. at 414.  
The prosecution asked for Leggett’s notes and she refused.  Id.  The suspect was 
posthumously acquitted.  Id.  Then, the federal government began its own investigation and a 
grand jury subpoenaed Leggett.  Laptosky, supra note 3, at 414.  She refused to testify citing a 
reporter’s privilege.  Id.  The Fifth Circuit upheld her contempt conviction and she was 
sentenced to jail.  Id.  She served 168 days in jail.  Id. at 415. 
122. See Laptosky, supra note 3, at 415–19. 
123. See infra Part III.C. 
124. See Peter Meyer, Note, BALCO, the Steroids Scandal, and What the 
Already Fragile Secrecy of Federal Grand Juries Means to the Debate over a Potential 
Federal Media Shield Law, 83 IND. L. J. 1671, 1672–73 (2008) (detailing the BALCO case).  
Fainaru-Wada and Williams were reporters for the San Francisco Chronicle who wrote the 
book Game of Shadows:  Barry Bonds, BALCO, and the Steroids Scandal That Rocked 
Professional Sports, which investigated steroids use in professional sports.  Id. at 1673.  A 
source for their book was the contents of a leaked federal grand jury testimony.  Id. at 1672–
73.  The reporters were subpoenaed to disclose their source and they refused.  Id. at 1680.  
They were sentenced to eighteen months in jail, but never ended up serving time because the 
source came forward.  See id. 
125. See Meyer, supra note 124, at 1673. 
126. See Jonathan Mahler, Reporter’s Case Poses Dilemma for Justice Dept., 
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2014, at A1. 
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were threatened with jail time or served jail time for a refusal to disclose 
confidential sources in federal court.127 
B. Branzburg v. Hayes128 
The Supreme Court of the United States does not recognize a 
constitutional right for journalists to protect the confidentiality of their 
sources.129  In Branzburg, newspapers had published stories on illegal 
activity.130  The journalists kept their sources anonymous.131  Subsequently, 
the respective journalists were subpoenaed before a grand jury, but refused to 
reveal their sources.132  The journalists were found to be in contempt, but 
appealed, stating that forced compulsion violated the First Amendment.133 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the journalists and upheld the 
conviction.134  The Court stated there was no constitutional right not to 
answer a grand jury; rather, the only recourse was for journalists to seek 
statutory protections.135  However, in concurrence, Justice Powell created the 
oft-cited qualified privilege.136  Justice Stewart forwarded the three-part 
Branzburg test.137  In order to compel the journalist to divulge the source, the 
state must: 
                                                            
127. See Meyer, supra note 124, at 1671.  Furthermore, for the exposed source, 
federal law provides few protections for a whistleblower, especially when the information is 
classified or pertains to national security.  See Papandrea, supra note 23, at 450–51 (outlining 
the limited statutory protections for national security whistleblowers). 
128. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
129. See id. at 697–98.  In a 5-4 split, the Court rejected a First Amendment 
absolute privilege to confidential sources.  Id. at 665, 698.  In all three consolidated cases, the 
facts involved journalists who had been subpoenaed by a grand jury.  Id. at 667–70, 672–74.  
Justice Powell argued that the holding of the case was only limited to grand jury proceedings.  
Id. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring). 
130. Branzenburg, 408 U.S. at 667, 669.  Branzburg was consolidated with two 
other cases, Pappas and Caldwell, where the journalists were protecting the identity of a 
Black Panther.  Id. at 665, 669, 672. 
131. Id. at 667–70. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 668–70, 679–80. 
134. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708–09. 
135. Id. at 685, 706.  The Court said that states were free to interpret their own 
constitution’s free press clauses.  Id. at 706. 
136. Id. at 709–710 (Powell, J., concurring).  This privilege is recognized in all 
different types of proceedings.  See United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 
1986) (criminal case); LaRouche v. NBC, 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986) (civil case); 
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (civil case); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. 
Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594 (1st Cir. 1980) (libel case); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 
F.2d 464, 467–68 (9th Cir. 1975). 
137. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J. dissenting). 
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(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the [journalist] 
has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable 
violation of [the] law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought 
cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First 
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and 
overriding interest in the information.138 
C. Free Flow of Information Act(s) 
Within the first “six years after [the decision in] Branzburg, ninety-
nine bills for a federal shield law were introduced in Congress.”139  None of 
the bills even made it to a floor vote, as Congress could not agree on a 
definition of journalist.140  Congress then abandoned the proposals after the 
courts started to recognize the Branzburg qualified privilege and states 
started to adopt their own shield laws.141 
The national headlines of Judith Miller’s incarceration renewed 
Congress’ consideration for a federal shield law.142  In 2004, Senator Dodd 
proposed an absolute reporter’s privilege against disclosure of confidential 
information.143  Then, in 2005, a bipartisan bill was proposed in the House.144  
This bill was also an absolute privilege for confidential sources.145  But, all 
non-confidential sources only had a qualified privilege that could be 
overcome with a showing of clear and convincing evidence.146  These bills 
                                                            
138. Id.  Though the test is oft-cited, federal courts have mostly applied the 
majority opinion.  See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
139. Laptosky, supra note 3, at 421. 
140. Id.  The press organizations also insisted that a shield law gives absolute 
protection, which the government did not want to allow.  Id. 
141. Russell, supra note 101, at 207. 
142. Laptosky, supra note 3, at 416, 418, 421.  The media insisted that the 
privilege had to be absolute.  Id. at 421. 
143. Id.; see also Free Speech Protection Act of 2004, S. 3020, 108th Cong. § 3 
(2004). 
144. Laptosky, supra note 3, at 422.  This bill was also known as the Free Flow 
of Information Act of 2005, H.R. 581.  Id.; see also Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, 
H.R. 581, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005).  A companion bill was also introduced in the Senate.  
Laptosky, supra note 3, at 422; see also Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S. 340, 109th 
Cong. § 1.  United States Senator Lugar, the bill’s sponsor, stated that it was essential to 
protect whistleblowers and confidentiality agreements needed for the free “‘flow of 
information [to] the public.’”  Laptosky, supra note 3, at 422; Press Release, U.S. Senator 
Richard Lugar, Lugar Introduces Bill to Shield Media (Feb. 9, 2005), available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20050225213402/
http://lugar.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=231858. 
145. See H.R. 581 § 4. 
146. Id. § 2(a). 
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were revised several times to answer concerns from the executive branch, 
including the addition of an exception for national security.147  Eventually, 
these bills died in committee.148 
In 2007, shield law legislation was introduced once again.149  This 
time, there were concerns that the definition of journalist was too vague.150  
The 2007 bill protected anyone regularly engaged in journalism for “‘a 
substantial portion of the person’s livelihood or for substantial financial 
gain.’”151  But the House still passed the legislation.152  The proposed law 
would only protect information that was obtained while engaged in 
journalism.153  But, the privilege would not be absolute.154 
There was also a more stringent test in order to have confidential 
information compelled.155  The government would have to show that the 
information was necessary to:  (1) prevent a national-security threat;156 (2) to 
thwart imminent death or significant bodily harm; (3) ascertain the identity 
of an individual who disclosed a trade secret, personal health, or financial 
information; or (4) to identify the source of a leak of classified information 
that could cause significant and articulable harm to national security.157  
Finally, the court would have to apply a balancing test to determine whether 
compelling the disclosure serves more of a public interest than 
newsgathering.158  The Senate Judiciary Committee approved a similar bill, 
                                                            
147. See S. 1419, § 2(a)(3)(A); H.R. 3323, § 2(a)(3)(A). 
148. See Laptosky, supra note 3, at 424. 
149. See Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, S. 1267, 110th Cong. (2007); 
Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007). 
150. See COHEN & RUANE, supra note 4, at 7. 
151. H.R. 2102, § 4(2); see also Federal Shield Law Efforts, REPORTERS 
COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/federal-shield-law (last updated 
Sept. 12, 2013). 
152. See Federal Shield Law Efforts, supra note 151.  In October of 2007, the 
House passed H.R. 2102 by a vote of 398–21.  Id. 
153. See id. 
154. See id. 
155. See id.  First, the government must exhaust all available sources.  See H.R. 
2102 § 2(a)(1); S. 1267 § 2(a)(1). 
156. Federal Shield Law Efforts, supra note 151.  A national-security threat 
includes a terrorist threat.  Id. 
157. Id.  The government must first exhaust all available sources and the leak 
would have to harm national security.  See id. 
158. Id.  “[T]he public interest in compelling disclosure of the information . . . 
outweighs the public interest in gathering or disseminating news or information.”  Free Flow 
of Information Act of 2013, H.R. 1962, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2013).  The privilege does not 
apply to eyewitness testimony of a crime or tortuous activity.  Federal Shield Law Efforts, 
supra note 151. 
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which was awaiting a full-vote in the Senate that never happened.159  In 
2009, the House passed another bill that was identical to the bills introduced 
in 2007.160  The Senate modified it and the bill was placed on the Senate 
calendar.161  However, Congress took no significant action on it.162 
In 2013, the White House showed support for federal shield law 
legislation.163  The bill supported by the White House was authored by 
Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-NC).164  
This particular bill gave different levels of protection depending on if a case 
was civil, criminal, or dealing with national security.165  In a civil case, the 
party seeking the source would have to show why the need for the 
information outweighed the public interest in newsgathering.166  In a criminal 
case, the test would be similar with the exception being that the burden of 
proof would be on the journalists seeking to quash the subpoena.167  When 
the case involved national security interests, the government would only 
have to show that information may prevent harm to national security.168 
D. Analysis 
1. Focus on Protecting Information, not Journalists 
a. Serving the Public Interest 
Pursuant to Bartnicki v. Vopper,169 a media outlet that publishes 
truthful information that it obtained legally cannot be punished.170  But in 
                                                            
159. KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34193, JOURNALISTS’ 
PRIVILEGE:  OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND LEGISLATION IN RECENT CONGRESSES 4 2011. 
160. Id. at 10.  The Senate Judiciary Committee approved a similar bill and it is 
awaiting a full-vote in the Senate.  Id. at 9. 
161. Id. 
162. See id. at 9.  Many people believe that a WikiLeaks’ document dump has 
derailed the Federal Reporter’s Shield Law.  See, e.g., Jonathan Peters, WikiLeaks Would Not 
Qualify to Claim Federal Reporter’s Privilege in Any Form, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 669 
(2011).  For a discussion on this and an argument as to why the Federal Reporter’s Shield Law 
would not protect WikiLeaks, see WikiLeaks Would Not Qualify to Claim Federal Reporter’s 
Privilege in Any Form.  Id. 
163. See Charlie Savage, Criticized on Records Seizure, White House Pushes 
Shield Law, PITTSBURGH POST, May 16, 2013, at A5. 
164. See Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, S. 987, 113th Cong. (2013). 
165. Id. § 2(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
166. Id. § 2(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
167. Id. § 2(b).  The burden of proof would be clear and convincing evidence.  
Id. § 2(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
168. S. 987 § 2(a)(2)(A)(iv). 
169. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
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today’s media landscape, the definition of who is a publisher deserving 
protection is unclear.171  But journalists are not defined by who they are.172  
A person should not have to work for a traditional media company or have 
been trained in a journalism program in order to be considered a journalist 
deserving legal protections.  Rather, it is the information collected and 
disseminated that defines journalism.  It is more important to protect the 
principles and product of journalism, than it is to be obsessed with the person 
behind it.173 
Thus, any federal shield law should define protected persons as any 
person who collects, vets, and disseminates information that is in the public 
interest.174  Furthermore, just because a person receives information from an 
anonymous source, that should not destroy his or her journalistic 
legitimacy.175  In fact, traditional journalists have used anonymous sources 
for decades to serve the public interest.176 
                                                                                                                                            
170. Id. at 517, 529–30 (holding that radio station could publish illegally taped 
phone conversation that it had obtained legally from a third person). 
171. See supra Part III.C. 
172. See supra Part III.C. 
173. See O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 88, 99 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006); supra Part III.C.  A website that accepts the posting of confidential information is 
“conceptually indistinguishable from publishing a newspaper, and we see no theoretical basis 
for treating it differently.”  O’Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 99. 
174. See Russell, supra note 101, at 225.  Note:  This policy is concerned with 
information pertaining to national security that is almost always in the public interest.  See 
Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, S. 987, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(A)(iv) (2013); Meier, 
supra note 28, at 209; Russell, supra note 101, at 225.  The idea of defining journalist 
conflicts with the First Amendment protection of all publishing, but nevertheless, courts have 
attempted to in applying reporter’s privilege.  Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 
151 F.3d 125, 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Russell, supra note 101, at 225.  In Titan 
Sports v. Turner Broadcasting Systems Inc., the Third Circuit forwarded a three-prong test:  
(1) the claimant was engaged in investigative reporting; (2) the claimant was gathering news; 
and (3) the claimant “possess[ed] the intent at the inception of the newsgathering process to 
disseminate this news to the public.”  Titan Sports, Inc., 151 F.3d at 131.  The Second Circuit 
has held that in order to claim the privilege, the person must be “involved in activities 
traditionally associated with the gathering and dissemination of news, even though he may not 
ordinarily be a member of the institutionalized press.”  Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 
136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987). 
175. See Borak, supra note 2, at 624; Russell, supra note 101, at 222–23. 
176. See, e.g., CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S 
MEN 71 (1974). 
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2. New Standard for Compelling Disclosure of Confidential Sources 
Under the status quo, open leaks sites would be compelled to 
disclose their sources or any information leading to the source.177  
Consequently, Congress should pass a new version of the Free Flow of 
Information Act that protects all publishers who are serving the public 
interest.  This Free Flow of Information Act should apply anytime the news 
media is subpoenaed and faces a compelled disclosure of its sources.  
However, the new proposed law would only apply when instances of 
national security leaks and compelled disclosure would lead to the source of 
the leak. 
First, if the leak revealed illegal government actions, the publisher 
would not be compelled to disclose the source.178  If the leak did not reveal 
illegal action, then in order to compel the disclosure of the source, the 
government will have to prove a three-part test.  The government must show 
with a preponderance of evidence179 that:  (1) the disclosure is necessary to 
identify the source of the leaked classified information;180 and (2) that the 
leak could cause “direct, immediate, and irreparable damage” to national 
security.181  Third, the court must apply a balancing test to determine whether 
                                                            
177. See Meier, supra note 28, at 211–12. 
178. See Borak, supra note 2, at 624; Meier, supra note 28, at 209.  The leak 
served the public interest in line with the stated principles of whistleblower statutes.  See 
Borak, supra note 2, at 624; Meier, supra note 28, at 209.  Thus, all parties are immune from 
liability.  See Borak, supra note 2, at 624; Meier, supra note 28, at 209–10 (discussing the 
legislative history of federal whistleblower statutes). 
179. Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, S. 1267, 110th Cong. § 2(a) 
(2007).  This is a lower standard than the previous federal shield law bills, both of which 
failed to be adopted.  Compare Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, S. 1267, 110th Cong. § 
(2)(a) (2007), and Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § (2)(a) 
(2007) with Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S. 1419, 109th Cong. § (2)(a) (2005) and 
Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, H.R. 581, 109th Cong. § (2)(a) (2005).  Both of these 
bills occurred before WikiLeaks became prominent and essentially killed the Act.  See S. 1419 
§ 2; H.R. 581 § 2.  This compromise might propel passage.  See S. 1267 § 2(a); H.R. 2102 § 
2(a); S. 1419 § 2(a); H.R. 581 § 2(a).  More importantly, the standard is also lower than the 
test used by the independent review tribunal.  See S. 1267 § 2(a); H.R. 2102 § 2(a).  The 
desired effect is to encourage potential whistleblowers to use the legal channels rather than 
risk leaking, and eventual disclosure.  Compare S. 1267 § (2)(a)(1) and H.R. 2102, 110th 
Cong. § (2)(a)(1) with Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972). 
180. See S. 1267 § (2)(a)(1); H.R. 2102, § (2)(a)(1).  The government must first 
exhaust all available sources.  See S. 1267 § (2)(a)(1); H.R. 2102, § (2)(a)(1). 
181. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 730 
(1971) (per curiam); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 558 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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this specific compelling disclosure serves more of a public interest than the 
protection of newsgathering.182 
3. Balancing Transparency and Government Efficacy 
Of course, this policy is in response to the government’s reaction to 
WikiLeaks and other open leak sites, and their mantra of complete 
transparency.183  This reaction has included the derailing of a needed federal 
shield law and whistleblower protection enhancement for those who 
undoubtedly disseminate information in the public interest.184  The 
government’s reaction might have been an overreaction, but it is 
understandable from its perspective.185  These leaks may have caused some 
damage to the United States’ reputation186 and may have put actual lives in 
danger.187 
There is no doubt that open leaks sites do add to the free flow of 
information and government accountability.188  But if these sites are going to 
take the place of corporate media to better serve the public interest, then they 
must live up to the ideals of journalism.189  Whoever it is that works at open 
leaks sites must actually vet through the information190 and decide what truly 
                                                            
182. See Free Flow of Information Act of 2009, S. 448, 111th Cong. § 
2(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2009) (currently stalled in committee).  “[T]he [public] interest in compelling 
disclosure [of the information] outweighs the public interest in gathering [or] disseminating 
the information or news.”  Id. 
183. Shield Act, S. 4004, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 448 § 2(a)(2)(B)(ii).  See also 
About:  What is WikiLeaks?, supra note 11. 
184. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
185. See Ken Dilanian & Richard A. Serrano, Snowden Leaks Severely Hurt 
U.S. Security, Two House Members Say, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/
print/2014/jan/09/nation/la-na-snowden-intel-20140110. 
186. Id.  Or more accurately has setback its reputation rebuilding after the 
international community’s opinion about the Bush Administration.  See, e.g., id. 
187. See David Williams, Taliban:  We’ll Behead WikiLeaks Informers, DAILY 
MAIL.COM, (July 29, 2010, 22:24 EST), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-
1298817/Taliban-Well-behead-WikiLeaks-informers.html.  The Taliban was on record 
promising to behead any informants found on WikiLeaks.  Id.  In August of 2011, it was 
reported that WikiLeaks accidently released thousands of documents without redaction.  
Tsukayama, supra note 30; Williams, supra note 187. 
188. See, e.g., Daily Mail Reporter, supra note 83 (arguing that movement to 
oust Tunisian President began after corruption in its government was released by WikiLeaks 
in a cable documenting widespread government corruption). 
189. See, e.g., Woolner, supra note 38.  WikiLeaks is admittedly an advocacy 
group, but claims that it is still a publication organization.  Id. 
190. See id.  WikiLeaks claims to have five journalists working full-time and 
about eight hundred people who worked occasionally, none of whom were compensated.  
Stefan Mey, Leak-o-nomy:  The Economy of Wikileaks (Interview with Julian Assange), 
82
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/1
2015] SHIELDING ACTS OF JOURNALISM 387 
is in the public interest.191  They must redact names—as WikiLeaks has 
done192—and consider what lives are being put in danger.193  Finally, these 
sites must consider the cost that complete transparency has on the public.194  
This can be ascertained by assessing the benefits of publication versus the 
harms of publication.195  Information about military abuse, possible war 
crimes, corruption,  and massive spy programs serve the public interest as it 
informs us about the government who represents us.196  A government, 
which we empower to take lives and for which we sacrifice our lives.197  But 
if transparency is just to spite those in power, to reveal behind-the-door 
meetings and innocuous promises made by diplomats,198 then it hardly serves 
the public interest and actually undermines the value of such sites.  
Furthermore, if publication by open leaks sites lead to immediate harms such 
as aiding terrorism or actual people dying,199 then these sites should not be 
protected. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Since the Nineteenth Century, journalists have defined themselves as 
the watchdog, informing and protecting the public from the abuses of 
powerful public and private interests.200  This perceived role has been the 
basis for journalists’ arguments that they deserve special privileges not 
                                                                                                                                            
MEDIEN-ÖKONOMIE-BLOG (Jan. 4, 2010), http://web.archive.org/web/20101213110334/http://
stefanmey.wordpress.com/2010/01/04/leak-o-nomy-the-economy-of-wikileaks/.  There is no 
physical headquarters for the organization.  Khatchadourian, supra note 32. 
191. See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text. 
192. Shaughnessy, supra note 47. 
193. See Khatchadourian, supra note 32.  Julian Assange has said that the 
release of documents could lead to the organization to have “blood on our hands.”  Id.  
However, there were no reports of deaths directly caused by information released in the leaks.  
Adam Levine, Gates:  Leaked Documents Don’t Reveal Key Intel, but Risks Remain, CNN 
(Oct. 17, 2010, 8:25 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/10/16/wikileaks.assessment/. 
194. See Khatchadourian, supra note 32. 
195. See id.  The same test as above, but self-regulated.  See id.  Ideally, all 
media would conduct this internal check.  See id. 
196. See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra note 50–56 and accompanying text. 
198. See Joshua Foust, WikiLeaks Hurts the Cause of Transparency, PBS (Dec. 
3, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/security/wikileaks-hurts-the-cause-of-
transparency/5503.  “The Wikileaked embassy cables have been viewed as either the foreign 
policy equivalent of TMZ or as the ruination of the entire international system.”  Id. 
199. See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, Bradley Manning Leak Did Not Result in Deaths 
by Enemy Forces, Court Hears, GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013 17:48 EDT), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/bradley-manning-sentencing-hearing-pentagon. 
200. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
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afforded to the general public.201  But critics argue that the traditional media 
has abandoned its watchdog role to become a part of the giant oligopolistic 
industries that they were meant to investigate.202  Critics claim that, as 
another power player in this hierarchy, the corporate media are unable and 
unwilling to investigate government sources or other barons of industry.203 
Conversely, if government abusers like Abu Ghraib, Black Sites, and 
Wiretapping were all exposed by the traditional press, then it is arguable that 
the current legal structure is working just fine.204  So, why would the law 
need to protect open leak sites, like WikiLeaks, at all?  Why would the law 
need to give any further protections to whistleblowers?  The answers are 
found in the source of the WikiLeaks most notorious drops:  Army PFC 
Bradley Manning.205 
One must consider why Manning went to this new media site and not 
the traditional press.  For PFC Manning, the most important consideration 
had to be that WikiLeaks promised absolute confidentiality.206  With the 
traditional press in the United States, there is no federal shield law.207  
Manning would not have had any real promise of confidentiality in the 
traditional model.208  Even if Congress had passed the Free Flow of 
Information Act, the exemptions added on to it would have undermined any 
promise of confidentiality for him.209  Moreover, no current whistleblower 
law protected him from criminal prosecution for whistleblowing on national 
security secrets.210 
Ultimately, Manning thought his justified actions were safer with 
WikiLeaks, though it did not turn out to be true.211  Without WikiLeaks, the 
world would never have been exposed to videos such as Collateral Murder 
                                                            
201. See id. at 721.  “The press has a preferred position[ing] in our 
constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored 
class, but to bring fulfillment to the public’s right to know.”  Id.; see also Potter Stewart, Or of 
the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (arguing that the press clause gave the news 
media separate additional protection than that afforded by the free speech clause). 
202. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
203. See, e.g., ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY:  
COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES 1 (1999). 
204. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
205. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
206. See Meier, supra note 28, at 211. 
207. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
208. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
209. See Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, S. 987, 113th Cong. §§ 2, 5 
(2013); Tate, supra note 65. 
210. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 
730 (1971) (per curiam) (White, J., concurring); Borak, supra note 2, at 635. 
211. See Tate, supra note 65; supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
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and other important leaks, which arguably had less to do with protecting 
national security and more to do with protecting public perception.212  So, 
maybe WikiLeaks and PFC Bradley Manning are “far from deserving 
condemnation for their courageous reporting,” but instead maybe they 
“should be commended for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers 
saw so clearly.”213 
 
                                                            
212. See Meier, supra note 28, at 211–12; Sunshinepress, supra note 52.  
Recent leaks have revealed that after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, the U.S. Government ignored 
reports of torture by Iraqi Officials, kept counts on over sixty-six thousand civilian casualties, 
and ignored reports of civilians killed at U.S. Army checkpoints.  Huge Wikileaks Release 
Shows US ‘Ignored Iraq Torture’, BBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2010, 5:42 ET), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11611319. 
213. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring). 
85
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
86
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/1
CARE AND FEEDING OF PRIVACY POLICIES AND KEEPING 
THE BIG DATA MONSTER AT BAY:  LEGAL CONCERNS IN 
HEALTHCARE IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
CHRISTINA SCELSI* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 392 
II.  WHAT IS THE INTERNET OF THINGS? ............................................. 396 
A.  Definition .......................................................................... 396 
B.  Prediction of Impact ......................................................... 397 
C.  Data .................................................................................. 398 
1.  How Data is Collected in Healthcare ................... 398 
2.  How Data is Used in Healthcare .......................... 398 
D.  Crime Concerns ................................................................ 398 
1.  General and Healthcare Related  
 Crime Concerns ................................................... 398 
i.  Hypothetical:  Hacking an  
 Insulin Pump ........................................... 402 
2.  Data Discrimination ............................................. 405 
E.  Internet of Things and Health Devices ............................. 405 
F.  Policy and Security Recommendations ............................. 406 
III.  LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS .............................. 408 
A.  General Data .................................................................... 408 
1.  Federal Privacy Act of 1974 ................................ 409 
2.  COPPA ................................................................ 410 
                                                     
* Christina Scelsi is the principal of Scelsi Entertainment and New Media 
Law with offices in Orlando and Port Charlotte, Florida, where she focuses her practice on 
entertainment, intellectual property, internet, technology, and business law.  Ms. Scelsi has 
served as in-house counsel for an international game based-simulations company, where she 
was responsible for advising on software licensing matters, trademarks, copyright, and 
corporate issues.  Ms. Scelsi began her practice in 2009, working with a punk music festival, 
and in years since has worked with clients ranging from software companies and independent 
filmmakers to professional daredevils and reality television participants.  She is the Chair-
Elect of the Florida Bar Entertainment, Arts and Sports Law Section.  Ms. Scelsi has served as 
an editor of the book Computer Games and Virtual Worlds:  A New Frontier in Intellectual 
Property Law, which was published by the ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law, is a 
chapter contributor to The American Bar Association’s Legal Guide to Video Game 
Development, and is the author of the PunkLawyer Blog.  Ms. Scelsi received her B.B.A. in 
marketing from Loyola University New Orleans, a J.D. from Saint Louis University School of 
Law, and an LL.M. in entertainment and media law from Southwestern School of Law. 
87
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
392 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
3.  California Online Privacy Protection Act 
(“CalOPPA”) ....................................................... 413 
B.  Health Data Laws and Regulations .................................. 414 
1.  The Hippocratic Oath ........................................... 414 
i.  The Hippocratic Oath in the Era of the 
Selfie ....................................................... 415 
2.  Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient 
Records ................................................................ 420 
3.  Medicare Conditions of Participation .................. 420 
4.  HIPAA ................................................................. 421 
5.  HITECH Act ........................................................ 421 
6.  ACA ..................................................................... 423 
7.  Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 
(“GINA”) ............................................................. 425 
C.  Impact of Internet of Things on Health Laws ................... 425 
1.  Hesitancy of Healthcare Providers ....................... 426 
2.  Imposition of Health Privacy Laws on New 
Categories of People ............................................ 427 
i.  Web Developers, App Developers, Tech 
Companies .............................................. 426 
3.  FDA Regulation of Health Apps  
 and Devices .......................................................... 428 
4.  Conflicts in Terms of Service  
 and Privacy Policy ............................................... 430 
5.   Interoperability issues .......................................... 431 
6.  BYOD .................................................................. 432 
7.  Recalls .................................................................. 433 
IV.  CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 434 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to 
the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, 
and for securing to the individual . . . the right to be let alone. . . . 
[N]umerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the 
prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed 
from the house-tops.”1 
                                                     
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 195 (1890). 
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The concept of privacy under the law, and concerns about invasion 
of that privacy in the face of new technologies is hardly new.2  While the 
above quotation sounds like it could have come from a recent blog post or 
online news story, it is actually from the 1890 Harvard Law Review article 
The Right to Privacy, written by Supreme Court Justices Brandeis and 
Warren.3  Though the article was inspired by the justices’ concerns about the 
advent of snapshot photography that allowed reporters to take pictures of the 
justices and their families in public that were later published in the 
newspaper, when read amid today’s concerns about privacy in the era of 
Google Glass and private drones, these concerns ring just as true as they did 
in the Nineteenth Century.4  Technology company Cisco has estimated that 
ten billion devices were already connected to the Internet in 2013, and that 
this number will grow to more than fifty billion by 2020.5  Of this growth, a 
recent Business Insider report estimates that enterprise use of the Internet of 
Things (“IoT”) will lead at first, but that growth in the home and government 
sectors will ultimately surpass it, with government use of the IoT taking the 
lead by 2019.6  This report also notes that experts believe the primary benefit 
of the growth of the IoT will be savings in terms of efficiency and costs for 
the home, government, and enterprise sectors; but that finding solutions to 
security and compatibility concerns related to the use of these devices is the 
key to enabling widespread adoption.7  While technology continues to race 
ahead of the law, much remains unclear about how laws written in the age of 
paper records will apply to these new advances.8  As the line between the 
user and the device becomes increasingly blurred, the need for legal and 
                                                     
2. See id. at 193–95. 
3. Id. at 193, 220. 
4. See id. at 195; Doug Gross, This Gadget Can Knock Drones and Google 
Glass Offline, CNN (Sept. 9, 2014, 10:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/08/
tech/mobile/cyborg-unplug-google-glass/. 
5. See Michael Endler, Cisco CEO:  We're All in on Internet of Everything; 
INFORMATION WEEK (Feb. 25, 2013, 12:11 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/
software/information-management/cisco-ceo-were-all-in-on-internet-of-everything/d/d-
id/1108801?; FED. TRADE COMMISSION, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD i (2015), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-
trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-
privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf; The Internet of Things, CISCO, 
http://www.cisco.com/web/solutions/trends/iot/overview.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2015). 
6. John Greenough, The 'Internet of Things' Will Be the World's Most 
Massive Device Market and Save Companies Billions of Dollars, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2014, 
8:35 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-internet-of-things-market-will-grow-
2014-10. 
7. Id. 
8. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195, 199–200; FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION, supra note 5, at viii. 
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business privacy solutions that are agile and practical becomes even more 
paramount.9 
While the use of big data that is generated by the IoT has great 
potential to produce boundless technological advances, it also presents some 
very real and serious legal concerns for consumers, as well as a number of 
regulated industries.10  As these great changes occur, lawmakers and 
regulators will need to not only stay on top of the related need for updates 
and changes to the relevant laws—to protect consumers and businesses from 
the potential misdeeds that can be done using big data—but also be prepared 
to respond with effective solutions.11  From the Target and Home Depot data 
breaches, to the dire possible results of the use of tools—like GPS spoofing 
devices that can take a plane or train off course, to the possible use of big 
data by terrorists, like was done in the Mumbai hotel attack of 2008—as the 
IoT develops, lawyers will be presented with challenges in the form of laws 
that are not up to date with the real world technologies that their clients are 
using, and opportunities to not only influence changes to these laws, but also 
to develop creative solutions to help clients navigate this changing 
landscape.12 
A prime example of the myriad of data privacy issues that consumers 
and businesses face—both in regulated and unregulated industries—can be 
found in an examination of the issues currently faced by the healthcare 
industry in the age of the IoT.13  While wearable fitness trackers, like 
FuelBand® and FitBit® devices, seem like innocuous gadgets urging users 
to move more and get in shape, the long term impact of having data about 
one’s habits and health collected are unknown.14  How would the data be 
viewed in the eyes of a person’s physician, or insurance company for that 
matter?15  When the device is more necessary for life—like a pacemaker 
capable of remote monitoring via the Internet—the implications of a data 
breach or potential attack by hackers become even more dire.  When it 
comes to healthcare related applications, the Food and Drug Administration 
                                                     
9. See FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 10. 
10. See id. at 7–18. 
11. See id. 
12. See Robin Sidel, Home Depot’s 56 Million Card Breach Bigger Than 
Target’s; ‘Unique, Custom-Built Malware' Eliminated from Retailer's Systems After Five-
Month Attack on Terminals, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/home-depot-breach-bigger-than-targets-1411073571; Marc Goodman, A Vision of 
Crimes in the Future, at TEDGlobal 2012 (June 2012), (transcript available at http://
www.ted.com/talks/marc_goodman_a_vision_
of_crimes_in_the_future/transcript?language=en) [hereinafter Goodman, TEDGlobal 2012]. 
13. FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 15–18. 
14. See id. at 16. 
15. See id. at 15–16. 
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(“FDA”) is considering different tiers of regulation to ensure that these apps 
are providing safe and accurate information to consumers.16 
Health experts have expressed alarm at the safety and accuracy of 
health and fitness applications, or apps, prompting the FDA to investigate 
these apps, as well as propose new tiers of regulation to ensure that the 
information provided is safe and accurate.17  This concern has proven to be 
well founded, as even the notoriously detail oriented technology company, 
Apple Computers, Inc., unveiled its new health data aggregation platform, 
HealthKit®, in a presentation featuring a slide that listed the user’s blood 
glucose level erroneously as being measured in mL/dL, rather than in 
mg/dL.18  In addition, a Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) examination of 
twelve health and fitness apps shared user data—such as names, email 
addresses, gender, as well as diet and fitness habits—with more than 
seventy-six third parties, a finding that is even more alarming when 
considered in conjunction with the reality that most of these apps do not 
feature privacy policies that disclose what data is collected, how it is used, 
and who it is shared with by the developer.19 
When coupled with the push to convert medical records to electronic 
format as part of the implementation of the Health Information Technology 
for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 (“HITECH”), and the rising 
problem of medical records identity theft, the importance of amending 
privacy laws like Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996 
(“HIPAA”) to better protect patient data becomes all too clear.20  As most 
privacy laws were drafted and enacted in the days of paper records, doing so 
                                                     
16. See Andrew Litt, Caution:  Untested mHealth Apps Proliferate, but Few 
Good Ones Work Well, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 11, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://
www.computerworld.com/article/2474276/healthcare-it/caution-untested-mhealth-apps-
proliferate-but-few-good-ones-work-well.html; Amy Standen, Sure You Can Track Your 
Health Data, But Can Your Doctor Use It?, NPR (Jan. 19, 2015, 3:32 AM), http://
www.npr.org/blogs/health/2015/01/19/377486437/sure-you-can-track-your-health-data-but-
can-your-doctor-use-it. 
17. Mark Sullivan, Apple’s On-Stage Healthkit Goof Proves It Still Has to 
Earn the Trust of the Health Community, VENTUREBEAT (June 4, 2014, 6:10 AM), http://
venturebeat.com/2014/06/04/apples-on-stage-healthkit-goof-proves-it-still-has-to-earn-the-
trust-of-the-health-community/; Elizabeth Weise, FDA Sets Guidelines for Medical Devices’ 
Cybersecurity, USA TODAY (Oct. 1, 2014, 4:32 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
tech/2014/10/01/fda-medical-devices-cybersecurity/16543731/.  
18. Sullivan, supra note 17. 
19. See Christina Farr, FTC Commissioner Warns on Mobile Health-Data 
Gathering, REUTERS (July 23, 2014, 8:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/24/us-
healthcare-tech-washington-idUSKBN0FT02320140724. 
20. See Health Information Technology for Economic & Clinical Health Act 
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, § 13001, 123 Stat. 226, 226; Health Insurance Portability & 
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, § 1, 110 Stat. 1936, 1936. 
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will not only involve the input of lawmakers, but also of the creators of the 
affected technologies.21 
II. WHAT IS THE INTERNET OF THINGS? 
A. Definition 
The IoT is defined by the FTC as: 
 
[T]he ability of everyday objects to connect to the Internet and to 
send and receive data.  It includes, for example, Internet-connected 
cameras that allow you to post pictures online with a single click; 
home automation systems that turn on your front porch light when 
you leave work; and bracelets that share with your friends how far 
you have biked or run during the day.22 
 
The FTC estimates that this trend is only still in its infancy, stating 
that experts estimate that as of 2015, there will be twenty-five billion 
connected devices, and by 2020, there will be more than fifty billion such 
connected devices.23  In its summary of the workshop titled The Internet of 
Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World, the FTC notes the many 
benefits presented by the IoT, such as how “connected medical devices can 
allow consumers with serious medical conditions to work with their 
physicians to manage their diseases.”24  However, the FTC also notes that the 
IoT presents “security risks [to consumers] that could be exploited to harm 
consumers by:  (1) enabling unauthorized access and misuse of personal 
information; (2) facilitating attacks on other systems; and (3) creating risks to 
personal safety.”25 
The FTC report states that the principles that it is basing its 
recommendations on for the IoT are the Fair Information Practice Principles 
of “notice, choice, access, accuracy, data minimization, security, and 
accountability.”26  The principle of data minimization refers to the idea that 
companies “should limit the data [that] they collect and retain, and 
                                                     
21. Jason Wang, HIPAA Compliance:  What Every Developer Should Know, 
INFORMATIONWEEK (July 11, 2014, 9:06 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/
healthcare/security-and-pray/hipaa-compliance-what-every-developer-should-know/a/d-
id/1297180; see also FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at ii. 
22. FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at i. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at i–ii. 
25. Id. at ii. 
26. Id. 
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[ultimately] dispose of it once” the data is no longer needed.27  The report 
notes that there was division among the participants in regard to this 
principle, as some participants expressed concern that “requiring fledgling 
companies to predict what data they should minimize would ‘chok[e] off 
potential benefits and innovation.’”28  The participants in the workshop also 
noted that one of the challenges with the IoT is providing notice to the user 
that the device is collecting data.29 
There was also some division as to the principles of notice and 
choice among the workshop participants, based in large part upon the 
ubiquity of these devices.30   
As one participant observed, [if consumers have] “a bunch of 
different sensors on a bunch of different devices, on your home, 
your car, your body . . . measuring all sorts of things” it would be 
burdensome both for the company to provide notice and choice, 
and for the consumer to exercise such choice every time 
information was reported.31 
The major concern among participants as it relates to the risk is if 
patients are faced with too many requests for consent to the collection of 
data, they will stop using the device, which could be a serious problem in the 
case of medical IoT devices.32  The participants found this to be especially 
true with medical devices that have no screen or other interface that would 
enable it to communicate said notice to the user, or in the case of devices 
with screens, they are smaller than the screens on mobile devices and make it 
difficult, if not impossible, to communicate the notice to the user.33  The 
timing of the request may also be an issue that prevents users from reading a 
notice, let alone consenting to it, such as when a consumer may be driving.34 
B. Prediction of Impact 
There is no doubt that the IoT will affect nearly every industry, 
whether in terms of better planning as a result of the analysis of data 
collected by smart devices, or in the increased efficiencies created by the 
ability for people to use devices to communicate data to people located 
                                                     
27. FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at iv. 
28. Id. at 21 (alteration in original). 
29. Id. at v. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 22. 
32. FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at v. 
33. Id. at 22. 
34. Id. 
93
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
398 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
remotely.35  Just in the healthcare industry, remote monitoring of patients 
over the Internet estimated to reduce hospital visits by forty percent and cost 
per visit by $1800 for implantable medical devices.36 
For the purposes of this Article, the focus will be on the potential 
impacts of IoT and the data collected by these devices on the healthcare 
industry.37 
C. Data 
1. How Data is Collected in Healthcare 
The healthcare industry is particularly unique in terms of the IoT in 
that it has perhaps the largest variety of types of data that can be collected, as 
well as devices to collect it.38  From blood pressure levels to levels of 
different materials in blood to oxygen saturation—among many others—
healthcare professionals can monitor what is going on with a patient from 
head to toe.39  In addition, there are numerous conditions that can be 
monitored, and just as many types of devices to monitor them.40 
2. How Data is Used in Healthcare 
Medical data is used for a number of purposes, including for patient 
diagnosis and treatment.41  In addition, this same information can be shared 
with insurance companies for billing purposes, government agencies 
collecting data, research institutions and organizations, prevention and 
wellness initiatives, and for the education of health care providers, patients, 
families, communities, government, and other organizations.42 
                                                     
35. See id. at 7–8. 
36. Gregor Koenig, Barracuda Networks AG, Security and Privacy of 
Wireless Implantable Medical Devices 4, Presentation at Security Forum 2013 (Apr. 17, 
2013). 
37. See infra Part II.C–D. 
38. DARRELL M. WEST, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS, 
IMPROVING HEALTH CARE THROUGH MOBILE MEDICAL DEVICES AND SENSORS 1–4, 8 (2013). 
39. See id. at 1, 8. 
40. See id. at 1–4. 
41. See Andy Ferris et al., Big Data: What Is It, How Is It Collected and How 
Might Life Insurers Use It?, ACTUARY, Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014, at 28, 30; WEST, supra note 38, 
at 1, 3–4. 
42. See Ferris et al., supra note 41, at 29–30. 
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D. Crime Concerns 
 1. General and Healthcare Related Crime Concerns 
While there are great expectations as to what solutions the advent of 
big data will bring to various industries and to consumers, there are also 
equally large concerns about how such data could be used by those with 
nefarious intent.43  Marc Goodman of the Future Crimes Institute has spoken 
about the future of crime in the age of big data, and the picture so far is not 
pretty.44  While the data breaches at Target and Home Depot in 2014 caused 
consumers financial headaches, the potential of criminal activity in the future 
according to Goodman could be far worse.45  As Goodman notes, going back 
to the time of Neanderthals, data has been a double sided coin with both 
good and bad aspects; and in today’s environment of three-dimensional 
printing and other high tech weapons, where the positive aspects have great 
potential, the negative present consequences will call for regulatory solutions 
in coming years.46  The primary example that he cites in his TED talk is the 
2008 terrorist attack on a hotel in Mumbai.47  What marked a shift from 
previous such attacks was that, while these terrorists attacked with the 
expected weapons of hand grenades, explosives and machine guns, they also 
came armed with mobile phones, night vision goggles, access to satellite 
imagery, and most importantly, access to an operations center in Pakistan.48 
The terrorist operations center allowed the people working there to 
monitor mainstream media coverage of the attack on television channels like 
CNN, the BBC, Al-Jazeera, and local Indian television stations, as well as 
the internet, and most importantly, social media.49  It was these latter sources 
that made the Mumbai attack so different from previous terrorist attacks; as 
the terrorists were able to call the war room as they moved through the hotel 
to have their operatives google the hostages and search social media to find 
out information about them that helped the terrorists gain advantages in their 
negotiations.50  In one such instance, the terrorists were able to learn that a 
hostage who claimed to be a schoolteacher was actually the second-
wealthiest businessman in India, and after this information was revealed, the 
                                                     
43. See What Does the Future of Crime Look Like?, NPR (Sept. 13, 2013, 
9:39 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript.php?storyId=215831944. 
44. Id. 
45. Sidel, supra note 12; What Does the Future of Crime Look Like?, supra 
note 43. 
46. See What Does the Future of Crime Look Like?, supra note 43. 
47. Goodman, TEDGlobal 2012, supra note 12. 
48. Id. 
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terrorists in the operations center gave the order to the terrorists on the 
ground to kill the man.51  Goodman sums up the impact of the situation, and 
the enhanced ability on the part of the terrorists to create such terror: 
 
Think about what happened.  During this [sixty]-hour 
siege on Mumbai, [ten] men armed not just with weapons, but with 
technology, were able to bring a city of [twenty] million people to 
a standstill.  Ten people brought [twenty] million people to a 
standstill, and this traveled around the world.  This is what radicals 
can do with openness.52 
 
The Internet is also cited as not only a means of providing 
information about hostages, but also to commit massive crimes, such as the 
hack of the Sony PlayStation Network, which resulted in the robbery of one 
hundred million people in one fell swoop.53  Goodman notes in his talk how 
every advance in technology—from drones to three-dimensional printing—
can be used not only for good, but also for evil by criminals.54  Three-
dimensional printing is certainly a prime example of this, for while the 
technology can and has been used by doctors to create prosthetic body parts 
to save lives, it has also been used to create weapons.55  While these weapons 
have yet to be used by criminals to commit crimes, there has been concern on 
the part of lawmakers and law enforcement that the ability to print these 
weapons from non-metal materials could be used to smuggle said weapons 
through security checkpoints and on to planes, or into other sensitive areas to 
carry out terrorist attacks.56  Goodman has also written about the Big Brother 
aspect of big data where implantable medical device data could be used as 
part of an autopsy to determine a person’s cause of death.57 
This concern about the potential nefarious use of new devices and 
the associated data collected by them becomes even graver when one 
considers the implications of a data breach of health devices.58  While 
devices like cochlear implants, diabetic pumps, pacemakers, and 
defibrillators have changed lives for thousands of people, it is important to 
remember that these very devices are also collecting and transmitting data 
                                                     
51. Id. 
52. Goodman, TEDGlobal 2012, supra note 12. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. See id. 
56. See id. 
57. See Marc Goodman, Future Crimes Inst., Who Does the Autopsy?  
Criminal Implications of Implantable Medical Devices 3, Presentation at the 2nd USENIX 
Workshop on Health Security and Privacy (Aug. 9, 2011); Koenig, supra note 36, at 20. 
58. Goodman, supra note 57, at 2. 
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about the patients in which they have been implanted.59  Goodman uses 
pacemakers as an example, noting that sixty thousand people in the United 
States have a pacemaker that connects to the Internet and allows a physician 
to shock the heart remotely in the event that the patient needs it.60  In the 
hands of the physician, it could be a lifesaver, but in the hands of a criminal, 
the ability to shock the patient remotely could be a means of committing 
murder.61  While these pacemakers represent a small fraction of all the 
devices that have been implanted, the connected devices are estimated to 
increase in terms of adoption, hence the concern about the impact of that 
increase in usage, as well as the potential need to update older models to 
these newer IoT models.62 
Even in the case of less crucial devices like fitness trackers such as 
Fitbit® or FuelBand®, the data collected from these devices has already 
been admitted as evidence in a personal injury trial in Calgary in 2014.63  
This case is even more significant, as the attorneys are not just using the data 
from the Fitbit®, but are instead putting it through an analytics platform that 
“uses public research [data] to compare [the] person’s activity data with that 
of the general [public].”64  Couple this data with information that can be 
discovered from social media, and the concern that wearable technology like 
fitness trackers could become like black boxes for humans, seem to be 
becoming all too real.65 
It is scenarios like those discussed above that led the FDA and the 
Department of Homeland Security to focus their attention on finding 
solutions to the potential risks presented by the IoT as it relates to 
healthcare.66  In addition to proposing the regulations that will be discussed 
later in this paper, the leaders of the FDA have made it widely known that 
they will be keeping an eye on developers of apps and devices designed for 
this market.67  Shortly before the guidelines were introduced in October of 
                                                     
59. FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 16; Goodman, TEDGlobal 
2012, supra note 12. 
60. Goodman, TEDGlobal 2012, supra note 12. 
61. See id. 
62. Sue Poremba, A Movement Is Needed to Improve Cyber Security for 
Medical Devices, SUNGARD AVAILABILITY SERVICES (Jan. 23, 2015), 
http://blog.sungardas.com/2015/01/a-movement-is-needed-to-improve-cyber-security-for-
medical-devices/#sthash.C6JIT9KN.dpbs. 
63. See, e.g., Parmy Olson, Fitbit Data Now Being Used in the Courtroom, 
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2014, Suzanne Schwartz, the director of emergency preparedness at the 
FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health, stated that “[t]here is no 
such thing as a threat-proof medical device,” and “[i]t is important for 
medical device manufacturers to remain vigilant about cybersecurity and to 
appropriately protect patients from those risks.”68  The FDA has been 
emphatic in urging developers and manufacturers to think about security in 
developing new products, and to anticipate potential solutions before 
releasing them to the marketplace.69  Chief among the considerations that 
developers and manufacturers should keep in mind during development are, 
“[a]t a minimum, medical devices should require secure authentication for 
access, use encrypted communication, and make sure that security patches 
are always added.”70 
While the FDA has released regulations to help with the current and 
future apps and devices that will be developed as part of the healthcare IoT, 
there are also unique challenges presented by the older medical devices as 
technology develops around them.71  The fact of the matter is that these older 
devices present their own security threat, for reasons varying from that the 
software used for these devices is not able to be patched, or that they were 
never tested for security flaws.72  Further, in the case of implantable medical 
devices, the challenges rise to a whole new level, as updating them can 
involve surgery, making it not only a conversation about improving patient 
data security, but also a decision between a patient and his or her physician 
as to whether such surgery is best for the patient from a medical 
perspective.73  This adds another piece to an already complicated puzzle for 
physicians, who must now not only consider the potential medical benefit to 
the patient presented by implanting a medical device, but also the long-term 
maintenance requirements presented by it.74  This is where physician 
education by representatives from medical device companies will play a 
crucial role in helping physicians navigate these considerations so that they 
can then help patients make these decisions.75 
                                                                                                                             
www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
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i. Hypothetical:  Hacking an Insulin Pump 
Perhaps the best deep dive into the potential ways in which a smart 
medical device or application could be hacked for criminal purposes is the 
2011 talk by Jerome Radcliffe at the Black Hat cyber security conference.76  
Radcliffe, a diabetic man, spoke about his experiments into how one might 
hack his insulin pump.77  His talk started with what would seem to be the 
most obvious source of information about the communication systems that 
the pump uses:  The user manual.78  He noted how the appendix of the user 
manual provided him with everything from the wireless frequency on which 
it operated to how often information was sent, and how large the file sizes 
were.79  Radcliffe also learned the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) identification number from the manual, which he then took to the 
FCC website, where a simple search resulted in downloadable FCC 
verification documents for the device that detailed the process by which the 
pump transmits data to the continuous glucose monitor (“CGM”).80 
With this information acquired, Radcliffe moved on to considering 
the types of hacks that a hacker could carry out on an insulin pump user.81  
He notes that perhaps the most dangerous type of attack would be a spoofing 
attack that would manipulate the sensor data that could lead an unsuspecting 
user to think that his or her sugar levels are higher or lower than they actually 
are.82  However, Radcliffe goes on to explain that while such a hack would 
be possible, there are characteristics of how the pump and its components 
work that would make carrying out such a hack difficult.83  First, the range of 
the CGM receiver is very limited, meaning that the transmitter would need to 
be within one hundred to two hundred feet of the receiver in order to work.84  
Second, if such a reading was detected by the pump, the device would 
require the user to calibrate it using a blood glucose meter, the intervention 
of which would be highly unlikely.85  Finally, Radcliffe explains that even if 
a criminal was able to manipulate the user into administering too much 
                                                     
76. Jerome Radcliffe, Hacking Medical Devices for Fun and Insulin:  
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insulin, it is not uncommon for diabetics to experience such levels, meaning 
that the hacker would need to continue manipulating the sensor data for 
hours to keep impacting the user, a fact that makes it unlikely such an attack 
would be successful.86 
Radcliffe goes on to examine the likelihood of the success of 
carrying out such an attack using the wireless communication functions of 
the insulin pump.87  He states that a particularly dangerous situation for a 
diabetes insulin pump user would be when—unbeknownst to the user—the 
configuration settings that are the basis for calculating the amount of insulin 
that is to be dispensed have been manipulated.88  He posits that this type of 
attack would likely involve using the wireless peripheral device that is 
necessary to talk to the pump, a task that is made relatively simple due to the 
availability of the device for sale on the Internet, and the publication of the 
command codes online.89  With the device and command codes in hand, 
Radcliffe estimates that a hacker could change the configuration settings in a 
short amount of time, and for example, could change the setting controlling 
the ratio of insulin given at meal time enough to cause a diabetic patient to 
become hypoglycemic within sixty to ninety minutes after eating.90  
However, as with the CGM devices, Radcliffe explains that the likelihood 
that such an attack would succeed are limited by several factors.91  He starts 
by noting that like the CGM devices, the wireless components in the pump 
have a very limited range of only one hundred to two hundred feet.92  The 
most significant limiting factor for the success of a wireless attack is the fact 
that the attacker would need the serial number of the device, which could not 
be obtained without physical access to the device.93 
The exploration of the potential hacking of an insulin pump 
concludes as Radcliffe observes that perhaps the most dangerous element of 
the medication delivery process for diabetic patients is that presented by 
humans in the form of the manipulation of the variables used to determine 
the amount of insulin to be given.94  However, he points to the trend of trying 
to remove the risk of human intervention from the equation that is currently 
leading organizations like the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation to 
explore computer-operated insulin delivery options through its Artificial 
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Pancreas Project.95  While such solutions would eliminate the risk of human 
intervention, Radcliffe remarks that these new automated solutions may 
reduce or eliminate one type of risk, but also present new risks that may be 
greater in the attack scenarios that he had considered—as such attacks would 
be on an automated system—and less human intervention would also mean 
less human oversight to detect them.96 
2. Data Discrimination 
In addition to concerns about actual physical harm caused by hacks 
or malfunctions by smart devices, perhaps the other greatest concern is that 
of discrimination on the basis of the data collected by these same devices.97 
While there are many issues related to the growth of the IoT and the 
data collected by the devices in its ecosystem, this Article focuses on the 
legal implications of the IoT as it relates to healthcare devices.98  Much like 
the potential hacking of a lifesaving device, it is not entirely unthinkable that 
Uber data could be used to make determinations in relation to whether a 
person is accepted for housing, or that health insurance companies could try 
to access policy holders’ credit card purchase data to inspect it for alcohol or 
tobacco purchases—or medical marijuana for that matter—and deny 
coverage based on data showing activities by policy holders that it finds 
unacceptable.99  Or, imagine if the data collected by health devices and 
apps—as to whether policy holders are properly managing their health 
conditions—were to be used as the basis to find the person to be non-
compliant and perhaps deny coverage, or even to make employment 
decisions.100 
E. Internet of Things and Health Devices 
One of the fastest growing sectors of the IoT is that related to health 
care devices and apps.101  The Intel’s report to the Senate Special Committee 
on Aging estimates that “[i]n large part because of widespread wastefulness 
in service delivery and need for virtual care models, McKinsey forecasts that 
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[forty] percent of the global economic impact of the IoT revolution will 
occur in healthcare, more than any other sector.”102  What began with simple 
heart rate monitors and fitness trackers has now given way to devices that 
can take photographs and videos of the inner ear and transmit them to a 
remotely located physician, allowing him or her to diagnose an ear infection 
using a smartphone.103  Researchers have even developed a temporary tattoo 
with electrodes that use a mild electrical current to monitor the wearer’s 
blood sugar levels.104 
Why is there so much interest and growth in terms of IoT smart 
devices and apps for healthcare?  A presentation at the Senate Special 
Committee on Aging cites a number of reasons for it: 
 a previously unseen aging population, in which “[t]here will 
be more people over age [sixty-five] than under age [five];” 
 an increase in chronic diseases; 
 “[g]lobal shortage of healthcare workers;” 
 a dramatically inefficient healthcare sector; 
 “a shift from passive to active patients;” and 
 rapid growth of health apps, social networks, and 
collaboration tools.105 
As part of the growth of IoT in healthcare, the presentation notes 
three emerging categories:  (i) person to person; (ii) person to computer; and 
(iii) person as computer.106 
F. Policy and Security Recommendations 
As one can imagine, for as much interest as there is in developing 
apps and devices for the healthcare sector, there is just as much or even more 
interest in developing solutions to keep healthcare data safe.107  The recent 
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data breach at Anthem Inc.—the second largest health insurer in the United 
States—involved “hackers br[eaking] into a database containing [the] 
personal information [of] about [eighty] million of its customers and 
employees.”108  This hack is estimated “to be the largest data breach [that has 
been] disclosed by a healthcare company” to date, and demonstrates the great 
risk that companies handling healthcare data face in terms of data breaches 
due to hacker attacks, lost computers or hard drives, and other methods.109  
Even though the breach thus far seems to be limited to the names, birthdays 
and addresses of customers and employees, it is still estimated that tens of 
millions of records were stolen, and it still represents a massive incursion for 
the company and for consumers.110 
Given the very real risk of data breaches, regulatory agencies—as 
well as federal and state legislatures—are keeping an eye on the situation and 
are recommending security guidelines for the IoT as it relates to 
healthcare.111  Intel presented to the Senate Special Committee on Aging 
recommendations for policies related to the development of security 
measures for healthcare data.112  The first policy principle posited by the 
Committee is to require data standards for connectivity, as well as for 
interoperability between smart devices.113  As the Committee’s report on the 
IoT notes, “[the] IoT in healthcare has the potential to aggregate data from 
patient records, wearable sensors, labs, diet, the environment, and social 
networking in real time, but only if the data can be analyzed.  This takes 
standardized data formats.”114  The second policy principle for securing the 
IoT for healthcare put forth by the Committee is to regulate smartly, and 
avoid de-innovation in developing security standards.115  The report 
emphasizes the need for collaboration between the relevant parties, such as 
                                                                                                                             
Hackers: Breach Gets Away with Names, Social Security Numbers of Customers, Employees, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2015, 9:39 PM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/health-insurer-anthem-hit-
by-hackers-1423103720; Michelle McNickle, 6 Best Ways to Protect Against Health Data 
Breaches, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/6-
best-ways-protect-against-health-data-breaches?single-page=true. 
108. Matthews & Yardon, supra note 107. 
109. Id.; see also Richard W. Walker, Negligent Employees Cause Most Data 
Breaches; Mobile is Key Factor, BREAKING GOV’T (Mar. 22, 2012, 1:32 PM), http://
www.breakinggov.com/2012/03/22/negligent-employees-cause-most-data-breaches-mobile-
is-key-fact/. 
110. Matthews & Yardon, supra note 107. 
111. See id.; INTEL, supra note 102, at 3–4. 
112. INTEL, supra note 102, at 3. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 3–4. 
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has been done by the Congress, regulators, and industry to develop 
regulatory frameworks like the FDA Safety Innovation Act.116 
The third policy principle noted in Intel’s report to the Senate 
Special Committee on Aging for the IoT for healthcare is rethinking 
reimbursement.117  The discussion of this principle notes that much of the 
“rich and actionable data is not being used today because our health systems 
are unprepared to incorporate the data into the fee for service payments, or 
shared savings models.”118  The report cites how the adoption of virtual care 
for patients by physicians and healthcare systems has been delayed thus far, 
not by technology, but by the fact that providers are not paid for situations 
where such virtual care is substituted and enhanced over in person visits.119  
The next policy principle that the Committee report emphasizes is to capture 
patient generated health data as a vital part of the patient record.120  It is 
stated in the report how the twenty-seven billion dollar investment made by 
the U.S. Government in promoting the adoption of electronic medical 
records through the HITECH Act resulted in “unparalleled adoption rates—
[seventy-eight] percent of physicians and [sixty-six] percent of our nation’s 
qualifying hospitals have been certified.  Yet, the real time data from sensors, 
tablets, smartphones, and peripherals are not captured in the [electronic 
health records].”121 
The final security policy recommendation included in Intel’s report 
to the Committee is that privacy and security standards be required for IoT 
applications and devices that are part of the IoT.122  As the report states, 
according to the Office for Civil Rights in the Department of Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”), “199 [personal health information] (“PHI”) 
breaches were reported in 2013, affecting [seven] million patient records.”123  
It urges HHS to continue its efforts to work with interested parties to find a 
“universally accepted health IT security standard or [principles] that can be 
enforceable and agree on criteria that deems organizations ‘HIPAA Security 
Rule Compliant.’”124 
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III. LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
A. General Data 
There are a number of legal aspects in play when it comes to big 
data, both in terms of more general privacy laws, as well as laws specific to 
certain types of data, such as medical records.125  What has become 
particularly interesting as the Internet and the IoT have developed, is the 
interplay of the obligations imposed by the various privacy laws upon new 
parties who likely did not initially anticipate being subject to them, such as 
web developers who take on a project for a school system and find 
themselves subject to the requirements of Family Education Rights and 
Privacy Act or Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”), or an 
app developer with an idea for a healthcare application that finds himself or 
herself subject to HIPAA and FDA regulation.126  As such, it has become 
more important than ever that web developers and information technology 
professionals working with healthcare clients are not only aware of the 
requirements of these laws, but can also help their clients find effective 
compliance solutions.  Privacy policies for websites and software that collect 
data have become a cornerstone of this process, as they not only allow the 
website operator to communicate its privacy policies and processes to users, 
but also to demonstrate its commitment to compliance to regulators.  These 
privacy policies are unique, living documents that, just like the magical 
creatures that Harry Potter and his friends at Hogwarts had to learn about in 
their Care and Feeding of Magical Creatures class, require proper care and 
feeding to thrive. 
1. Federal Privacy Act of 1974 
The Privacy Act of 1974 governs the collection, maintenance, use, 
and dissemination of information about individuals that is stored in the 
records systems of federal agencies.127  The Act defines a system of records 
as “a group of any records under the control of any agency from which 
information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying 
number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.”128  
It further establishes the no disclosure without consent rule, which states 
“[n]o agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of 
records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, 
                                                     
125. See infra Part III.A–C. 
126. See infra Part III.A.2–3, B.4, C.3. 
127. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (2012). 
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except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, 
the individual to whom the record pertains.”129  This rule is subject to twelve 
exceptions, ranging from an agency’s need to know the information, to 
responding to Freedom of Information Act requests, to responding to court 
orders.130 
The Privacy Act grants the following rights to people:  To find out 
what information was collected about them; to see and have a copy of that 
information; to correct or amend that information; and to exercise limited 
control of the disclosure of that information to other parties.131 
The Privacy Act comes into play for healthcare organizations that 
are operated by the federal government, such as the Veterans’ Health 
Administration, as well as record systems operated as part of a contract with 
a federal government agency.132 
2. COPPA 
One privacy law that has been in the spotlight in recent years due to 
enforcement actions by the FTC is the COPPA.133  Passed in 1998, this law 
protects the personally identifiable information (“PII”) of children under the 
age of thirteen and sets out regulations that commercial website operators 
must abide by if the website is collecting such information.134  The law 
defines personal information to include:  “[F]irst and last name; [a] home or 
other physical address, including street name and name of a city or town; 
[o]nline contact information; . . . a screen or user name [that] functions . . . as 
online contact information; . . . [a] telephone number; [and a] social security 
number.”135 
COPPA prohibits operators of commercial websites from collecting 
or disclosing the personal information of minors under the age of thirteen 
without verifiable parental consent.136  The law not only requires website 
operators to put mechanisms in place to comply with COPPA but also to 
provide notice to parents about what information is collected by the site and 
how that information will be used, even if the parents consent.137  COPPA 
applies even if the website is not targeted specifically at children.138  So long 
                                                     
129. Id. § 552a(b). 
130. Id. § 552a(b)(1)–(12). 
131. See id. § 552a(b)–(e). 
132. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(f). 
133. 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–.12 (2014). 
134. Id. §§ 312.1–.2. 
135. Id. § 312.2. 
136. Id. § 312.3. 
137. Id. §§ 312.3–.4. 
138. See 16 C.F.R. § 312.3. 
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as the website is collecting PII from children, it must be in compliance with 
the law.139  This is why many commercial websites that allow users to 
register either require users to check a box certifying that they are over the 
age of thirteen or do not permit users under the age of thirteen to register.140 
The FTC announced revisions to COPPA in 2013.141  These changes 
included an expansion of the definition of what was considered personal 
information to include: 
 A “persistent identifier[] that can be used to recognize [a] 
user[] over time and across . . . websites or online services,” 
such as cookies, IP addresses, and mobile device IDs;142 
 A photograph, video, or audio file, where such file 
“contain[s] a child’s image or voice”;143 
 Geolocation information sufficient to identify street name 
and name or a city or town;144 and 
 Information concerning the child or the parents of that child 
that the operator combines with an identifier described 
above.145 
The FTC’s amendments to the COPPA rules in 2013 also expanded 
the definition of a commercial website operator to include not only the 
operator of a website or service directed at children, but also of “outside 
services, such as plug-ins or advertising networks that collect personal 
information from . . . visitors.”146  The amendments also clarified that 
COPPA applies to “plug-ins or ad networks that have actual knowledge that 
                                                     
139. Id. 
140. See id. 
141. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Strengthens Kids’ Privacy, 
Gives Parents Greater Control over Their Information by Protection Rule (Dec. 19, 2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/12/ftc-strengthens-kids-privacy-gives-
parents-greater-control-over; see also 16 C.F.R. § 312. 
142. Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, supra note 141.  Compare 16 C.F.R. 
§ 312.2 (2012) with id. § 312.2 (Personal Information) (2014). 
143. Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, supra note 141.  Compare 16 C.F.R. 
§ 312.2 (2012) with id. § 312.2 (Personal Information) (2014). 
144. Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, supra note 141.  Compare 16 C.F.R. 
§ 312.2 (2012) with id. § 312.2 (Personal Information) (2014). 
145. Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, supra note 141.  Compare 16 C.F.R. 
§ 312.2 (2012) with id. § 312.2 (Personal Information) (2014). 
146. Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, supra note 141; see also Complying 
with COPPA:  Frequently Asked Questions, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-
questions#General Questions (last updated Mar. 20, 2015).  Compare 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 
(2012) with id. § 312.2 (Personal Information) (2014). 
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they are collecting personal information through a . . . website or online 
service” directed at children.147 
In updating COPPA, the FTC aimed to streamline and clarify the 
requirements for direct notice to parents in such a way that it ensures that the 
information is provided to parents in a succinct manner that provides this 
information just in time.148  The Commission also expanded the list of 
acceptable methods for operators to obtain prior verifiable parental consent 
from parents, created new exceptions to the rule’s notice and consent 
requirements, and strengthened the data security protections.149  The 
amendments also require that operators have reasonable data retention and 
deletion procedures.150  As part of the new changes, the FTC strengthened its 
oversight of the self-regulatory safe harbor programs, and instituted a 
“voluntary pre-approval mechanism[] for new [methods of consent],” as well 
as “for activities that support the internal operations of a website or online 
service.”151 
The FTC initially granted website operators a grace period during 
which it would allow operators a chance to update their procedures to meet 
the requirements of the new amendments, but in 2014, it started enforcing 
the new regulations.152  Among the notable settlements was a $450,000 
settlement with the online review website Yelp for not having the proper 
COPPA compliance mechanisms in place as part of its mobile app.153  The 
irony of the settlement—as noted by the FTC in its press release—was that 
Yelp had the appropriate mechanisms in place on its full website, just not on 
the mobile app.154 
                                                     
147. Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, supra note 141; see also Complying 
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152. Lesley Fair, Updated FAQs to Help Keep Your Company COPPA-
Compliant, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Apr. 25, 2013, 11:22 AM), http://www.ftc.gov/news-
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154. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 152. 
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While COPPA is not a law that addresses health care directly, the 
FTC has said in a recent report that it is among the laws that it intends to use 
to police the IoT as it develops.155  Given the unprecedented use of Internet-
connected devices by children in recent years, it is likely that there will need 
to be further amendments made to COPPA by the FTC to include the ever-
evolving categories of data collected by them.156 
3. California Online Privacy Protection Act (“CalOPPA”) 
In addition to the federal efforts to protect Internet users online, 
states have also been implementing their own laws to protect their citizens on 
the Internet.157  Perhaps the most significant such state law is CalOPPA.158  
This law requires all commercial operators of websites or online services to 
conspicuously post privacy policies to inform consumers about:  (a) the 
categories of PII being collected; and (b) with which third parties the PII will 
be shared.159 
California introduced amendments to CalOPPA that took effect on 
January 1, 2015.160  Among these amendments was a requirement that retail 
website operators include a delete button on such sites and applications that 
would allow minors who are registered users on the site to have the ability to 
delete their content that has been posted on the site, or the ability to request 
that it be deleted.161  These amendments also require that operators provide 
notice that they have the ability to delete online content and instructions on 
how to do so.162  Finally, the amendments prohibit retail website operators 
from advertising certain categories of products or services to minors.163  It is 
worth noting that the operators of the major app platforms have entered into 
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a Joint Statement of Principles with the Attorney General of California.164  
As part of this Statement of Principles, the operators voluntarily agreed to:   
 “[P]rovide consumers with the opportunity to review the 
app’s privacy policy before downloading”; 
 “[W]ork to educate app developers about their privacy 
obligations”; and 
 “[D]evelop tools [for] consumers [to] report non-compliant 
apps.”165 
Given the creation of laws like CalOPPA and state laws prohibiting 
employers from requiring employees to provide their social media 
passwords, it is likely that states will continue to create laws to protect their 
citizens online.166  It is also likely that there will be similar federal laws 
passed in regard to how websites, apps and Internet-connected devices 
operate, and to protect the data that they collect, especially when it comes to 
regulated industries like healthcare.167 
B. Health Data Laws and Regulations 
The care and feeding of privacy policies related to healthcare data 
are a special species, and as such, there are special laws that apply to its 
handling.168  From the oath that physicians take that is the basis of their 
ethical obligations, to their patients and the practice of medicine, to laws 
intended to promote the adoption of electronic health records, there is quite a 
thicket of regulations that need to be considered when drafting a privacy 
policy for an app or website that captures and handles healthcare data.169 
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1. The Hippocratic Oath 
Healthcare privacy has its most basic roots in the Hippocratic Oath, 
an ancient Greek medical text which requires new physicians to swear that 
they will abide by certain professional ethical standards in their practice of 
medicine.170  Though not required by most medical schools, the Hippocratic 
Oath has been adopted in various forms by some medical schools who have 
adapted it for modern times.171  The Oath addresses the confidentiality of 
patient information, as physicians taking it state that “[w]hatever I see or 
hear in the lives of my patients, whether in connection with my professional 
practice or not, which ought not to be spoken of outside, I will keep secret, as 
considering all such things to be private.”172 
i. The Hippocratic Oath in the Era of the Selfie 
Despite the Oath’s lengthy history and emphasis on physicians 
making a serious commitment to the ethical standards of their profession, it 
seems that in the era of the selfie, the desire to try to become an Internet 
celebrity seems to be overcoming the commitment to ethical standards for 
some physicians.173  Recent headlines have noted stories of surgeons texting 
or taking photos during procedures—in some cases resulting in allegations of 
malpractice and personal injury lawsuits.174  Perhaps the most high profile 
such case is the wrongful death lawsuit filed by Melissa Rivers, the daughter 
of the late comedienne Joan Rivers, against the surgical center and 
physicians who operated on her mother.175  The chief allegation in Rivers’ 
lawsuit is that her mother’s private physician, Dr. Gwen Korovin, not only 
performed an unauthorized biopsy procedure on Joan Rivers without the 
patient’s consent but also took a selfie with the comedienne while she was 
under anesthesia.176  In a statement, “Rivers’ family lawyer Jeffrey Bloom 
said [that] doctors acted as groupies,” with one doctor taking pictures of 
Korovin at work during the procedure and “that the [comedienne] ‘would 
have been doing Fashion Police last week,’ if [the doctors] had done their 
jobs.”177  The lawsuit goes on to allege that when Joan Rivers began to go 
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into cardiac arrest, the doctors did not perform a tracheotomy until seventeen 
minutes had elapsed, by which time Rivers had suffered irreversible brain 
damage.178  It has been reported that the clinic may now “lose its federal 
accreditation in March,” as an inquiry by Medicaid and Medicare 
investigators found errors that were made at the clinic, including “failing to 
note Rivers’ weight before administering a sedative, allowing an 
unauthorized doctor in, and noting the cell phone photos” that were taken 
during the procedure.179 
The age of paparazzi and reality television has intersected with the 
world of healthcare as part of the production of a number of healthcare 
television shows.180  This interaction has brought to light new questions 
about healthcare privacy when a reality show is being filmed at a hospital.181  
In the case of the family of the late Mark Chanko, an eighty-three-year old 
investment advisor who was struck by a garbage truck and brought to New 
York Presbyterian Hospital, these questions have become all too real.182  
Unbeknownst to the family, the hospital was participating in the television 
show NY Med; and Chanko’s treatment and ultimate death from his injuries 
had all been filmed; and the physician treating Chanko was wearing a hidden 
microphone.183  His widow, Anita, did not realize this until she was watching 
the show one night and recognized her husband’s voice calling for her on the 
show.184  Even though his image had been blurred, and his voice changed to 
protect his identity, his wife recognized her husband’s voice and was 
horrified to watch his treatment and death on television.185  Adding to her 
horror was the fact that not only had she and her family not know that—
according to their lawsuit—they were being filmed for the show, but also 
that they did not consent to said filming.186  In 2013, the hospital was cited 
by the state for violating Mr. Chanko’s rights, finding that “[t]he patient was 
unaware and uninformed that he was being filmed and viewed by a camera 
crew while receiving medical treatment thus his privacy in receiving medical 
treatment was not ensured.”187  The family has also sued the hospital, as well 
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as the physician.188  While a state supreme court judge narrowed the lawsuit 
and allowed some of the family’s claims to proceed, an appellate court 
dismissed the case, finding that “the doctor and hospital . . . did not breach 
their duty to avoid disclosing personal information since no . . . information 
was disclosed.”189  The family is now appealing and has reported the 
violation to the HHS Office for Civil Rights, which is investigating the 
report.190 
The Chanko’s called the hospital and spoke to one of its lawyers 
about who was responsible for the placement of the microphones to which 
the lawyer responded that ABC was responsible for placing the microphones 
on the physician treating Mr. Chanko.191  According to Chanko’s daughter-
in-law, Barbara, who also happens to be a medical ethicist, the members of 
the television crew were all wearing scrubs, and—to the family—were not 
distinguishable from the nurses and physicians working on her father.192  In 
an interview with National Public Radio (“NPR”), she questioned whether 
the hospital had a responsibility to inquire with its patient population as to 
whether it should allow such a show to film in the hospital.193  Barbara 
Chanko also explained that the family has reported the incident to the Office 
for Civil Rights at the HHS, which investigates reports of HIPAA violations, 
though she noted that the HIPAA law concerns protecting information from 
being released to unauthorized parties, not patient privacy.194 
She also questioned at what point is privacy violated in such a 
situation, is it if the camera crew is filming before the client gives consent?195  
Further, if the patient has been a victim of trauma, can he or she really 
understand the situation, let alone give informed consent?196  Her inquiry 
continued, as she wondered how having a reality television show filmed in 
an emergency department impacts the patients and their treatment.197  In this 
instance, the promotions for the episode of NY Med described the doctor who 
treated Chanko as Dr. McDreamy-like, and Barbara Chanko pointed out that 
the doctor treating her father-in-law seemed more interested in talking to the 
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camera during filming than treating his patient.198  “The American College of 
Emergency Physicians opposes ‘the filming for public viewing of emergency 
department patients or staff members except when they can give full 
informed consent prior to their participation’ . . . .”199 
The resulting debate among those in the medical community 
produced an ironic twist:  Jeffrey Flier, the Dean of the Harvard Medical 
School, after reading about the Chanko case tweeted, “[h]ow could this be 
allowed to happen?”200  Just four minutes later, the Chief of Surgery at 
Boston Medical Center, Dr. Gerard Doherty, replied via tweet that, “The 
same group is filming a trauma series at your place [Massachusetts General 
Hospital] and ours [Boston Medical Center] right now.”201  Unbeknownst to 
Flier, ABC News had been in Boston since October, filming at 
Massachusetts General and Brigham and Women’s Hospitals for a 
documentary-style series called Golden Hour that would chronicle the care 
of patients in the hospitals’ emergency rooms.202  While he recalls watching 
similar shows and enjoying them, Flier said that after reading about the 
Chanko case, he is giving more thought to patient privacy and ethical 
concerns.203  The Boston Globe reported that all three Boston hospitals 
signed contracts that “require consent from patients before their stories could 
be aired,” and also “allow patients to change their minds and withdraw 
consent during filming, [as well as] within [thirty] days after the last filming 
of a patient.”204  The story also noted that this has already happened in at 
least three cases, and that the contract also allows the staff to ask the crew to 
stop filming at any time.205 
 ABC News has thus far defended itself in the Chanko case using a 
First Amendment defense, claiming that the show is protected because it is 
produced by the company’s news division.206  While it does not dispute that 
the crew did not obtain the family’s consent, it also further moved that the 
claim should be dismissed because New York does not recognize a common 
law right to privacy, and that the Chanko family themselves were responsible 
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for their loss of privacy.207  ABC News has released a statement about the 
case: 
We are very sorry about Mark Chanko’s tragic and 
untimely death.  We sympathize with his family over their loss.  
We worked hard in our N.Y. Med broadcast to obscure his image 
and identity and the identity of his family. 
We are very proud of our acclaimed series of medical 
programs showing up close the work and humanity of doctors, 
nurses, residents and other health care professionals at the top 
medical academic centers in the country, including Johns Hopkins, 
New York Presbyterian, Mass General, Brigham and Women’s, 
Boston Children’s Hospital, Boston Medical Center and other 
great medical institutions. 
We strive always to be highly respectful of the patients, 
their families and the hospital caregivers.  We have heard many 
stories of people inspired after seeing our programs to pursue 
medical professions, to seek treatment they wouldn’t have known 
about or been too frightened to pursue or to become organ donors 
after seeing depictions of successful transplants.208 
The Chanko case is hardly the first lawsuit resulting from the filming 
of a reality show in a hospital and will probably not be the last as devices 
capable of recording patient identity and date creep into more and more 
aspects of our lives.209  In the early 2000s, the New York Times Co. was 
sued for invasion of privacy by a group of patients who were featured in the 
show Trauma:  Life in the E.R.210  Many of the plaintiffs settled, but in one 
case an appeals court ruled in favor of the production company, finding that 
the show qualified as news, and was protected under the law.211  The 
intersection of reality television, the IoT, and healthcare will be likely to 
produce more interesting questions as to what is news and what is an 
invasion of privacy in coming years; it will be interesting to see what results. 
It remains to be seen how the case law will develop in regard to the 
filming of patients in medical facilities during treatment, particularly in the 
age of smartphones and the IoT.  Where there are failures on the part of 
health care professionals to respect their duty to keep patient information and 
data confidential, the task of regulating and disciplining them falls to state 
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professional licensing boards, as well as hospital credentialing committees.212  
These bodies are often the epicenter of disciplinary trends in health care, and 
they will be a crucial part of the adoption and regulation of IoT devices.213  It 
will be important that these entities stay on top of developments in terms of 
new applications and devices, and their impact on patient data, so that they 
can draft and implement policies to appropriately address them.214 
In the case of hospitals, data and public image are more important 
than ever.  The implementation of section 3025 of the Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”) added section 1886(q) to the Social Security Act, which established 
the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program.215  The establishment of this 
program brought with it a new reality:  That hospitals would lose Medicare 
reimbursement dollars in instances where patients over the age of sixty-five 
are readmitted to the hospital for heart failure, pneumonia, or acute 
myocardial infarction.216  Section 3008 of the ACA also resulted in the 
creation of the Hospital-Acquired Condition (“HAC”) Reduction Program, 
which aims to reduce the occurrence of preventable conditions that patients 
did not have upon admission to a hospital, but developed during a hospital 
stay.217  In addition, the data about these readmission and infection rates has 
been made available to the public as never before, and thus giving consumers 
the ability to shop between hospitals based on their patient data for 
conditions like pneumonia and urinary tract infections.218  This increased 
pressure on hospitals to improve readmission rates and reduce hospital 
acquired infections will likely result in these facilities keeping a keen eye on 
the implementation of new, Internet connected devices and how they impact 
patient outcomes, as well as hospitals’ public images.219  As hospitals collect 
more and more patient data, the protection of that data will be paramount to 
not only complying with the related healthcare privacy laws, but also 
maintaining consumer trust in their ability to do so. 
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2. Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records 
Another aspect of the web of medical privacy laws can be found at 
42 C.F.R. § 2, which sets out privacy provisions for the records of the 
identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of patients that are maintained as 
part of a federally assisted drug or alcohol abuse program.220 
3. Medicare Conditions of Participation 
A significant requirement in terms of privacy for most healthcare 
providers and facilities comes in the form of the Medicare Conditions of 
Participation, codified 42 C.F.R §§ 482 to 486.221  The Conditions for 
Participation for hospitals, home health agencies, states, long-term care 
facilities, and suppliers all require these entities to safeguard patient records 
from disclosure, and not to release them without the patient’s consent.222 
4. HIPAA 
The most prominent privacy law when it comes to healthcare is 
HIPAA.223  Passed in 1996, this law protects the privacy of individually 
identifiable health information, which it defines as information that 
 
relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition 
of an individual, the provision of healthcare to an individual, or the past, 
present, or future payment for the provision of healthcare to an individual, 
and (i) identifies the individual; or (ii) with respect to which there is a 
reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to identify the 
individual.224 
 
HIPAA applies only to certain entities, which it refers to as covered 
entities, and includes “health plan[s], . . . healthcare clearinghouse[s], [and] a 
healthcare provider who transmits any health information in electronic 
form.”225  It is the latter category where it is likely that change will be needed 
as the IoT devices, particularly those related to healthcare mature, and 
regulatory solutions to protect healthcare data become apparent.226  As it 
currently stands, HIPAA does provide covered entities with an exemption 
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that allows them to use or disclose protected health information in order to 
provide treatment, obtain payment, or carry out other healthcare operations 
as set forth in the statute.227 
5. HITECH Act 
A major factor in the growth of healthcare data and related issues is 
the implementation of the HITECH Act of 2009.228  This law was intended to 
provide a monetary incentive for hospitals and healthcare providers to 
convert to electronic medical records systems, and it covers medical records 
and patient information in oral, paper, or electronic form.229  The passage of 
the HITECH Act also made significant changes to both the enforcement and 
sanctions as they relate to the healthcare privacy and security requirements 
enacted as part of HIPAA.230  One of these changes was the shift of the 
enforcement authority of the provisions of HITECH to the HHS from the 
Office for Civil Rights and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(“CMS”).231  While some agencies retain certain interests in the enforcement 
of HITECH, the primary enforcement after the implementation of the law 
lies with HHS.232  In addition, state attorney generals can bring an action in 
federal court on behalf of their respective state residents.233 
The HITECH Act places privacy obligations on not only covered 
entities, but also on the business associates who provide services to those 
covered entities, and may handle personal health information.234  This means 
that these business associates are subject to the same physical, technical, and 
administrative security requirements as those that covered entities must 
follow under HIPAA.235  These business associates can include lawyers, IT 
personnel, benefits consultants, and accountants.236  Typically, the 
compliance requirements imposed upon business associates are addressed in 
the terms of a business associate contract.237  Under the Omnibus Rule that 
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made modifications to the HIPAA and HITECH laws, business associates are 
now directly subject to some of the requirements of the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule, including providing a notice of privacy practices or designating a 
privacy officer in the event that the business associate delegates that 
obligation to a third party.238  In addition, the Omnibus Rule allows business 
associates of covered entities to disclose protected health information to a 
business associate who is a subcontractor.239  As part of this change, the 
business associate can allow the subcontractor to create or receive that PHI 
on its behalf, so long as the business associate obtains adequate assurances 
from the subcontractor that it will safeguard the information.240  This change 
passes the responsibility of obtaining such assurances from being that of the 
covered entity to being the responsibility of the business associate, but is still 
done through a business associate agreement, which lays out the 
responsibilities and obligations of the respective parties.241 
Other important aspects of the HITECH Act are the requirements 
that it imposes upon covered entities and business associates in terms of 
security breach notifications.242  The Act defines a breach as “the 
unauthorized acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of protected health 
information which compromises the security or privacy of such information, 
except where an unauthorized person to whom such information is disclosed 
would not . . . have been able to retain such information.”243  The Act further 
defines unsecured personal health information as information that is not 
protected “through the use of a technology or methodology specified by the 
Secretary in . . . guidance . . . that renders the [PHI] unusable, unreadable, or 
indecipherable to unauthorized individuals.”244 
6. ACA 
Yet another significant law when it comes to healthcare privacy is 
ACA.245  This law created the Health Insurance Marketplace, as well as the 
website HealthCare.gov, where consumers can shop for insurance policies 
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available through the federal marketplace.246  The law also requires insurance 
companies to cover people with pre-existing health conditions, allows 
coverage to continue for young adults up to age twenty-six under their 
parents’ policies, and makes it illegal for health insurance companies to 
cancel coverage just because an insured person gets sick.247 
As with many new healthcare laws, the implementation of ACA has 
not been without bumps in the road.248  In addition to challenges by 
politicians who are not fans of the new law, there have been privacy 
concerns that have emerged as the HealthCare.gov website has rolled out.249  
This website serves as the hub for consumers to sign up for health insurance, 
as well as the marketplace for them to shop for policies.250  As one can 
imagine, this process involves a lot of sensitive data, which consumers and 
regulators are very concerned about keeping safe.251  However, as recent 
headlines have detailed, an Associated Press report said that the site has been 
sharing user data, including users’ ages, income levels, and whether they are 
pregnant or not, with third parties like Facebook, Twitter, and Google.252  
These reports highlighted new privacy concerns that have arisen as the IoT 
expands:  First, that of broken promises of anonymization; and second, “‘the 
spillage of data from one context into others.’”253  The concerns in the first 
instance focus on situations where the organization collecting the data 
assured users that the data would be made anonymous, but it is then either 
not made anonymous, or the process is not carried out well.254  The second 
concern relates to situations where health data is collected in one context, but 
then used by a third party in ways that consumers are not aware of and may 
not have necessarily consented to under the terms of the first context.255 
Officials from CMS have emphasized that they do not and will not 
sell visitor information from HealthCare.gov, and that they remain vigilant 
about working to make sure that consumer data is protected.256  Aaron 
Albright, director of the media relations group at CMS, explained that 
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 “Private sector tools . . . play a critical role in the 
operation of a consumer focused website.  Without these tools, 
HealthCare.gov would be unable to effectively respond to system 
errors, issues that result in a poor or slow web experience, or 
provide metrics to the public on site visits [or] mobile usage.  In 
addition, consumers would have to continuously resubmit 
information throughout the process making signing up for 
insurance more difficult.”257 
This explanation highlights the tension between consumer demands 
for user-friendly websites, as well as for sites that protect consumer data to 
the greatest extent possible.258  As with many types of software projects, this 
tension must be weighed against the business decision that often must be 
made between using a third party tool or taking the extra time and money to 
build such a tool internally.259 
7. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”) 
An important privacy law that has been enacted to protect patient 
health information is GINA.260  This law states that genetic information is 
PHI, and is protected under HIPAA.261  It further prohibits health insurance 
companies from using genetic information for underwriting purposes and 
prohibits employers from discriminating against people based on such 
information.262 
The passage of the GINA law, as well as the updates to it as the 
HIPAA and HITECH laws have evolved, represent an important line of 
defense to protect patients against discrimination on the basis of genetic 
information.263  This defense will only continue to grow in importance as 
personalized medicine based on genetic information is used more widely and 
as more is discovered about the impact of genetics on human health.264  It is 
also likely that as other categories of health data are discovered that laws will 
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be passed to protect against discrimination based on what can be gleaned 
from that data.265 
 
C. Impact of Internet of Things on Health Laws 
1. Hesitancy of Healthcare Providers 
Despite the great potential of the use of big data in healthcare, there 
is also evidence of hesitancy on the part of providers to implement some 
tools until they are fully baked.266  A recent NPR story noted how a doctor at 
Stanford’s Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital searched patient record data to 
examine treatment of pediatric lupus patients, and eventually find a way to 
save the life of such a patient, but that ultimately the hospital opted not to 
continue doing so, as the doctors felt that the system for mining such patient 
data was not yet ready for prime time.267  While it is noted in the story that 
the ability to search such data can fill the gap in situations where there is not 
sufficient published literature to help doctors navigate difficult cases, there 
does seem to be a consensus among some hospitals and physicians that these 
systems need to be better developed before they are widely adopted.268  This 
applies not only to systems to mine patient data to find solutions, but also to 
electronic medical records systems.269  In some instances, hospitals have 
begun to mine the data present in their records, but found that they are not 
yet ready to do this in all of their cases, as was discovered by Dr. Jenny 
Frankovich, an attending physician at the Stanford Lucile Packard Children’s 
Hospital.270  As Dr. Frankovich explained in her NPR interview, while her 
analysis of the treatment of other pediatric lupus patients from the data from 
their respective charts in the database helped her find a solution to treat her 
patient in that instance, the physicians have not yet instituted this practice on 
a widespread basis, as they feel that the system is not yet ready in terms of 
accuracy and reliability to be used in every case.271 
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2. Imposition of Health Privacy Laws on New Categories of People 
i. Web Developers, App Developers, Tech Companies 
An interesting aspect of the issues that develop at the intersection of 
the growth of the Internet of Things and healthcare are those faced by the 
parties that support the entities that are bound by HIPAA and other medical 
data protection laws, including web developers.272  Development of 
healthcare websites has grown exponentially, especially given the fact that, 
according to a 2013 study by the Pew Internet and American Life Project, 
“[o]ne in three American adults have gone online [to try] to figure out [what] 
medical condition” that they or another individual might have.273  Of those 
individuals who searched for a medical condition online, forty-six percent 
said that the information led them to think that they needed the attention of a 
medical professional, and thirty-eight percent said that they used it to 
determine if the condition was something that they could take care of at 
home, and eleven percent said it was both reasons or somewhere in 
between.274  The increased use of online medical information has made the 
online presence of medical device manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, 
physicians, hospitals, and other related entities have a presence on the 
web.275  As such, they are increasingly reaching out to web and app 
developers to help them create such a presence, and in instances where such 
developers have to interact with patient data, to ensure HIPAA 
compliance.276 
The changes to the HIPAA and HITECH laws as a result of the 
implementation of the Omnibus Rule have made taking on the obligations of 
abiding by these healthcare data privacy laws a bit clearer for developers, as 
it better lays out the obligations of business associates handling PHI, as well 
as the circumstances under which a developer could opt to use a 
subcontractor who is more familiar with the obligations and procedures for 
handling sensitive data rather than taking on all of the obligations 
themselves.277  The developers remain responsible for oversight in such a 
situation, but they also can make sure that both parties are clear as to their 
roles through the use of a well-drafted business associate agreement.278  
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Further, as healthcare companies have become more experienced in dealing 
with developers, they are in some instances becoming more adept at training 
them as to how to comply with relevant data privacy laws.279  In other words, 
regulatory agencies seem to be picking up the slack, and will likely get the 
message across through enforcement actions for those who do not ensure 
their apps and devices comply, as the FTC has done with recent COPPA 
actions.280 
3. FDA Regulation of Health Apps and Devices 
At the time of this writing, there were more than 43,000 healthcare 
apps available in the Apple iTunes App Store.281  However, of these apps, an 
October 2013 survey by the IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics found 
that most of these apps had only been downloaded fewer than 500 times, and 
very few offered any type of robust functionality.282  In the worst cases, the 
apps provided inaccurate or unproven information, some even in apps 
designed for clinical use by physicians!283  This new reality of healthcare 
apps has caught the attention of the FDA, as it seeks to protect people from 
inaccurate or unsafe information that may be provided in healthcare apps or 
devices.284  In September of 2013, the FDA announced that it would start 
regulating healthcare apps, focusing on those apps that “meet the regulatory 
definition of device, and that (i) are intended to be used as an accessory to a 
regulated medical device, or (ii) transform a mobile platform into a regulated 
medical device.”285  The FDA noted that the agency has extensive resources 
available to help app developers determine the level of regulation that applies 
to their particular product, such as the Product Classification Database and 
the 510(k) Premarket Notification Database, and to stay up-to-date on new 
information about changes to these regulations.286 
The FDA has provided examples of specific apps that have been 
approved under its new regulations, as well as examples of the types of apps 
and devices that would be subject to these regulations.287  The first category 
of apps the FDA will be regulating are “[m]obile apps that transform a 
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mobile platform into a regulated medical device and therefore are mobile 
medical apps.”288  The FDA’s guidance states that this category would 
include apps that use sensors attached to the mobile platform or tools within 
the mobile platform to diagnose a condition, as well as those that “present 
donor history questions to a potential blood donor and . . . transmit the 
[answers to] . . . a blood collection facility” to determine the donor’s 
eligibility to donate blood.289  The second category of apps that the FDA will 
now regulate are those “apps that connect to an existing device type for 
purposes of controlling its operation, function or energy source, and 
therefore are mobile medical apps.”290  The guidance states that this category 
would include apps that control or monitor devices such as infusion pumps, 
neuromuscular stimulators, or blood pressure cuffs.291  The third category of 
apps that are now covered by FDA regulation are “mobile apps that display, 
transfer, store, or convert patient-specific medical device data from a 
connected device and therefore are mobile medical apps.”292  Included in the 
examples for this category are 
 
apps that connect to a nursing central station and display medical 
device data to a physician’s mobile platform for review, . . . apps 
that connect to bedside—or cardiac—monitors [that] transfer the 
data to a . . . viewing station for . . . patient monitoring, . . . [as well 
as] apps that connect to a perinatal monitoring system and transfer 
. . . contraction and fetal heart rate . . . to another display to allow 
for . . . monitoring [the] progress [of a patient’s labor].293 
 
The announcement of these new regulations for healthcare apps 
caused plenty of grumbling in fast-paced Silicon Valley, where the focus is 
often on being the first to market, and there is typically lower tolerance for 
lengthy regulatory processes.294  However, the FDA has made it clear that 
going forward, device and app developers looking to create IoT products and 
services for the healthcare industry will need to play by their rules in order to 
operate in this space.295  There will likely be some growing pains, but one 
hopes that as developers learn the ropes of the FDA procedures, and take 
advantage of the huge potential market for smart healthcare devices and 
                                                     
288. Examples of MMAs the FDA Regulates, supra note 107. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. 
293. Examples of MMAs the FDA Regulates, supra note 107. 
294. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 67, at 4. 
295. See id. 
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apps, that the process of complying with the regulations will become less 
painful. 
4. Conflicts in Terms of Service and Privacy Policy 
Among the legal challenges presented by the growth of the IoT as it 
relates to healthcare is how developers can not only write privacy policies for 
their devices or services that comply with applicable privacy laws, but also 
ensure that they work with the policies of other products in that ecosystem.296  
As the universe of apps has exploded in recent years, conflicts between the 
terms of use and privacy policies of different apps and platforms have 
become more common.297  Such conflicts became apparent to this author 
when she installed an app on her tablet called SnapHack, which allows users 
to save their SnapChat messages, which typically only last between one to 
ten seconds.298  The SnapHack app interfaces with SnapChat through its 
applied programming interface, or API, and more interestingly, the app 
features a disclaimer in its terms of service that states that the developers of 
SnapHack are not responsible if the use of its app violates the terms of use 
for SnapChat and results in the user’s SnapChat account being deleted.299  As 
the IoT ecosystem matures, it will be important for developers to work to 
ensure that their apps do not violate the terms of use for another app or 
platform in such a way that might result in users’ accounts being deleted.   
While it may be upsetting in the short term for a user to lose his or her 
SnapChat messages, one can imagine how devastated a user of a healthcare 
app would be to lose months or years of health data that he or she has been 
using to track a serious medical condition. 
As well as conflicts between the terms of use and privacy policies of 
apps, there are also real world legal consequences of developers creating 
apps using pieces of software that are not in compliance with privacy laws.300  
The FTC recently took the unprecedented step of warning app developer 
                                                     
296. See FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at viii. 
297. See, e.g., id. at vii−viii. 
298. See Salvador Rodriguez, SnapHack App Lets Users Save Snapchat Photos 
Without Notifying Sender, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2013, 1:19 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-snapchat-snaphack-save-photos-
20131014-story.html. 
299. Charlie Osborne, Snapchat Issues Outright Ban on Third-Party Apps 
Following 4chan Hack, ZDNET (Nov. 17, 2014, 12:30 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/
article/snapchat-issues-outright-ban-on-third-party-apps-following-4chan-hack/. 
300. See 16 C.F.R. § 312.3 (2012); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC 
Warns Children’s App Maker BabyBus About Potential COPPA Violations, (Dec. 22, 2014) 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/12/ftc-warns-childrens-app-maker-
babybus-about-potential-coppa. 
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BabyBus that its apps were not in compliance with COPPA, and that it could 
face fines if it did not take steps to bring them into compliance.301  It turned 
out that the problem was not with BabyBus’ software code in the app, but 
with a third party API that was collecting data subject to COPPA from 
minors and did not have the applicable compliance and parental consent 
mechanisms in place.302  As a result of the warning, Google pulled all of the 
BabyBus apps from the PlayStore until they were in compliance with the 
law.303  Situations like this illustrate the importance for developers to not 
only work to ensure that they have policies and procedures in place so that 
their products are in compliance with applicable privacy laws, but also do 
their due diligence in terms of third party software to make sure it does as 
well.304  Given the growing thicket of regulations and laws governing the 
protection of healthcare data, taking these steps will be more important than 
ever for developers in the IoT healthcare space.305  As much as the FTC is 
stepping up its COPPA enforcement actions, it is likely that the Commission, 
as well as the FDA, will do the same as it relates to apps and devices in the 
IoT in healthcare, and not being in compliance could result in expensive 
lessons in terms of fines, as well as negative publicity.306 
5.  Interoperability issues 
In addition to the myriad legal considerations that come with the era 
of the IoT for healthcare, there are also an equal number of practical 
considerations that must be addressed as part of the implementation 
process.307  One such consideration is the interoperability of all of these 
devices and applications.308  As mentioned above, there is hesitancy among 
some physicians and hospitals in the midst of the implementation of so much 
technology at this time, and interoperability is a big part of that concern.309  
Developers and manufacturers of IoT devices and apps will have to tread 
                                                     
301. See 16 C.F.R. § 312.3; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 
300. 
302. 16 C.F.R. § 312.3; Wendy Davis, Google Suspends BabyBus Apps After 
FTC Warns of Privacy Violations, MEDIAPOST (Dec. 29, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://
www.mediapost.com/publications/article/240860/google-suspends-babybus-apps-after-ftc-
warns-of-pr.html; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 300. 
303. Davis, supra note 302. 
304. See id.; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 300. 
305. See Davis, supra note 302; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 
300. 
306. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 300. 
307. See INTEL, supra note 102, at 1. 
308. Id. at 3. 
309. See id. at 3; supra Part III.C.1. 
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carefully, and involve doctors and hospitals in the development of their 
products to make sure these products can become part of the IoT ecosystem 
and work with other products in it if they want to succeed.310  As Dr. Michael 
Blum, a cardiologist at the University of California, San Francisco, noted on 
a recent NPR story, doctors are getting pitches from entrepreneurs on a near 
daily basis, and while “[t]heir perspective is, ‘[y]ou old doctors have kept 
things the same as they are for [fifty] years.  [We have] got [sic] new 
technology, and [it is] going to disrupt healthcare’ . . . .  [But] [t]he 
[p]roblem is just because a device looks shiny and new [does not] mean [it 
is] useful.”311  Blum said that in many instances, validation studies are 
needed, and the task of carrying out these studies often falls to doctors and 
hospitals, so developers will also need to allow time in their product 
planning.312  The implementation of the new FDA guidelines for medical 
devices and apps should help with this process, whether developers like it or 
not.313 
6. BYOD 
A practical reality related to interoperability is bring your own 
device (“BYOD”) to hospitals and healthcare facilities.314  Where in the past 
corporations had certain standard devices that all employees used, the 
proliferation of smart phones and devices in society now means that 
physicians and nurses all have a variety of personal and professional devices, 
and that any platform a hospital or healthcare system adopts must work with 
a broad spectrum of devices.315  The same goes for patients, so developers 
must consider what platforms patients are using, and make sure that their 
products work well with those platforms to help with their widespread 
adoption.316 
This BYOD reality makes the concerns about interoperability, both 
in terms of policies and operation, even more important for new IoT devices 
and applications.317  The challenge will be how to find products that allow 
medical professionals easy and fast access to patient data detected by IoT 
devices, while also building in security measures to protect that same data. 
                                                     
310. See Sullivan, supra note 17. 
311. Standen, supra note 16. 
312. Id. 
313. INTEL, supra note 102, at 3–4. 
314. BYOD, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS, http://www.healthcareitnews.com/
directory/byod (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). 
315. See id. 
316. See id. 
317. See id. 
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7. Recalls 
Ultimately, given the legal and practical considerations of the IoT as 
it relates to healthcare, there will need to be solutions on both fronts to 
protect healthcare data.318  One such solution is that of recalls of medical 
devices.319  To date, there have not been any such recalls for cybersecurity 
reasons, but it is foreseeable that this could change in the future with the 
explosion of medical devices that are part of the IoT.320  The challenges 
could be said to be twofold:  First, those presented by the rise of three-
dimensional printing, and, second, the related—but in many instances 
separate—challenges presented by the rise of crowdfunding as a means of 
funding medical device challenges.321  In the first instance, while three-
dimensional printing has allowed physicians to print prostheses to create 
lifesaving solutions for patients, these prostheses were not subject to the 
same rigors that traditional solutions undergo as part of research and 
development, and their long-term consequences remain to be seen.322  
However, the same can be said of devices that go the traditional development 
route.323  In the instance of some metal hip replacements, this oversight did 
not prevent problems with the implants that caused devastating injuries to 
patients when they began to lock up and shed metal shavings into their 
bloodstreams.324 
The challenge that both three-dimensional printing and 
crowdfunding present is that in some instances, unlike traditional 
pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers, these products are starting 
to be developed by small or independent companies that may not have the 
same corporate legacy in terms of incorporation and continued corporate 
existence.325  This legacy is important, as in the case of device recalls, 
government agencies, as well as consumers, would need to be able to contact 
the company and its customers to inform them of said recall.326  Though this 
                                                     
318. See supra Part II. 
319. See Poremba, supra note 62. 
320. Id. 
321. See Lucy Vernasco, 3-D Printing Is Changing the Future of Prosthetics, 
DAILY BEAST (Dec. 10, 2014, 5:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/10/3-
d-printing-is-changing-the-future-of-prosthetics.html; Alex Wawro, Washington Sues 
Kickstarted Game Creator Who Failed to Deliver, GAMASUTRA (May 2, 2014), 
http://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/216887/Washington_sues_Kickstarted_game_creator_
who_failed_to_deliver.php. 
322. See Vernasco, supra note 321. 
323. See Barry Meier, Maker Aware of 40% Failure in Hip Implant, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2013, at A1. 
324. Id. 
325. See Vernasco, supra note 321; Wawro, supra note 321. 
326. Meier, supra note 323; see also Poremba, supra note 62. 
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concern is less likely for the companies creating devices and apps subject to 
the FDA regulations, there is still a concern for those companies or inventors 
that are not covered by them.327 
As the IoT for healthcare develops, the Agency may have to help fill 
the gap between established companies and startups, or other parties may 
have to step up.328  This has already started to happen on the crowdfunding 
front, as popular crowdfunding sites like Kickstarter and game platform 
Steam Early Access changed their terms of service in September to require 
that creators actually deliver the products and rewards described in their 
campaign.329  This move was motivated by the backlash from backers in 
response to several game campaigns that never delivered as promised, or else 
delivered low quality games.330  State attorneys general are monitoring the 
crowdfunding space from a consumer protection law standpoint as well, as 
the Attorney General for the State of Washington filed what is believed to be 
the first consumer protection lawsuit concerning crowdfunding against 
Kickstarter game creator Edward J. Polchlepek III—also known as Ed 
Nash—and his company Altius Management, in May of 2014.331 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Much as it did in the time of Justices Brandeis and Warren in the age 
of snapshot photography, concerns about privacy remain just as paramount 
among consumers and regulators today in the age of the IoT.332  Given the 
importance of keeping consumers and their data safe in this fast-paced age of 
rapid technological development, it will be crucial for regulators to keep an 
eye on how these technologies are developing, as well as collect and analyze 
data, so that they can develop solutions to the problems that may crop up 
along the way.  Lawyers will also play an important role in this process, as 
they defend victims of data breaches and hold retailers and data aggregators 
accountable for the protection of consumer data.  Lawyers will also play an 
                                                     
327. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 67, at 13–18; Standen, supra note 
16; Sullivan, supra note 17. 
328. See INTEL, supra note 102, at 2–4; Poremba supra note 62; Sullivan, supra 
note 17. 
329. Jeff Grubb, Valve Expands Its Rules for Early Access Games on Steam, 
VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 20, 2014, 11:45 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2014/11/20/valve-expands-
its-rules-for-early-access-games-on-steam/; Christian Nutt, Kickstarter Updates Terms:  ‘The 
Creator Must Complete the Project’, GAMASUTRA (Sept. 19, 2014), 
http://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/226071/Kickstarter_updates_terms_The_creator_must
_complete_the_project.php. 
330. Wawro, supra note 321; see also Nutt, supra note 329. 
331. Wawro, supra note 321. 
332. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195; Greenough, supra note 6. 
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integral role in the care and feeding of privacy policies as they relate to the 
IoT and healthcare, as well as other industries, advising companies as to how 
best to develop their policies and procedures, as well as how to communicate 
them to patients and regulators. 
There is perhaps no other industry that this process will be more 
important than in healthcare.  As such, the solutions developed by entities, 
from hospitals to state and federal healthcare agencies to app developers, will 
shape the role of the IoT in the future of healthcare. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Iconic film critic, Roger Ebert, proclaimed that a scene from the hit 
movie Raging Bull showcased “acting as good as any ever put on the 
screen.”1  In addition to cracking Ebert’s list of top ten movies, the American 
Film Institute declared Raging Bull the fourth greatest American movie of all 
time.2  Despite the critical acclaim, Raging Bull is not receiving headlines for 
the knockout performance delivered by Robert De Niro.3  Instead, Raging 
Bull is in the spotlight because of the impact a recent Supreme Court of the 
United States’ decision will have on copyright and patent law.4  On May 19, 
2014, in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,5 the Supreme Court held 
that the equitable doctrine of laches does not apply to copyright infringement 
claims.6 
Legal scholars are of the belief that the Supreme Court’s ruling will 
have a significant impact on copyright law.7  Specifically, they predict that 
the Supreme Court’s bar on the defense of laches will result in a substantial 
increase in copyright claims.8  This presumption was immediately evidenced 
by a lawsuit filed against Led Zeppelin claiming that their legendary song, 
Stairway to Heaven, was created as a result of copyright infringement.9 
This Comment will focus on the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Petrella, its far-reaching implications, and the pending lawsuit against Led 
Zeppelin.10  Specifically, Part II of this Comment will explain, in detail, the 
doctrine of laches and the relevant copyright law necessary to appreciate the 
                                            
1. Roger Ebert, Ten Greatest Films of All Time, ROGER EBERT’S J. (Apr. 1, 
1991), http://www.rogerebert.com/rogers-journal/ten-greatest-films-of-all-time. 
2. AFI’s 100 Years . . . 100 Movies—10th Anniversary Edition, AM. FILM 
INST. (2007), http://www.afi.com/Docs/100Years/100Movies.pdf; Ebert, supra note 1. 
3. See David G. Savage, Supreme Court Ruling Revives Copyright Suit; 
Justices Say Heirs of Composers and Writers Can Wait Decades to Seek Royalties from 
Rereleases, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 2014, at B1; Ebert, supra note 1. 
4. Bill Donahue, With ‘Raging Bull’ Ruling, Copyright Cases Could Spike, 
LAW360 (May 19, 2014, 7:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/539438/with-raging-
bull-ruling-copyright-cases-could-spike; see also Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 
12-1315, slip op. at 1 (U.S. May 19, 2014). 
5. No. 12-1315, slip op. (U.S. May 19, 2014). 
6. Id. at 1. 
7. Donahue, supra note 4; see also Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 1. 
8. Donahue, supra note 4; see also Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 1. 
9. Todd McCormick & Jason M. Joyal, How ‘Raging Bull’ Case Could 
Impact Entertainment Industry, LAW360 (July 2, 2014, 10:08 AM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/552689/how-raging-bull-case-could-impact-entertainment-industry; see also 
Complaint at 22–23, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 2:14-cv-03089-JS (E.D. Pa. filed May 31, 
2014). 
10. See Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 1; Complaint, supra note 9, at 22–
27; infra Parts II–IV. 
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significance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella.11  Part III will 
thoroughly analyze Petrella by providing a background of the case and a 
detailed explanation of the Supreme Court’s holding.12  Then, Part IV of this 
Comment will transition into an extensive discussion of the lawsuit filed 
against Led Zeppelin and its acclaimed song, Stairway to Heaven.13 
II. COPYRIGHT LAW 
The origins of United States copyright law can be found in Article 1, 
Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which provides that Congress 
has the authority “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 14   Today, the United States 
Copyright Act (“the Act”) promulgates the founding fathers’ desire to 
promote innovation, while providing authors and inventors with exclusive 
rights to their works.15  Section 102(a) of the Act grants copyright protection 
for “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.”16  Under the Act, a copyright “vests initially in the author or 
authors of the work.”17  Pursuant to section 106 of the Act, a copyright owner 
is conferred “certain exclusive rights, including the rights to reproduce and 
[re]distribute the work and to develop and market derivative works.” 18  
However, these exclusive rights are protected for only a fixed period of 
time.19  Copyrighted works published before 1978—as were Raging Bull and 
Stairway to Heaven—“are protected for an initial period of [twenty-eight] 
years, which may be—and in [these] case[s] [were]—extended for a renewal 
period of up to [sixty-seven] years.”20 
 
                                            
11. See Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 1; infra Part II. 
12. See Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 1; infra Part III. 
13. See Complaint, supra note 9, at 1; infra Part IV. 
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Toni Lester, Blurred Lines—Where 
Copyright Ends and Cultural Appropriation Begins—The Case of Robin Thicke Versus 
Bridgeport Music and the Estate of Marvin Gaye, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 217, 222–
23 (2014). 
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (limiting works of authorship to the following 
categories:  “(1) [L]iterary works; (2) musical works . . . ; (3) dramatic works . . . ; (4) 
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works”). 
17. Id. § 201. 
18. Id. § 106; Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc, 12-1315, slip op. at 2 
(U.S. May 19, 2014). 
19. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a). 
20. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 2 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)). 
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A. Statute of Limitations 
Despite lengthy periods of protection, copyright owners’ ability to 
recover from infringement is hindered by a three-year statute of limitations 
period.21  Section 507(b) of the Act provides that, “[n]o civil action shall be 
maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within 
three years after the claim accrued.”22  “A claim ordinarily accrues ‘when [a] 
plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.’”23  For a copyright 
claim, this three-year period will begin to accrue at the moment an act of 
infringement occurs.24   The Act’s statute of limitations operates under a 
separate-accrual rule, which provides that “when a defendant commits 
successive violations, the statute of limitations runs separately from each 
violation.”25  Essentially, each act of infringement, by the same person or 
entity, will result in a new three-year limitations period.26  Although the 
courts have implemented a recurring statute of limitations, “[u]nder the Act’s 
three-year provision, an infringement is actionable within three years, and 
only three years, of its occurrence.”27  Ultimately, this means that a plaintiff 
is only entitled to recover for infringing acts that took place within the three 
years prior to the date the complaint was filed.28 
B. Doctrine of Laches Applied to Copyright Law 
The doctrine of laches is an equitable defense that is typically raised 
when a plaintiff delayed filing their lawsuit without good reason.29  The 
ability to invoke a defense of laches is dependent upon the reason the 
plaintiff delayed bringing the particular claim and the effect that this lapse of 
time had on the defendant.30  In other words, to prevail on a defense of 
laches, the defendant must show that the plaintiff’s delay was both 
unreasonable and caused them to be prejudiced.31 
                                            
21. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). 
22. Id. 
23. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 4 (alteration in original) (quoting Bay 
Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 
(1997)). 
24. Id. (explaining that a complete cause of action arises when an infringing 
act occurs); see also 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). 
25. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 5. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 5–6. 
29. Samuel L. Bray, A Little Bit of Laches Goes a Long Way:  Notes on 
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1, 1 (2014). 
30. Id. at 2. 
31. Id. 
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Due to some of the complexities involved with the application of a 
laches defense, the circuit courts have been divided as to whether this 
defense is available in copyright infringement actions.32  The circuits’ split 
revolves around two primary concerns:  Whether the application of laches 
should be allowed, despite a codified statute of limitations period, and 
whether the defense of laches is available for all claims or only equitable 
ones.33 
1. Laches Within a Prescribed Limitations Period 
The courts’ split is derived primarily from the ability of a laches 
defense to cut short a statute of limitations period that was prescribed 
specifically by Congress.34  The circuit courts have adopted three distinct 
ways of dealing with a defense of laches, while still within the Act’s three-
year limitations period. 35   The courts have either completely barred the 
application of laches, allowed the application, or have permitted the defense 
of laches only in rare cases.36 
In Lyons Partnership v. Morris Costumes, Inc.,37 the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that laches could never bar a copyright infringement 
claim, so long as the claim is within the statute of limitations period.38  The 
Lyons Partnership court suggested that if it were to allow a laches defense to 
cut short the statute of limitations period, enacted by the legislature, it would 
raise significant separation of powers concerns.39 
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit is of the opinion that a defense of 
laches may be available, regardless of a statute of limitations.40  In Martin v. 
Consultants & Administrators, Inc.,41 the court noted that “there is plenty of 
authority for applying laches in cases governed by a statute of limitations.”42 
Meanwhile, the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have consistently 
held that a laches defense may be applied before a statute of limitations has 
                                            
32. Vikas K. Didwania, Comment, The Defense of Laches in Copyright 
Infringement Claims, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2008). 
33. See id. at 1236. 
34. Id. at 1239 (explaining that “[t]he major concern[] among courts . . . [has] 
been separation of powers and judicial deference to Congress seemingly raised by the 
application of laches within the copyright infringement context”). 
35. See id. at 1239–44. 
36. See id. 
37. 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001). 
38. Id. at 798. 
39. Id. 
40. Didwania, supra note 32, at 1240. 
41. 966 F.2d 1078 (7th Cir. 1992). 
42. Id. at 1100. 
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run, only if rare and compelling circumstances exist.43  The Sixth Circuit has 
held that in copyright litigation, laches applies only to the most compelling of 
cases.44  Additionally, in Peter Letterese & Associates, Inc. v. World Institute 
of Scientology Enterprises,45 the Eleventh Circuit noted that “there is a strong 
presumption [in copyright cases] that a plaintiff’s suit is timely if it is filed 
before the statute of limitations has run [and] [o]nly in the most 
extraordinary circumstances will laches be recognized as a defense.”46 
2. Laches:  Equitable, Legal, or Both? 
Having been developed by courts of equity, there is also constant 
debate as to whether a laches defense applies to all claims or merely 
equitable ones.47  In Lyons Partnership, the Fourth Circuit proclaimed that 
laches “applies only in equity to bar equitable actions, not at law to bar legal 
actions.” 48   However, some circuit courts have held that “significant 
precedent exists for applying laches to bar [copyright] claims, even within 
the copyright context.”49 
The Seventh Circuit has observed that “although laches is an 
equitable doctrine, courts increasingly apply it in cases at law in 
which plaintiffs seek damages.”  The Sixth Circuit has held that 
laches can be argued “regardless of whether the suit is at law or in 
equity, because, as with many equitable defenses, the defense of 
laches is equally available in suits at law.”50 
Most important to note, however, is the stance taken by the Ninth 
Circuit.51  In the Raging Bull lawsuit, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District 
Court’s decision that the plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim was barred 
by laches, despite the claim being within the three-year limitations period.52  
                                            
43. Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc., v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters. Int’l, 
533 F.3d 1287, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008); Didwania, supra note 32, at 1242–43. 
44. Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007). 
45. 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008). 
46. Id. at 1320. 
47. Bray, supra note 29, at 1–3. 
48. Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc, 243 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 
2001). 
49. Didwania, supra note 32, at 1238. 
50. Didwania, supra note 32, at 1238–39 (quoting Chirco v. Crosswinds 
Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 234 (6th Cir. 2007); Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax Inc., 191 F.3d 
813, 822 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
51. See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 
2012), rev’d, No. 12-1315 (U.S. May 19, 2014). 
52. Id. at 951, 955–56. 
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The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on this case to 
once and for all “resolve [the] conflict among[st] the [c]ircuits on the 
application of the equitable defense of laches to copyright infringement 
claims brought within the three-year [statute of limitations] period prescribed 
by Congress.”53 
III. PETRELLA V. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER GOES THE DISTANCE 
A. Background 
In 1963, Frank Petrella authored a screenplay, which depicted the 
life of former middleweight champion, Jake LaMotta.54  That very same 
year, Petrella and LaMotta registered a copyright for the work.55  In 1976, 
thirteen years after collaborating to create the screenplay, Petrella and 
LaMotta assigned their rights in the work to Chartoff–Winkler Productions, 
Inc.56  Two years later, United Artists Corporation, a subsidiary of Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. (“MGM”), acquired the rights to Petrella’s screenplay, 
which became the inspiration behind the Martin Scorcese film, Raging 
Bull.57  MGM released the iconic film and registered a copyright for it in 
1980.58  Just a year later, in 1981, Frank Petrella died while still within the 
initial terms of the copyright.59 
Although Petrella and LaMotta assigned their rights to the 
screenplay, the Supreme Court’s decision in Stewart v. Abend60 declared that 
a copyright holder’s heirs could renew copyrights unburdened by previous 
assignments made by the author.61  In Stewart, the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that when an author who has assigned their rights away 
dies before the renewal period, “the assignee may continue to use the original 
work only if the author’s successor transfers the renewal rights to the 
assignee.”62  As a result of the Court’s decision in Stewart, the renewal rights 
for the screenplay, unburdened by the previous assignment, reverted to Frank 
                                            
53. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, slip op. at 10 (U.S. 
May 19, 2014). 
54. Savage, supra note 3; see Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 7 (explaining 
that although Frank Petrella was listed as the sole author, the registration stated that the 
screenplay was written in collaboration with LaMotta). 
55. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 7. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. 495 U.S. 207 (1990). 
61. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 7; see also Stewart, 495 U.S. at 221–22. 
62. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 221. 
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Petrella’s heirs upon his death.63  Subsequently, Paula Petrella, the daughter 
of the late Frank Petrella, renewed the copyright to the 1963 screenplay in 
1991, and became the “sole owner of the copyright in that work.”64 
Paula Petrella filed a complaint in the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California on January 6, 2009, eighteen years after 
renewing the copyright. 65   Her copyright infringement suit “alleged that 
MGM violated . . . her copyright in the 1963 screenplay by using, producing, 
and distributing Raging Bull, a work she described as derivative of the 1963 
screenplay.” 66   Petrella sought both legal and equitable remedies. 67  
Additionally, pursuant to section 507(b) of the Act, she could only seek relief 
for acts of infringement that occurred between January 6, 2006 and January 
6, 2009.68 
Subsequently, MGM moved for summary judgment, claiming that 
the suit should be barred based upon the doctrine of laches.69  MGM asserted 
that Petrella’s eighteen-year delay in filing the suit was both unreasonable 
and prejudicial towards MGM. 70   Ultimately, the district court granted 
MGM’s motion for summary judgment, holding that laches barred the 
lawsuit because MGM was indeed prejudiced by Petrella’s unreasonable 
delay in filing the suit.71 
Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision 
to dismiss the lawsuit based upon the doctrine of laches.72  The Ninth Circuit 
ruled in favor of MGM, despite Petrella being within the three-year statute of 
limitations period, because “Petrella was aware of her potential claims many 
years earlier.”73  On October 1, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States 
granted certiorari to hear the case and resolve the laches conflict.74 
                                            
63. Id. at 220–21; see also Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 7. 
64. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 8; see also 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(A)–(B) 
(2012) (providing that a copyrighted work published before 1978 is set to expire twenty-eight 
years after the creation of the work, unless the copyright is extended for a renewal period of 
up to sixty-seven years). 
65. See Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 8. 
66. Id. 
67. See id. (explaining that Petrella’s complaint requested both monetary and 
injunctive relief). 
68. Id. at 8–9; see also 17 U.S.C. § 507(b); supra Part II.A. 
69. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 9. 
70. Id. 
71. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 
2012), rev’d, No. 12-1315 (U.S. May 19, 2014). 
72. Id. at 951, 957. 
73. Id. at 952. 
74. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, 2013 WL 5430494, 
at *1 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013). 
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B. Petrella Wins in Split-Decision 
1. SCOTUS Delivers Knockout Punch to Laches 
In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, finding that in the face of a 
statute of limitations, the equitable defense of laches cannot be invoked to 
bar legal relief.75   This decision resolved the long-standing debate as to 
whether laches can be applied within a prescribed statute of limitations 
period and its application to legal claims.76 
Section 507(b), it is undisputed, bars relief of any kind for conduct 
occurring prior to the three-year limitations period.  To the extent 
that an infringement suit seeks relief solely for conduct occurring 
within the limitations period, however, courts are not at liberty to 
jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of suit.  Laches, we 
hold, cannot be invoked to preclude adjudication of a claim for 
damages brought within the three-year window.  As to equitable 
relief, in extraordinary circumstances, laches may bar at the very 
threshold the particular relief requested by the plaintiff.77 
In order to reach this holding, the Supreme Court first noted that the 
Ninth Circuit erred by neglecting to recognize that section 507(b) of the Act 
already accounts for the delay of filing the suit.78  Led by Justice Ginsberg, 
the majority explained that because a plaintiff cannot recover retrospectively 
beyond the prescribed three-year window, any profits made outside that 
window remain the defendant’s to keep.79 
Second, the Supreme Court explained that the Act already allows 
defendants to offset against profits made within the three-year look-back 
period.80  Section 504(b) of the Act allows infringers to prove “deductible 
expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the 
copyrighted work.” 81   Although laches cannot be invoked within the 
limitations period, the Supreme Court suggested that a delay in filing the suit 
could be a factor in determining the appropriate relief to be awarded.82 
                                            
75. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 21–22; Savage, supra note 3. 
76. See Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 1; Savage, supra note 3. 
77. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 1; see also 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012). 
78. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 11; see also 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). 
79. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 11–12. 
80. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 504(b)). 
81. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). 
82. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 19. 
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Lastly, the Supreme Court addressed the significance of the 
defense’s origins.83  The Supreme Court explained that “laches’ . . . principal 
application was, and remains, to claims of an equitable cast for which the 
Legislature has provided no fixed time limitation.”84  Before the 1938 merger 
of law and equity, laches was used to account for delay in the absence of a 
statute of limitations.85  Using this logic, the Supreme Court determined that 
if within the statute of limitations period, laches ought to be limited to 
extraordinary cases in which the plaintiff is seeking equitable relief.86 
In the opinion, Justice Ginsburg references the Sixth Circuit case, 
Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities Inc.,87 to demonstrate the extraordinary 
circumstances that would justify a curtailment of equitable relief at the outset 
of litigation.88  In Chirco, plaintiff Michael Chirco filed an infringement 
lawsuit alleging that Crosswinds Communities built its housing development 
by using his copyrighted architectural design without his permission. 89  
Chirco, however, had knowledge of Crosswinds’ plans to use his design well 
before the construction process began.90  In fact, Chirco waited to file his 
complaint until Crosswinds completed 168 of the 252 proposed units.91  The 
Supreme Court explained that even though the infringing act was within the 
three-year look-back period, this would be an instance where a laches 
defense ought to prevail, assuming the plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief.92 
2. The Significance of Petrella’s Victory 
The Supreme Court’s decision that laches could not be invoked as a 
bar to Petrella’s infringement claim is expected to have far-reaching 
implications on both copyright law and the entertainment industry as a 
whole.93  The general consensus among parties on both sides of the aisle is 
that this ruling will lead to a significant rise in copyright claims.94  Dylan 
Ruga—an intellectual property attorney at Steptoe and Johnson, LLC—
described the decision as a “boon for plaintiffs and a defeat for 
                                            
83. See id. at 12. 
84. Id. 
85. Id.; see also Bray, supra note 29, at 6. 
86. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 20. 
87. 474 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007). 
88. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 20; Chirco, 474 F.3d at 229. 
89. Chirco, 474 F.3d at 229. 
90. Id. at 230. 
91. Id. 
92. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 20; see also Chirco, 474 F.3d at 229. 
93. See Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 22; McCormick & Joyal, supra note 
9. 
94. See McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9. 
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defendants.”95  Ruga went on to explain that it will lead to “a flood of new 
lawsuits based on purported infringement of films, television programs, 
music, and other copyrighted material that were created decades ago but are 
still exploited today.”96 
Many within the entertainment industry have suggested that Petrella 
will have unintended consequences that go beyond the scope of litigation.97  
In an amicus brief jointly filed by DirecTV, Dish Network, Tivo, and others, 
these powerful corporations argued that a decision in favor of Petrella would 
chill innovation.98  In its brief, these industry leaders explained that creators 
of dual use technology products—such as iPods, DVRs, and DVD players—
are often sued for copyright infringement under theories of secondary 
liability.99  Having abolished the defense of laches, these companies suggest 
that they will be subject to endless liability, which will ultimately 
disincentivize the creators of these items from investing the money necessary 
to create these types of products.100 
The entertainment industry’s prime concern, however, is the degree 
of vulnerability that the Petrella decision has imposed upon them.101  In the 
majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg expressly rejected the defendant’s 
argument that a laches defense is necessary to prevent a copyright owner 
from sitting and waiting until an alleged infringers return on investment is 
substantial enough to file a lawsuit.102  Intellectual property lawyer, Brad 
Newberg, took issue with the Supreme Court’s stance suggesting that Justice 
Ginsburg is “saying that no matter how long it takes you, you should game 
the system.”103  Newberg went on to proclaim, “[she is] inviting plaintiffs to 
game the system, to wait until something like a key witness for the defense 
dies.” 104   Mark Haddard, a partner with Sidley Austin LLP, shared 
Newberg’s sentiment.105  Haddard explained: 
Writers “can now wait for decades to see if a film or a 
song that they think incorporates their work becomes a hit and a 
money-maker before suing to get their share of the profits . . .  The 
decision is likely to put pressure on studios to negotiate a license 
                                            
95. Donahue, supra note 4. 
96. Id. 
97. McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9; see also Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. 
at 22. 
98. McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id.; see also Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 22. 
102. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 16. 
103. Donahue, supra note 4. 
104. Id. 
105. See id. 
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early on with someone they think has a valid claim, to avoid 
having to pay more expensive claims later.”106 
On the other hand, many have argued that the Supreme Court’s 
decision will have an alternative effect.107  Some contend that eliminating a 
laches based defense is fair and just because it allows copyright owners with 
limited resources time to establish the means necessary to enter into a lawsuit 
against a large corporation.108  Proponents of the Supreme Court’s decision 
also argue that copyright owners finally find themselves on an even playing 
field with these big-time entertainment studios.109  In their amicus brief, the 
California Society of Entertainment Lawyers revealed that, in the Ninth 
Circuit, studios and networks have won every single copyright infringement 
case since 1990.110  The Supreme Court’s decision on May 19, 2014, will 
likely put an end to these types of disproportionate outcomes.111 
Ultimately, there is one thing that parties on both sides of the issue 
can agree upon, and that is the subsequent increase in lawsuits that will stem 
from this ruling.112  Agreeing with Mr. Ruga, Brad Newberg predicted that 
“[t]his will open the floodgates for copyright lawsuits going forward as 
masses of litigants from the ‘70s, ‘80s and ‘90s will likely come out of the 
woodwork.”113  Although legal scholars—like Ruga and Newberg—expected 
a significant rise in copyright lawsuits, nobody could have expected the 
immediate impact it would have.114  On May 31, 2014, a mere twelve days 
after the Petrella ruling, a complaint was filed against Led Zeppelin, alleging 
that the band stole the intro to its timeless classic, Stairway to Heaven.115 
                                            
106. Id. 
107. Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 21–22; McCormick & Joyal, supra note 
9. 
108. Donahue, supra note 4. 
109. McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9. 
110. Id. 
111. See Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 21–22; McCormick & Joyal, supra 
note 9. 
112. Donahue, supra note 4; McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9. 
113. Donahue, supra note 4. 
114. See Donahue, supra note 4; McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9. 
115. Complaint, supra note 9, at 7; see also Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 
21–22. 
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IV. RANDY CRAIG WOLFE TRUST V. LED ZEPPELIN 
A. Background 
1. Led Zeppelin 
Requiring little introduction, Led Zeppelin is known around the 
world for transforming rock ‘n’ roll music.116  Comparing their influence to 
the Beatles, the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame proclaims that their combination 
of power and intensity mixed with the delicacy of British folk rock 
“redefined rock in the Seventies and for all time.”117  Led by vocalist, Robert 
Plant, and guitarist, Jimmy Page, Led Zeppelin provided the world with 
timeless classics such as, Black Dog, D’yer Mak’er, and Whole Lotta 
Love.118  As many incredible songs as Led Zeppelin has released, no song 
has received quite the recognition and acclaim that Stairway to Heaven 
has.119  Despite never having been released as a single, the epic eight-minute 
song “remains [the] radio’s all-time most requested rock song.”120 
2. Randy “California” Wolfe 
Despite a fantastic nickname, Randy Wolfe is not very renowned 
within the classic rock community.121  At only fifteen years old, however, 
Randy Wolfe received the nickname Randy California from legendary 
guitarist and rock ‘n’ roll icon, Jimi Hendrix.122  As a matter of fact, before 
the Jimi Hendrix Experience came to fruition, Randy California played guitar 
alongside Hendrix in the band Jimmy James and the Blue Flames.123  After 
going their separate ways, Randy California moved to the West Coast and 
formed the psychedelic rock group, Spirit. 124   California’s exposure to 
                                            
116. Led Zeppelin Biography, ROCK & ROLL HALL OF FAME, http://
rockhall.com/inductees/led-zeppelin/bio/ (last visited May 12, 2015). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. See Sean Michaels, Led Zeppelin Accused of Stealing Stairway to Heaven 
Opening, THE GUARDIAN (May 19, 2014, 7:13 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/music/
2014/may/19/led-zeppelin-accused-stealing-stairway-to-heaven-opening. 
122. Id. 
123. Pierre Perrone, Obituary:  Randy California, THE INDEP., Jan. 17, 1997, at 
18. 
124. Id. 
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famous musicians continued while touring with his band.125  In 1968 and 
1969, Spirit played four shows with Led Zeppelin in Detroit, Atlanta, and 
Seattle.126  In addition to those four shows, Led Zeppelin actually opened up 
for Spirit in a 1968 concert at the Denver Auditorium Arena. 127  
Unfortunately, Spirit ended up being relatively unsuccessful, releasing only a 
few minor hits.128  Spirit’s less than moderate success in conjunction with a 
poor record deal, left Randy California bartering songs in exchange for food 
in the latter portion of his life.129  Before California’s untimely death in 1997, 
he reportedly told Listener Magazine that Zeppelin’s Stairway to Heaven 
was ripped off from a Spirit song.130 
3. Stairway to Heaven 
Legend has it, Jimmy Page created the masterpiece while doing what 
every other up-and-coming rock ‘n’ roll mogul would do, retreating to a 
secluded cottage in Wales without power or running water.131   After an 
arduous tour, Page decided to stay in the stone cottage known as Bron-Yr-
Aur.132  “At Bron-Yr-Aur, by candlelight, Page constructed the bones of 
what may well be the most popular, and valuable, rock ‘n’ roll song of all 
time, Stairway to Heaven.”133  Upon his return to England that winter, Page 
showcased the instrumental foundation of the song to the rest of the band.134  
“As Page plucked, singer Robert Plant seemed to channel another world as 
he wrote the lyrics” to what would eventually become Stairway to Heaven.135 
Stairway to Heaven was released to the public in November 1971 on 
Led Zeppelin’s fourth studio album, commonly referred to as Led Zeppelin 
IV.136  In 2008, Conde Nast Portfolio magazine published an article that 
                                            
125. See id.; Jeff Perlah, Led Zeppelin Accused of Stealing ‘Stairway to 
Heaven’ Opening, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 20, 2014, 1:31 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/led-
zeppelin-accused-stealing-stairway-heaven-opening-1587312. 
126. Perlah, supra note 125. 
127. Id. 
128. Vernon Silver, Stairway to Heaven:  The Song Remains Pretty Similar, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 15, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-05-
15/led-zeppelins-stairway-to-heaven-vs-dot-spirits-taurus-a-reckoning. 
129. Id. 
130. Perlah, supra note 125; see also Perrone, supra note 123 (explaining that 
Randy California drowned after saving his twelve-year-old son who was caught in a riptide 
off the coast of Molokai, Hawaii). 
131. Silver, supra note 128. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Silver, supra note 128. 
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estimated the song had earned over $562 million from royalties and record 
sales.137  While, the royalties are likely attributable to the radio demand of 
the song, the record’s success is reflective of the band’s refusal to release 
Stairway to Heaven as a single.138  More than 23 million copies of Led 
Zeppelin IV have been sold in the United States alone.139 
4. Taurus 
In 1968, three years prior to the release of Stairway to Heaven, Spirit 
released its self-titled debut album. 140   This album shares something in 
common with Led Zeppelin IV, but unfortunately for Spirit it is not the 
global success. 141   Instead, it is the music that sounds eerily similar. 142  
Spirit’s album boasts Taurus, a two minute and thirty-seven second 
instrumental piece that features an incredibly catchy plucked guitar line.143  
A guitar line that sounds awfully similar to the opening of Stairway to 
Heaven.144 
5. The Lawsuit 
Declaring it a long time coming, Philadelphia lawyer, Francis 
Malofiy, filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against Led Zeppelin on 
behalf of the estate of Randy California.145  In this case, a long time coming 
may be a bit of an understatement.146  The suit alleges that the nearly forty-
three-year-old song, Stairway to Heaven, was in part copied from Spirit’s 
1968 song Taurus.147  In addition to the songs at issue being over forty years 
old, it is clear that California was aware of the alleged infringement for a 
significant amount of time.148  In his 1997 interview with Listener Magazine, 
California was quoted,  
I [would] say it was a ripoff, . . . [a]nd the guys made millions of 
bucks on it and never said [t]hank you, never said, ‘[c]an we pay 
you some money for it?’  It [is] kind of a sore point with me.  
                                            
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Michaels, supra note 121. 
141. See id. 
142. Id. 
143. Complaint, supra note 9, at 6. 
144. See Michaels, supra note 121. 
145. Silver, supra note 128. 
146. Michaels, supra note 121. 
147. McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9. 
148. See Silver, supra note 128. 
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Maybe someday their conscience will make them do something 
about it.149 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella, it is likely that the 
estate of Randy California could not have imagined that it would have a 
viable claim, forty-three years after the alleged infringement. 150   Under 
Petrella, the estate can potentially recover up to three years worth of profit, 
dating back from May 31, 2014, as well as, attribution rights or injunctive 
relief.151 
Although this lawsuit may come as a surprise to fans, this is familiar 
territory for Led Zeppelin.152  Since the band’s debut, Led Zeppelin has dealt 
with several lawsuits that have required them to redistribute portions of 
royalties and alter credits to their songs.153  In the early 1970s, Zeppelin 
settled a dispute with music publisher Chester “Howlin’ Wolf” Burnett over 
The Lemon Song by extending a writing credit to Mr. Burnett.154  Around 
1979, Led Zeppelin’s chart-topping hit, Whole Lotta Love came under quite a 
bit of scrutiny when Shirley Dixon-Wilson, daughter of blues musician 
Willie Dixon, informed her father of the vast similarities between Whole 
Lotta Love and her father’s song You Need Love.155  Ultimately, Dixon filed 
suit and after an undisclosed settlement in 1987 the song now attributes 
credit to the members of Led Zeppelin as well as Willie Dixon.156  Another 
song that has been subject to infringement claims was Babe I’m Gonna 
Leave You.157  Babe I’m Gonna Leave You is a cover of a Joan Baez song 
that appeared on Led Zeppelin’s debut album.158  In 1960, Anne Bredon, a 
University of California-Berkeley student, wrote the song Babe, which 
became the song that both Joan Baez and Led Zeppelin covered.159  Upon 
discovering her song was enshrined in classic rock history, Bredon hired an 
attorney and the dispute was quickly resolved by a settlement agreement of a 
50-50 split in authorship.160  Lastly, the hit song Dazed and Confused was 
                                            
149. Id. 
150. See id.; Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, slip op. at 
22 (U.S. May 19, 2014). 
151. See McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9; Petrella, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 
5, 21. 
152. Michaels, supra note 121; Silver, supra note 128. 
153. Michaels, supra note 121; Silver, supra note 128. 
154. Silver, supra note 128. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Silver, supra note 128. 
160. Id. (explaining that Bredon was not a hard rock fan and did not learn of 
the infringement until the 1980s when her twelve year old son broke the news). 
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also in the spotlight recently when folk singer, Jake Holmes sued Jimmy 
Page and his record and publishing companies alleging copyright 
infringement of his 1967 song by the same name.161  Although both parties 
stipulated for a dismissal of the action in 2011, the credit for Dazed and 
Confused was changed to “Jimmy Page; inspired by Jake Holmes” the very 
next year.162 
Even though this most recent action brought against Led Zeppelin 
will likely result in a settlement, much like the above instances, the following 
sections of this Comment will analyze the merit of the infringement claim 
involving Stairway to Heaven.163 
B. Copyright Infringement of Music 
In order to prove a copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff is 
required to show that he or she is the owner of a valid copyright and that the 
defendant copied protected elements of the copyrighted work. 164   This 
Comment will not examine the ownership element because the complaint 
filed against Led Zeppelin claims that a copyright for the song Taurus, which 
lists Randy California as the author, was filed in 1968 and later renewed in 
1996. 165   Instead, it will focus on the complexities of proving that a 
defendant copied a plaintiff’s copyrighted work.166  The copying element of a 
musical infringement claim can be established through either direct or 
circumstantial evidence.167  Although direct evidence would on its face prove 
the copying element, it is rarely ever available because it requires some sort 
of admission by the defendant or a key witness.168  Since direct evidence is 
so unlikely, most musical copyright infringement cases have to be proved via 
circumstantial evidence of copying.169  To prove copying with circumstantial 
evidence, the estate of Randy Wolfe will be required to demonstrate that:  (1) 
                                            
161. Id. 
162. Id. (suggesting that details of the settlement were private). 
163. See Oliver Herzfeld, Spirit v. Led Zeppelin:  Analysis of the “Stairway to 
Heaven” Infringement Lawsuit, FORBES (May 21, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/oliverherzfeld/2014/05/21/spirit-v-led-zeppelin-analysis-of-the-stairway-to-heaven-
infringement-lawsuit/; infra Part IV.B. 
164. Emily Miao & Nicole E. Grimm, The Blurred Lines of What Constitutes 
Copyright Infringement of Music:  Robin Thicke v. Marvin Gaye’s Estate, WESTLAW J. 
INTELL. PROP., Nov. 13, 2013, at 3, 4. 
165. Complaint, supra note 9, at 7. 
166. See infra Part IV.B–C. 
167. Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
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Led Zeppelin had access to Spirit’s song Taurus; and (2) Led Zeppelin’s 
Stairway to Heaven is substantially similar to Taurus.170 
1. Access 
The courts are varied in their approach to determining whether the 
defendant had access to a plaintiff’s copyrighted work.171  The general rule, 
however, is that the plaintiff has the burden of showing “significant, 
affirmative and probative evidence” that the defendant had access to their 
work. 172   In Selle v. Gibb, 173  the Seventh Circuit explained that the 
“plaintiff’s work need only be available with some reasonable possibility of 
access.”174  Courts have proved access by circumstantial evidence through 
various different methods, including:  Widespread dissemination, a chain of 
events, or in the absence of the previous, courts may even infer access from 
striking similarity of the works.175 
A plaintiff can satisfy his or her burden of proving access if he or she 
can show that the allegedly infringed work was widely disseminated to the 
public.176  In Cholvin v. B & F Music Company,177 the plaintiff’s musical 
composition, When the Sun Bids the Sky Goodnight, was reproduced on two 
thousand copies of sheet music and released through four separate 
recordings, which resulted in more than two hundred thousand records 
sold.178  The Seventh Circuit held that in light of the evidence, an inference 
of access was proper because the widespread dissemination of the song 
allowed for it to be heard on the radio from coast to coast.179  However, in 
order for the court to make this type of inference, the dissemination must be 
significant.180  For example, in Jewel Music Publication Co. v. Leo Feist, 
                                            
170. See id. 
171. Karen Bevill, Note, Copyright Infringement and Access:  Has the Access 
Requirement Lost its Probative Value?, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 311, 322 (1999). 
172. Id. (quoting Intersong-USA v. CBS, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991)). 
173. 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984). 
174. Debra Presti Brent, The Successful Musical Copyright Infringement Suit:  
The Impossible Dream, 7 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 229, 234 (1990) (quoting Selle, 
741 F.2d at 901)). 
175. See id. at 234–38. 
176. Id. at 234; see also Cholvin v. B. & F. Music Co., 253 F.2d 102, 103–04 
(7th Cir. 1958). 
177. 253 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1958). 
178. Id. at 103. 
179. See id. at 103–04. 
180. See Jewel Music Publ’g. Co. v. Leo Feist, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 596, 598 
(S.D.N.Y. 1945). 
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Inc.,181 the court refused to infer access despite the fact that the plaintiff 
distributed four thousand copies of the song to broadcasting stations and 
artists, and sold 5626 copies of the song.182 
Evidence of widespread dissemination “may also support a theory of 
subconscious infringement.”183   The theory of subconscious infringement 
was first postured by Judge Learned Hand in the case Fred Fisher, Inc. v. 
Dillingham. 184   In Fred Fisher, Inc., Judge Hand inferred copying by 
implementing the following principal: 
 
Everything registers somewhere in our memories, and no one can 
tell what may evoke it. 
. . . . 
Once it appears that another has in fact used the copyright as the 
source of [their] production, [they have] invaded the author’s 
rights.  It is no excuse that in so doing [their] memory has played . 
. . a trick [on them].185 
 
In ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 186  the Second 
Circuit held that the district court’s finding of subconscious infringement 
was proper.187  In ABKCO Music, Beatles superstar George Harrison was 
sued for copyright infringement by Ronald Mack based on allegations that 
My Sweet Lord was copied from Mack’s He’s So Fine.188  Although the court 
genuinely believed that Harrison was unaware of the infringement, it held 
that there was sufficient evidence to support that Harrison had access to He’s 
So Fine due to its widespread distribution.189  The court further explained 
that this ruling, predicated upon subconscious copying, was proper because 
the courts are not concerned with a defendant’s intent; instead, its focus is 
whether the defendant had access to the infringed work.190 
Another means by which a plaintiff may establish access through 
circumstantial evidence is by showing a chain of events that allowed the 
defendant to have direct access to the copyrighted work.191  A prime example 
of this type of access can be found in the infringement suit against hip-hop 
                                            
181. 62 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). 
182. Id. at 598. 
183. Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4. 
184. 298 F. 145, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
185. Id. at 147–48. 
186. 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983). 
187. Id. at 998–99. 
188. Id. at 990. 
189. Id. at 998–99. 
190. Id. 
191. Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4. 
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mogul Kanye West.192  In this action, Vincent Peters, an aspiring rapper, 
“recorded and distributed a song entitled Stronger.”193  Peters’ search for an 
executive producer came to an end when Kanye West’s long-time friend and 
business manager, John Monopoly, expressed interest. 194   In addition to 
sending Monopoly a copy of the recording, Peters also attended a meeting 
with Monopoly, during which he played the song Stronger. 195   Despite 
having agreed to be Peters’ executive producer, Monopoly did not end up 
producing any music for Peters due to a funding issue.196  Less than a year 
after that meeting, Kanye West coincidentally released the hit song 
Stronger.197  Although there is no direct evidence that West had access to 
Vincent Peters’ song, the court used a chain of events theory to support the 
inference that West did indeed have access to the copyrighted work.198 
Although the general rule is that there must be a reasonable 
possibility of access and that access may not be conferred through 
speculation and conjecture, the Second Circuit has inferred access from an 
attenuated chain of events.199  In Gaste v. Kaiserman,200 the court held that 
the plaintiff’s theory, based on an attenuated chain of events, was sufficient 
to show access because a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant 
had access to the song.201 
In this case, [the plaintiff’s] principal theory of access 
was that [the] owner [of the defendant’s publishing company], 
Lebendiger, received a copy of Pour Toi in the 1950s, when [the 
plaintiff] was trying to market the song to subpublishers, and that 
[the defendant] obtained it from Lebendiger in 1973.  Georges 
Henon, a former employee of [the plaintiff] who had been 
responsible for distributing materials to foreign subpublishers, 
testified that he gave a recording of Pour Toi to Lebendiger in 
France in the 1950s and that he sent copies of the sheet music and 
record to Lebendiger in Brazil.202 
                                            
192. See Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2012). 
193. Id. at 631. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Peters, 692 F.3d at 631. 
198. Id. at 634. 
199. E. Scott Fruehwald, Copyright Infringement of Musical Compositions:  A 
Systematic Approach, 26 AKRON L. REV. 15, 21 (1992). 
200. 863 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1988). 
201. Id. at 1067. 
202. Id. at 1066. 
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The Second Circuit’s liberal finding of access, under what it 
acknowledged as an attenuated chain of facts, sets a relatively low burden for 
proving access.203 
2. Substantial Similarity 
Once a plaintiff makes a showing that the defendant had access to 
the copyrighted work, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the two works are 
substantially similar. 204   The seminal case with regard to musical 
infringement claims is Arnstein v. Porter.205  In Arnstein, the court created a 
two-prong test in its approach to determining whether the works are 
substantially similar.206  The first prong provides that “[i]f there is evidence 
of access . . . then the trier of the facts must determine whether the 
similarities are sufficient to prove copying, [and in this] analysis, dissection 
is relevant, and the testimony of experts may be received to aid the trier of 
the facts.”207  Once copying is established by the above method, the court 
will employ the second prong of the test to determine if the similarity is 
substantial enough to constitute an improper appropriation.208  The court will 
make this determination by applying the lay-listener standard, which allows 
the jury to make a determination on the similarity of the songs without taking 
into account dissection or expert testimony.209  The Arnstein court justified 
the second prong of the test by explaining:   
The plaintiff’s legally protected interest is not, as such, his 
reputation as a musician but his interest in the potential financial 
returns from his compositions which derive from the lay public’s 
approbation of his efforts.  The question, therefore, is whether 
defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing 
to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom 
such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully 
appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.210 
Dissatisfied with the Second Circuit’s two-prong test, the Ninth 
Circuit created its own formula to determine the legitimacy of a musical 
                                            
203. Fruehwald, supra note 199, at 21. 
204. Alice J. Kim, Expert Testimony and Substantial Similarity:  Facing the 
Music in (Music) Copyright Infringement Cases, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 109, 111 
(1995). 
205. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
206. Id. at 468. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 468–69. 
210. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473. 
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infringement claim.211  In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 212  the court determined whether two works were 
substantially similar by employing a two-part analysis:  An extrinsic test and 
an intrinsic test.213  Under the extrinsic test, the trier of fact will compare the 
similarity of the ideas behind the two works.214  A determination will be 
made by comparing the similarity of elements, between the two works, 
through expert testimony and analytical dissection of those works.215  If the 
trier of fact determines that there is a substantial similarity of ideas, then the 
court will apply the intrinsic test, which examines the work through the ears 
of an ordinary listener, without analytic dissection or expert testimony.216  
Although, the Ninth Circuit created this two-part analysis to distinguish itself 
from the two-prong test developed in Arnstein, in practice, the two methods 
became very similar.217 
3. Access and Substantial Similarity 
Although a plaintiff typically needs to prove both access and 
substantial similarity, it is important to note how courts interpret these 
elements in conjunction with one another.218  Some courts will “apply an 
inverse-ratio rule . . . between access” and substantial similarity, which 
suggests that “the more access the defendant had to the copyrighted work, 
the less similarity” the plaintiff will have to show to prove copying. 219  
Additionally, some courts have gone as far to waive the access requirement if 
“the two works are strikingly similar.” 220   These courts will make an 
inference that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s copyrighted work if 
the plaintiff’s showing of similarity is so strong that it could only have been 
achieved “through copying and not by coincidence,” accident, or 
independent creation.221 
                                            
211. Kim, supra note 204, at 113–14. 
212. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). 
213. Id. at 1164. 
214. Id. (explaining that ideas include specific criteria that can be listed). 
215. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004). 
216. See Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4. 
217. Margit Livingston & Joseph Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music:  
Determining Whether What Sounds Alike is Alike, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH L. 227, 260–61 
(2013); see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
218. See Livington & Urbinato, supra note 217, at 264. 
219. Id.; Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4. 
220. Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4. 
221. Id. 
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C. Did Led Zeppelin Steal Its Stairway to Greatness? 
In an interview for Light and Shade:  Conversations, Jimmy Page 
stated that “‘I always tried to bring something fresh to anything that I used.’ . 
. . ‘I always made sure to come up with some variation.  In fact, I think in 
most cases, you would never know what the original source could be.’”222  
Page likely hopes the trier of fact will share his sentiment.223 
In order to prevail on its copyright infringement claim, the estate of 
Randy California will first be tasked with the burden of showing that Led 
Zeppelin had access to Spirit’s song, Taurus. 224   Since an admission of 
copying is highly unlikely, the estate of Randy California will almost 
certainly have to prove access by means of circumstantial evidence.225  The 
plaintiff’s counsel will likely be able to make a strong showing of access by 
implementing both a theory of widespread dissemination and by 
demonstrating direct evidence of access through a chain of events. 226  
Although, Spirit’s fame and notoriety pales in comparison to that of Led 
Zeppelin, the estate of Randy California will likely assert a widespread 
dissemination argument based upon the relative success of Spirit’s self-titled 
album that contained the song Taurus.227  Spirit’s album rose to thirty-one on 
Billboard’s Top 200 list in 1968.228  Randy California’s strongest theory of 
access, however, will be shown through a chain of events.229  The argument 
that Led Zeppelin had access to Spirit’s Taurus will center around the five 
concerts the two bands played together prior to the creation of Stairway to 
Heaven, but subsequent to Spirit’s release of Taurus.230  Like in Peters v. 
West,231 where the court inferred access based upon the plaintiff’s interaction 
with the defendant’s close friend and manager, an inference of access will 
certainly be present in this case because Led Zeppelin likely heard Taurus 
while being physically present at a minimum of five Spirit concerts.232 
After making a showing of access, the parties will move onto the 
much more litigious element, substantial similarity.233  In order to make a 
                                            
222. Silver, supra note 128. 
223. See id. 
224. See supra Part IV.B. 
225. See Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4. 
226. Brent, supra note 174, at 234–38. 
227. See Spirit:  Awards, ALL MUSIC, http://www.allmusic.com/album/spirit-
mw0000653465/awards (last visited May 12, 2015). 
228. Id. 
229. See supra notes 178–82 and accompanying text. 
230. See supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text. 
231. 692 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2012). 
232. Id. at 633–34; Herzfeld, supra note 163. 
233. See Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4. 
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determination on this element, an expert will be brought in to break down the 
works into elements and compare those elements to determine if the works 
are indeed substantially similar.234  If the experts make a convincing showing 
that protectable elements of Taurus are substantially similar to Stairway to 
Heaven, the trier of fact will then be required to determine if the guitar 
arpeggio opening of Stairway to Heaven and the instrumental track, Taurus, 
are similar enough to rise to the level of improper appropriation.235  The jury 
will be required to make this determination of improper appropriation based 
upon its untrained ears, without taking into account the experts’ dissection or 
testimony.236   As a consequence of the ambiguity behind the substantial 
similarity test and the lack of case law, due to pre-trial settlements, this 
Comment will not attempt to infer what the jury’s ultimate determination 
will be.237  However, it is important to note that if the Pennsylvania court 
chooses to adopt the inverse-ratio rule, Randy California’s estate would have 
a significantly reduced burden of proving substantial similarity because its 
evidence that Led Zeppelin had access to Taurus is very strong.238 
V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Comment was to demonstrate the immediate and 
long-term impact the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer will have on copyright and patent law.239  Had it not been 
for this landmark decision, Led Zeppelin likely would not be facing a lawsuit 
for a song the band released almost forty-three years ago.240  Even if the 
estate of Randy California did file the lawsuit, absent the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Petrella, Led Zeppelin would have been confident in their 
likelihood to prevail based upon California’s unreasonable delay in filing the 
lawsuit.241  However, this decision in Petrella has drastically changed the 
landscape of copyright law. 242   As intellectual property attorney Brad 
                                            
234. Id. (explaining that these elements can include pitch, melody, lyrics, 
cadence, etc.). 
235. See Herzfeld, supra note 163. 
236. Id.; see also Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 4. 
237. See Miao & Grimm, supra note 164, at 5 (explaining that very few 
copyright case actually go to trial). 
238. See Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 217, at 264; Miao & Grim, supra 
note 164, at 4; Herzfeld, supra note 163. 
239. See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, slip op. at 21 
(U.S. May 19, 2014). 
240. McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9. 
241. Id. (explaining that the lawsuit “would likely have been time-barred prior 
to Petrella”); see also Petrella, No. 12-1215, slip op. at 21–22. 
242. Petrella, No. 12-1215, slip op. at 21; McCormick & Joyal, supra note 9. 
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Newberg suggested, litigants from decades past will continue to come out of 
the woodwork to pursue lawsuits that all parties involved likely thought 
dead.243 
 
                                            
243. Donahue, supra note 4. 
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